The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1947. Hungary

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25206, 10 June 1947, Page 6

The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1947. Hungary

While saying that the State Department was fully investigating the political changes in Hungary, President Truman anticipated the result by describing the overthrow of Mr Nagy as “ a terrible outrage ”. It might have been better to wait a little. The antecedents of this affair are too complicated to justify a snap judgment; and some of the evidence does not square well with that one. After the 1945 elections, which gave the Smallholders a majority of 60 per cent, of votes, the Coalition Government made a beginning of democratic reform with an inadequate but significant land measure. The parties of the Left were encouraged, by success and by Russia, to press their aims; their pressure produced the reaction of an underground conspiracy of the Right. This was exposed; and the exposure implicated the reactionary wing of the Smallholders, including Bela Kovacs, the party’s general secretary, certainly no fascist, ' certainly an honest land-reformer, but, if not certainly then in a very probable general estimate, a tough opponent of the Communists ■ and a very capable hand at thwarting their administrative experiments. So much he admitted himself, though he denied conspiring to overthrow the Coalition. The sequel was the Smallholders’ reorganisation, on the one hand, specifically designed (in Mr Nagy’s words) to “ harmonise their political views ", with those of the Left parties; on the other, the crisis had made it possible for the Left to demand, with a much better show of reason than before, that new elections should be held, anticipating the due date by two years. In March, Mr Nagy agreed to have new electoral registers prepared for an election in *May; it has also been reported that his “ advisers ”, looking to the stage when Russian withdrawal would leave the Left parties without their sure prop, were thinking of

reconstructing the Government without them. This report, not ruled out by “ The Times ”, is on the face of it consistent with a situation in which the Left parties were urging whole-hog action to nationalise the banks, which before the war exercised a joint monopoly control of most of Hungary’s industry, in furtherance of Hungary’s three-year economic plan, xhile the Smallholders were hanging back. They wanted " documentary proof ” that this measure was necessary to the success of the plan—proof which, the’ “ Manchester Guardian ” said on June 2, “ the pre-war record of the “ banks would appear to offer . . .

“ to anyone concerned, as the Small- “ holders claim to be, With raising “ the standard of living of the peas- ‘ ants of Hungary”. The Smallholders also, according to the Minister of Transport, Mr Gero, were afraid that nationalisation would cut Hungary off from “the possibility “ of a foreign loan ”. That is the situation in which Mr Nagy fell. It has been deliberately described, above, so as to bring out all the facts that suggest the fall of a leader who failed to carry out his own policy and to command further support, even in his own party. He promised new elections; he promised closer accord with the Left groups; he fulfilled neither promise. He may have been moving—constitutionally, but not consistently—to establish an untrammelled Smallholder regime-. With this interpretation the result, on the face of it, is quite consistent. The Cabinet changes have been few, and they leave the party balance unaltered. His successor’s statement boils downto this, that Mr Nagy had fallen out of touch with his party and his colleagues; and that he undertakes Mr Nagy’s promises to seek harmony with the Left and to hold free elections. What, then, is disturbing? Unfortunately, more than enough. That Mr Nagy’s fall was precipitated by Russian action, and is curiously timed with action against the Opposition leader in Bulgaria. That Mr Rakosi, the Communist Deputy-Prime Minister, claims that the “ brave iron fist ” of the Communist Party grabbed “ the reins of “government”; which can only mean that it regards the Smallholders now as mere puppets in office. That indistinct charges of “conspir- “ acy ” are preferred, in a too familiar fashion, to any specific ones that might be Brought against Mr Nagy. That the kind of evidence which Britain has reasonably asked for is refused. That this kind of preparation for “free” elections points to very carefully prepared electionr indeed. The light of these facts can be made less alarming only by a conciliatory and frank reply from • Moscow to Washington’s Note; and such a reply would be as surprising as it would be welcome. Meanwhile, strangely enough, the darkest comment on developments has not been made; yet it is obvious. It has been widely said that Russia is preparing to leave a friendly, Communist regime behind, when the time to withdraw from Hungary comes. It is surely far nearer the truth to say that, if Russia does intend to set up a Communist regime, she has no intention of withdrawing at all; which means, no intention of withdrawing from Austria, and none of concluding an Austrian peace settlement. It would not be worth Russia’s while to set up a Communist regime which would collapse as soon as Russia withdrew; and Russia can remain indefinitely in Hungary, as a “ communications ’’ country, only while the occupation of Austria continues indefinitely. Mr Nagy’s fall, therefore, may signify one advance further to the east-west division of Europe. There will be no undoing such a division until the Truman doctrine is successfully developed on its positive side, towards a firm and friendly I understanding with Russia.