WHY IT’S HARD TO BE SURE OF U.S.S.R. And

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24987, 23 September 1946, Page 4

WHY IT’S HARD TO BE SURE OF U.S.S.R. And

RUSSIAN POLICY

In this article in the "Manchester Guardian" MAX BELOW viewed "I Chose Freedom," newly published in the United A..* by Victor Kravchenko, the Soviet Purchasing Commission who six months ago abandoned his duties in WashingtJ?* (Published by Arrangement.)

On April 1, 1946, Victor Kravchenko, an official of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington abandoned his mission and accepted the hardships and hazards of .being a refugee from the, Soviet Union. In these circumstances there attaches to the somewhat melodramatically entitled book he has now published a natural interest and a natural suspicion. It is indeed a necessary consequence of totalitarianism that by discouraging normal forms of contact and information it gives an enhanced importance to the abnormal and the casual. Because Soviet officials are unapproachable. unwilling to go outside the official line on the business strictly in hand, a book subtitled “The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official ’ commands an attention which one of Lord Halifax’s underlings could, not have hoped to receive for a similar work. One must take it that the famous firm of publishers who have sponsored this book are convinced of the honesty of the author’s intentions and of his personal integrity. And the impression which it makes on the reader confirms their trust. Child of the Revolution It is the story of a personal Odyssey, the more painful In that the author, born in 1905 of working class and peasant parentage, son of an active combatant in the struggle against Tsardom, and a natural beneficiary of the Revolution, took so long to come to the decision to make a break with the regime and did so at such obvious cost of personal and patriotic ties. For those who argue with a curious fatalism that Russians as such have an inborn predisposition for despotism and that Russia had no choice except between Tsardom and the more rigorous and efficient absolutism of single-party rule Kravchenko’s book will prove difficult material to assimilate. Over much of the ground covered in the author’s narrative we have other guides who enable one to evaluate what must be regarded from many points of view as a typical autobiography of a member of the new Soviet ruling class. What is new is of psychological rather than of sociological interest—the picture of the collectivisation of agriculture and the subsequent famine by a party activist sent to stimulate local zeal m the refractory districts, the supply of prison or camp labour by the N.K.V.D. as seen by a factory manager, the story of the great “purge” as it affected not the publicised figures of the Moscow trials but a comparatively minor party member who fell under suspicion and yet survived. It is as Sroducts of experiences of this kind lat one must learn to estimate the dour leaders of the regime with whom our negotiators have to deal. The Soviet-German Pact At the outbreak of war in 1939 Kravchenko was in charge of building a new pipe-rolling factory at Kemorovo, in Western Siberia; in 1940 he was placed in charge of a factory ©ear Moscow. His impressions were thus those of a responsible executive. He shared with his fellow party members in the complete bewilderment occasioned by the news of the Soviet-Ger-man Pact —a bewilderment Which turned to something like satisfaction when it appeared as though Russia might by this means be Qble to avoid war. What is mon* significant is that Hitler’s attack came likewise withoutany psychological preparation or any forewarning in the shape of a new slant in Soviet propaganda. From this fact and from what he observed of the Soviet economy and of SovietGerman economic contacts Kravchenko does not accept the view that the Soviet-German Pact was intended to gain only a temporary respite during which Russia could the better prepare for war. The crushing losses which Russia suffered during the early part of the war, the terrifying lack of equipment to which Krav-

chenko bears detailed witnew extraordinary necessary to solidity the regime—these confirm the that the Marxist prophets Kremlin saw no farther into mJ purposes than the bourseX 1 51 of the Western democracies JS* period of military service KrJS? received a high appointment** supply side of the SovnarlSL’SJ R.S.F.S.R. a position he towards the end of 1942 whwik? gan to undergo the long and process of investigation which sidered necessary before anv 0? citizen is considered Sql enough to be submitted to thTZ3 and temptations of representi? ll country in a foreign caoitlw vironment. h ■ Three points of primary u. emerge from this last portfan ’Jr book. The first concerns nuinJ? student of Soviet governments clear from Kravchenko’s (feLJ* that the Sovnarkom of stituent Republic (like fhatL* U.S.S.R. itself) is quite inami/ 1 pared to a “Cabinet” in a PmSLS tary system. It is an adnvS3 machine, not a political bodrTß the case of the R.S.F.S.R c Republic—the machine is almaa iS tinguishable in its working fn*! Sovnarkom of the U.S.S.R. Sal! for Soviet “federalism”! The Party I In the second place, EgMthu shows in greater detail hitherto been available thaT-J by which the administrative is controlled at every level by responding organ of the through the “special deDartSnwi the N.K.V.D. and its successor J party hierarchy within anyEvki stitution need not necessarily ha same as the official hierarchy this applies, for instance, to Soviet 13 sions abroad it has an obvSg|s ance to those who are called have contact with the Soviet ISJ ities. Third, he demonstrates how J may be the gulf between ths J “line” at one moment as expouaii the inner hierarchy and the it may be thought advisable to esaJ it to the rank and file through gj and other means. For this asserts, it is not possible toad Soviet • policy at any moment fl by a study of the Krernlfa’i actions and of the Soviet pml radio. As related by Kravchenkow development of Soviet policy j June, 1941, this general prindiilil molishes the foundations of tted gut forward by those interydfri oviet foreign policy who seeltal outcome of a conflict betwwa fl schools of thought—the one facliMil revolutionary isolationism aad | other to genuine coilaboratioa. M policy was and has remained loi and homogeneous; what has the level at which it was befog fori preted. j Thus for Kravchenko on the there was no moment at which m picions of the intentions of the M Powers were abandoned, no monad which faith in the Marxist weakened, and no moment at whigi permanent deviation from “Lenißii towards “traditionalism” “nationsM or “old-fashioned imperialuw’’ tj seriously contemplated by ttawl power. Where deviations wers M they were made in the teue Las spirit—compromises with iMCm be abandoned when cireumstan«H mitted. Unless we can measure fl dynamic faith of the Soviet rulfof fl —a faith tested by fire and fortfflfl privilege—our dealings with the® sians cannot but be marked by fifl disillusion such as the Western roj suffer from to-day. Those whf d/sn the testimony of KravdMfo uj others as “mere anti-Scnw w ganda” do little service totMfiW* peace. - : 1