SUEZ CANAL DEFENCE

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24870, 9 May 1946, Page 5

SUEZ CANAL DEFENCE

Mr Eden added that the truth was that the interests of the two countries were as one. The presence of some troops in Egypt, not necessarily in Cairo, was called for for the effective defence of the Suez Canal, and he had never heard this challenged by any Egyptian statesman. The Egyptians did not like British troops in Cairo, but they never said that the presence of British troops in Egypt was unthinkable.

Mr Attlee had made a concession, continued Mr Eden, which would make it physically impossible to carry out Britain’s obligations unless the Egyptians themselves later said “We welcome your gesture, but you can still keep troops in the Canal Zone for our defence.” He did not believe that that was the correct method to set about negotiations. The matter was not one in which Britain alone was concerned.

“Can Mr Attlee assure us to-night that the Dominions were consulted before this announcement, and agreed to its terms and timing? Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa made matchless contributions in blood and effort for the defence of the canjil,” If Britain and the Dominions agreed to some alternative method of defending the canal, the House ought to be tow. ‘But if there is no alternative proposal we cannot but condemn an act which appears to place in jeopardy an essential artery of Imperial life at the very outset of negotiations.’*. The defence of the canal was a British and Egyptian interest which had stood the test of time and war. The fundamental principle of the British and Egyptian treaty appeared to have been thrown cv ®r any substitute. vj £ttlee, replying, said that Mr "fen had succeeded in obtaining the easting treaty in 1936 when the world « ®4 e , a dy cloudy with aggression, reason British and Egyptian relations were more favourable than previously. That treaty had opened jnth a statement that the military ocd'flpjuon of Egypt was at an end. . came after a great many years 5. u j had been in Egypt, and we naa said we were going and had

not gone. One must remember that these things remain in the minds of the Egyptian people,” continued Mr Attlee.

Provision was made then for the protection of the Suez Canal and the evacuation of troops from Cairo, but the war came, ana so the troops had to be kept in Cairo and great installations built up. Mr Attlee said that he agreed that the Egyptians should remember that Britain and the Dominions had rendered great services to Egypt, saving her from aggression, but it did not alter tha fact that the continued presence of troops in Cairo and elsewhere affected Egyptian Nationalist sentiment, which was perfectly understandable. “The fact remains that there is suspicion which we must dissipate. The idea is strong in Egypt still that we want to occupy the country. We are seeking a treaty of friendship and alliance. The strength of such a treaty does not rest on standing out on the terms of some written document, but on real friendship among peoples.” Mr Churchill Intervened: “That is exactly what was said about the Irish ports.’ 1

, Mr Attlee: The right honourable gentleman made that treaty. Mr Attlee went on to say that' the British proposal was made because all the advice available to the Government indicated that in order that the alliance should continue with mutual confidence and success it was essential to take as a point of departure the complete freedom and independence of Egypt. “Egyptians to-day do not consider that freedom is theirs so long as foreign troops are retained, even by treaty, on Egyptian soil. We are satisfied that the proposals to Egypt really offer us the best means of getting agreement on the facilities we should need on Egyptian soil to make the alliance a reality.” Mr Attlee said that the proposals would enable Britain in the case of emergency to come effectively to Egypt’s assistance.