The Press SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 1945. Russia and Japan

Press, Volume LXXXI, Issue 24535, 7 April 1945, Page 6

The Press SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 1945. Russia and Japan

When the San Francisco conference was fixed for April 25, it was widely inferred that the choice of date signified Russia’s intention of denouncing the five-year pact of 1941. The inference was based on two facts. The date was the latest on which Russia could denounce the pact' and prevent its automatic renewal for five years more, as from April 25 next year; and it has been assumed, if never officially affirmed, that the reason why Russia took no part in the Cairo and Quebec conferences was that these were concerned with the war on Japan, with whom Russia’s relations were those of a friendly neutral. The San Francjsco conference, however, will deal with the treatment of Japan as a defeated aggressor; Russia is to take part;, therefore, - the character of those relations is to be changed. The inference is justified in the event reported to-day, Mr Molotov having informed the, Japanese Ambassador iri Moscow that the pact has “ lost its sense ’’—for the very good reasons given—and is accordingly denounced as the terms of the pact permit. Nevertheless, the inference may be justified rather by accident than in the working out of the Kremlin’s purposes; by the calendar.; T&e real •. signals of Russia’s intentions were given,-not when the date of the conference was fixed for . the anniversary of the pact, but when • Russia began to strengthen her fortified system in Siberia, from Vladivostok to Lake Baikal, before the pact was a year old; when the- Russian ‘ attitude; in renewing :the fisheries agreement# with Japan, was each time stiffened; -when. “ Pravda ”, -on "the .first-anni-versary, of the pact, warned Japan’s “military-fascist clique, dizzy with “ military successes ”, against the ruinous consequences of trying to pursue them'northwards; when, last year, Russia forced Japan, in Sakhalin, to make concessions ignominious to her and helpful to the. Allies; and when Stalin, in No j vember, deliberately chose the occasion of ' the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Soviets to describe Japan as “an aggressor “ nation Again, the reasons which Mr Molotov gave Ambassador Sato for denouncing thq pact r\qw—that Germany has attacked Russia and Japan is helping Germany; that Japdn is at : war with Britain and, the United; States and is their ally—-are / reasons which , have not suddenly become potent; they, have been clear end strong for nearly four years. The Kremlin’s real reason for acting now, therefore, rather than sooner, is not to be found in the strict terms of. a-pact which has “lost ite sense” blit in the changed military situation, Clearly of the European war' on.Russia will soring fee contracted. As 'V clearly, japan’s over-all strategic position has deteriorated. Till now, the case for Russia’s neutrality in the East, though the ally of Britain arid America* . has been that she could not afford 'to, figbt;on two fronts, the end of firing and exposed commuriications; that, even as a neutral,'she held a vastjapam eso ,‘ aripy, .immobilised'- in - Manchuria;. Ajtped: 'cause was of aid’to tok,' .TiUWvtr,-* that’lias; bean the case, and ‘a' scumf brie;' but - the’ last’ few months, weeks, and even days have .seen its . strategic,, foundations dissolved, or - rapidly dissolving. What Mr Molotov has told - Ambassador Sato, in effect, is that Russia is ready to meet a Japanese attack, if it is made; and that Japan may draw her own conclusions about Russia’s future course; if* the Japanese mbke no moye. ; It is true that the pact has, formally, another year to run before it lapses. It is also true, and much more momentously so, thdt it cap drop'dead before it runs another day. .And the Pacific theatre is transformed by that truth. " '