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The Press MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1945. Pacific Commands

The announcement from Washington that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have charged General Mac Arthur with command of all the Army forces and resources, and Admiral Nimitz with command of all naval forces and resources in the Pacific theatre marks a welcome move towards a unified command in the war against Japan. According to London comment, the appointments do not affect Admiral Mountbatten’s position as Supreme Commander in South-east Asia; and a Washington correspondent observes that the relationship among MacArthur, Nimitz, and Mountbatten remains to be settled .by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. But, so . tar as they go, the appointments announced by. the Joint Chiefs of Staff remedy a weakness in the American command organisation which became apparent when Nimitz’s advance from the east impinged en MacArthur’s from the south. Nimitz’s assault on the Palaus, co-ordinated with that of Mac Arthur on Morotai, cleared the latter’s flank for the leap to Leyte; and it was the Leyte invasion which, brought the Japanese fleet into its first defensive action of the Pacific war. Three days after Mac Arthur landed on Leyte, the Japanese began their attempt to annihilate his invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf. Two of the enemy task forces advanced on the Philippines from the west, towards the only straits through the archipelago navigable for big ships. The larger approached through the Sibuyan Sea towards San Bernadino Strait; the smaller, to the south, headed through the Sulu and Mindanao Seas towards Surigao Strait. The principal forces against them were Admiral Halsey’s 3rd Fleet and Admiral fCinkaid’s 7th Fleet. The heaviest attacks were concentrated against the enemy force in the Sibuyan Sea; and on the\ second day of the action it turned and headed away from San Bernadino Strait. According to pilots’ reports, it had sustained heavy damage. Towards the end of the second day, Admiral Halsey turned to deal with a third enemy force, 200 miles east of the northern tip of Luzon. But while Admiral Halsey was moving north and Admiral Kinkaid was finishing off the force in Surigao Strait, the enemy in the Sibuyan Sea turned east again, unobserved, and came through San Bernadino Strait at night. Dawn found it close to its objective. “But “it missed”, so the military correspondent of the “New York Times ’ has written, “ through a combination “of American courage, in a tight “spot and a lack of Japanese reso“Tution ”. Between the eneipy force of five battleships, seven, cruisers, and nine' destroyers was only a group of six out-gunned and outspeeded- escort carriers and seven destroyers and destroyer escorts.

David defeated, Goliath, but a bad error which cost us dearly and might have had* extremely serious consequences was made in leaving San Beraadino Strait uncovered [the ‘‘New York Times”, correspondent added]. History will'explain why it was done; but in this limited perspective of time, it seems that the old trouble—lack of a clear-cut, unified. command—was partly responsible Admiral Kinkaid was under General MacAtthur, but not under Admiral Halsey, Admiral Halsey was. under AdmiraK Nimitz (who had his headquarters in Pearl Harbour), but was co-operating with, but not under, General Mac Arthur. ~ . Perhaps Admiral Halsey believed Admiral Kinkaid would watch San Bernadino Strait; perhaps Kinkaid thought Halsey had done it; both may have felt the Army Air Force would provide the necessary guard. Whatever the reason, San Bernadino Strait was left completely uncovered.

A check has now been imposed against such possibilities of confusion and mistake. But it is a sobering thought that, as yet, the check is needed to operate only within a limited compass of tho war against Japan. “An Eisen- “ hower for Asia ”, said Mr Roosevelt after Quebec, was not then needed: vast distances remained to be covered. The war has since come very near Japan from the Pacific. It has still to move a long way from other directions.'

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19450409.2.35

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume LXXXI, Issue 24536, 9 April 1945, Page 4

Word Count
647

The Press MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1945. Pacific Commands Press, Volume LXXXI, Issue 24536, 9 April 1945, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1945. Pacific Commands Press, Volume LXXXI, Issue 24536, 9 April 1945, Page 4

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