ARMY AND NAVY CRITICISED

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25085, 17 January 1947, Page 7

ARMY AND NAVY CRITICISED

“Tried To Destroy R.A.F.”

BOOK BY FORMER BOMBER CHIEF (From A. W. MITCHELL, Special Correspondent. N.Z.P.A.) LONDON, January 15. “For nearly 20 years I watched the Army and Navy, both singly and in concert, engineer one deliberate attempt after another to destroy the Royal Air Force. Time after time they were within a hair’s breadth of success, and time after time Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard, and Lord Trenchard alone, saved us,’’ writes Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Harris, former Command-er-in-Chief, Bomber Command, in his book, “Bomber Offensive.” just published.

“If they had succeeded they would have abolished our air power as they succeeded in abolishing our tank power, while retaining the Camberley drag hunt and, as the pinnacle of our sea power, those scarcely more useful battleships whose bones now lie where air power so easily consigned them, littering the floors of the ocean or obstructing the harbours of the world. “And, had they succeeded in suppressing our Air Force, we should have entered the war with one fighter as we entered it with one tank, we would have lost the Battle of Britain and the Nazis would have ruled Europe—if not the world —for centuries.”

Crews’ Courage Referring to the bomber crews, Sir Arthur Harris writes: “There is no parallel in warfare to such courage and determination in the face of danger over so prolonged .a period, a danger which at times was so great that scarcely one man in three could expect to survive his tour of 30 operations.” He regrets that they were refused a Bomber Campaign Medal "although every clerk, butcher, or baker in the rear, of the armies overseas had a campaign medal.” Interesting are Sir Arthur Harris’s comments on the lack of appreciation by Navy and Army chiefs of the use of air .power until the closing stages of the war,-his criticisms of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, his despair of the Civil Service, and of “getting anything done through the proper channels in reasonable time.” The book is full of such phrases as “sailors being complete amateurs in air matters,” and he makes the strik-

ing claim: “The fact that the Air Force was sinking more submarines than the Navy never seemed to get published at all, just as the fact that Bomber Command sank more German naval ships has never got out.” He refers to battleships as “the most expensive and most utterly useless weapons employed in the whole of the last war.” He criticises the “cavalry mind of the Army,” and its love of horses, and he declares: “Unfortunately they are too apt to develop the mentality of the animals they are so enthusiastic about.” He makes an exception where Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery is concerned, and quotes fully the message of congratulation which he received from the field-mar-shal after the attack on Caen.

Looking ahead, he agrees with the Srinciple of co-operation, but only on le lines of abolishing all three services and having one defence force, and he adds: "The whole key to our defence is the encouragement of science and scientists. Whoever gets far enough ahead in science will prevail—for thfe time being.” “End of Air Warfare”

Sir Arthur Harris sees in atomic energy the end of air warfare, not because it is too terrible to use : but because it can be used with infinitely greater effect without aircraft at all. He believes that the roftket, in all its forms, is already an out of date weapon. Sir Arthur Harris is a frank and open-hearted admirer of Mr Churchill and General Smuts, and he has a special word of praise for Air Marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane, former Chief of Staff of the R.N.Z.A.F.. who was “a most brilliant enthusiastic, hardworking leader of men.”

In recounting the various stages of the Bomber Command‘d work, Sir

Arthur Harris also mentions that the Germans abandoned the London blitz after they had lost 260 bombers in one month from crashes on their return to their own airfields. By 1942 the Bomber Command was “still too small to achieve anything lasting, and it was also poorly equipped.” At flight the bomber crews were, “hardly ever able to find their targets.” It was a long and difficult task to increase efficiency. Navigational guides were slow in production and development. The weather was always one of the greatest factors to overcome. At one period, as fast as squadrons were raised they were used, not against Germany, but on transfer to the Middle East or other commands. But a definite advance was made with the first 1000-bomber raid on Cologne, which had an immediate effect on the whole of German air strategy, resulting in a drastic modifications of Germany’s aircraft production plan, “which eventually stripped the German army ef all air cover and of all close support from the air. Later came the successful strategic bombing, the battles of the Ruhr and Berlin, until. the Bomber Command switched to its pre-invasion campaign and the offensive against oiL”