China

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24988, 24 September 1946, Page 6

China

It is at best difficult to measure the complexities of the KuomintangCommunist cleavage and the prospects of a reconciliation from the cablegrams which come sporadically from China to tell of gains and losses in the field by one or other of the factions or of “ifnity” conferences which, early or late, have failed in their purpose. We print elsewhere on this page this morning, from the New York “Nation ”, an article which usefully assesses the problem as it existed early last month, eight months after President Truman had made his welcome declaration of the need for a democratic coalition government in China and of his Administration’s intention to make American aid in China's reconstruction conditional on the achievement of political and military unity. The “ Nation’s ” survey is depressing. It is not questioned that. President Truman’s envoy, General George Marshall, has worked with the greatest diligence and sincerity to arrange a political accommodation. Yet American policy, as the “ Nation ” sees it, has rendered an intractable problem even more intractable. So far from bringing the factions nearer, it has encouraged in their stubborn intransigence the conservative elements who dominate the political machinery of the Kuomintang and constitute at present some of the Government’s strongest supporters; and it it high time to end a mischief that threatens to divide China permanently into two camps —time, as the “Nation” sums up, for America to go home from China. It may still be thought, however, that final, irremediable failure has been seen too soon. On August 10, a few days after the “ Nation ” article was published, General Marshall and Dr. Stuart, who latterly had become associated in the political negotiations on his appointment as America’s Ambassador to China,

seemed also to have confessed failure. The complete cessation of hostilities throughout China, they said, appeared impossible; and some days later Dr. Stuart observed that there was nothing further that American mediation could do—it was “up to the two Chinese fac- “ tions to fipd a solution Yet General Marshall and Dr. Stuart, as appeared a fortnight ago, have not given up hope; for they then obtained the assent of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist leaders to the appointment of two Nationalists and two Communists, under Dr. Stuart’s chairmanship, to discuss the formation of the State Council which would be the mainspring of the projected coalition government. According to the Chungking-Yenan agreement made last February, the council is to consist of 40 members, half from the Kuomintang and half from the other parties, and its constitution is designed to mark the formal ending of the Kuomintang dictatorship and the beginning of a democratic system. It may be rash to suppose that Kuomintang right-wing opposition to the working out of the February agreement will be any less stubborn to-day. On the other hand, even the most violent reactionary cannot have misread Washington’s decision, at the end of August, to halt the transfer to China of surplus Army aircraft and combat material until civil strife has ended. Nor, so long as American plans for the economic rehabilitation of China and the reorganisation of China’s armed forces by an American military mission remain in suspense, can it be said that those in the Kuomintang who have blocked agreement may safely continue to do so.