TRIAL OF AZI LEADERS

Press, Volume LXXXI, Issue 24747, 12 December 1945, Page 7

TRIAL OF AZI LEADERS

German Plans For Aggression SECRET PAPERS READ (N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) (Rec. 7 p:m.) NUREMBERG, Dec. 10. Mussolini's decision to declare war on the United States pleased King Victor Emmanuel This was disclosed in excerpts from the diary of Count Ciatio, the former Italian Foreign Minister, which were produced to-day by the United States prosecutor (Mr Sidney Alderman) at the trial of Nazi leaders in Nuremberg. The diary revealed that four days before Pearl Harbour, the Japanese Ambassador visited Mussolini and told him that the Japanese and United States relations had reached a dead end. He asked Italy to declare war immediately hostilities commenced. Mussolini agreed. Active planning for the invasion of Russia was gbing on four months before the Germans actually attacked, according to documents which Mr Alderman introduced at the trial to-day. The minutes of a conference between Hitler and his leading generals in February, 1941, showed that Keitel declared: "The Russians are superior in numbers and we in quality. In an estimate of personalities, Marshal' Timoshenko is the only outstanding figure." A secret German military document said that mobilisation against Russia should be camouflaged as long as possible, and when it was no longer possible to hide it, it should be explained as a deceptive diversion from the invasion of England. Invasion of Russia

Another document outlined how the apparent preparations for the Invasion of England were stepped ub as camouflage for the impending invasion of Russia. "Extensive measures for deception of friend and foe are a necessary prerequisite to the success of the operations," it stated. The complete time-table for the attack against Russia disclosed that the Germans withdrew six infantry divisions from the west, leaving a force consisting of 40 infantry divisions, one motorised division, one police division, and one armoured brigade facing Eng-i land. The forces available for the Russian operation Vereao infantry, one cavalry, and 17 armoured divisions, 12 motorised infantry, nine lines of communication, and two reserve infantry divisions, and three air fleets. Describing the cold, calculated plan to strip. Russia of food and other necessities and leave the victims to starve, Mr Alderman read Goering's four-year plan for the government of Russia which Hitler's conference approved in February, 1941. The document stated: "The first object is to avoid the destruction of supplies and secure, the removal of important goods. The second is administration and exploitation."

Keitel, according to the minutes, told the conference that the projected attack against Gibraltar through Spain had been abandoned because German artillery was moving eastward. Hitler considered that Sweden would come in against Russjsl at a price. He proposed giving Sweden the Aafand' Islands. Hitler told ' the conference that when Operation Barbarossa (the attack on Russia) began the wdrld would hold its breath and make no ccmment. ■■■.:■".

On May 1 he sent but a directive naming June 22 as the date for the invasion. The directive was accompanied by a survey of the relative strength of the Russian and German armies and an estimated course of the bsttle. Presumably, there would Be violent battles on the frontiers for up to five weeks, after which weaker resistance could be expected, but htf added-a warning: "A Russian will fight on an appointed spot to his last breath." "Systematic Plunder"

Mr Alderman said that the Germans planned systematic, plunder, fully aware that it would mean, starvation for millions. The .Nazis translated their greed for raw materials into'a right They not only planned. to make war against a neighbour. with whom they had pledged their word, but they also planned to strip their neighbour of her food, facilities, and 'all her means of livelihood.

The prosecutor i read Hitler's orders for the Germanisation of Russia arid the western territories., Ruthenia would become a Reich commissariat and a Germanised protectorate. The Ukraine would become an indepen- 1 dent State in alliance with Germany. Caucasia would, become a federal State with, a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put its own.house in order. ' ■ .....-

Mr Alderman quoted from a document assessing the. military situation which could be expected in Russia. "There is no doubt that many millions will starve to death if we take out of Russia the things needed," it said. 7 Rosenberg commented on this subject: "We see no reason' for any obligation to feed the Russian peoples with the products of the captured territory. We know that this is a" harsh necessity bare of any feeling. It is sure that the future will hold very hard {years for the Russians." '

Mr Alderman read excerpts from a German .naval diary: showing that the Russians kept pressing the "Germans for, plans of the battleship Bismarck and a number of cruisers, but Hitler continually hedged. The German naval attache in Moscow in April reported consjderable rumours abpiit the danger of a Russian-German war. He added that the British Ambassador I predicted that war would break out oh jJune 22. I Negotiations with Japan I Dealing with Germany's machinaI tions td induce Japan to enter the war, IMr Alderman .introduced a series of German political documents showing that von Ribbehtrop was continually prodding Japan to seize Singapore, emphasising that she would . never again have such an opportunity. Von Ribbentrop, in March, 1940, told Matsuoka that Japan need not fear Russia, because, if Russia attacked when Japan was involved in the Pacific, Germany would smash Russia immediately. Von Ribbentrop added that the British. Fleet was tied up in the Mediterranean and could not be a powerful force in the Pacific. Matsuoka expressed the fear that the United States might come in if Japan attacked Singapore, but von Ribbentrop reassured him, saying- that the United States could not do anything in the Pacific once Singapore wasr taken. Von Ribbentrop asked Matsuoka to bring maps of Singapore so that Hitler could advise him on the best method of attack, and he promised him alf the expert assistance Germany could offer. Raeder, in March, 1940, at a conference of the German chiefs of staff, said that Japan would attack British territory in the Pacific only if Germany was prepared to make a landing in England. Raeder added that Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her forces on spurring Japan to act immediately. Keitel, on March 4, 1941, issued the following instructions: "The Fuehrer has ordered collaboration with Japan. It will be aimed at inducing Japan to intervene actively in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the focus of United States interest will be shifted to the Pacific. Japan's prospects of success will be better the earlier she intervenes. The Fuehrer does not wish any reference to be made to the Plan Barbarossa." ' . Mr Alderman introduced a telegram from von Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, dated July 10, 1941, urging pressure to induce Japan to attack. It would be impossihje that Japan should not solve the matter' of Vladivostok with the collapse of Russia. Britain's collapse was only a matter of time, said von Ribbentrop, and the United States-would then be isolated from the rest of the world. Von Ribbentrop again met Matsuoka on April 5, 1941, and told him that Germany had already won the war. The world would realise this by the end of the year. If Japan entered the war, victory would be hastened. Raeder consulted with the Jaoanese about naval possibilities in the Pacific, said Mr Alderman. Raeder told the

Japanese that the British Navy had its «Jf«? ™& U m its home wa ters and Mediterranean that it would be Pacific. United States submarines were sa the Japanese need not bother, about them at all. The Japanese navy would be able to mantrouble American Nay y without Matsuoka told the Nazis that he was doing everything to reassure the British about Singapore and to appear friendly towards the British in words and acts. Von Ribbentrop, in March, 1943, complained, through the new Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, that Japan was behaving defensively, while Germany was warring against Britain and the United States almost alone. ! »-m? Alderman quoted abetter from i iSJrt r .?^ ead 5 u i rte " d^te <i October 10, , 1940: "The Fuehrer is at present coni ' jsidering the question of the' occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the prosecution of the war against the United States at a later date " Goering speaking in July, 1938. said: I am still without a- bomber capable of flying to New York with 10 tons of explosives, and returning. I would be extremely happy to have such a bomber, and should then, to some extent, be able to stop the mouth of the l arrogant people over there."