POLITICAL ISSUES OF RED ARMY’S ADVANCE

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24371, 25 September 1944, Page 4

POLITICAL ISSUES OF RED ARMY’S ADVANCE

SOVIET POLICY

As it strides towards Germany the Red Army is now fighting m regions the inhabitants of which are mostly non-Russian. Its lines now cross territory inhabited by Karelo-Finns, Etonians, Latvians. Lithuanians, Poles, Huzuls, Moldavians, and Rumanians. Where there are Byelo-Russians and Ukrainians their national identity is to some extent affected by Polish influences. The baroque churches of Poland, the severe Lutheran architecture of the Baltic lands, the tiny flamboyant wooden Uniate churches on the Carpathian slopes—these are a reminder to the Red Army man that he has entered lands where the faith of ms parents is unknown. . , The advance into regions so varied by nationality, creed, and local tradi-tion-lands whose experience of Soviet Socialism was brief before the war, others where allied Poles are recognised to enjoy full sovereignty, and some where alien Rumanians live—creates a complex of political tasks not all of which can be postponed. In general, the Russians have been behaving with scrupulous correctness in the lands of allies and enemies while within the constitutional borders or their State no haste is being made to effect radical changes. The policy of non-intervention adopted in the case or Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia has to some extent been applied also to lands incorporated into the Soviet Union before the war and now largely recovered from the Germans. Till the ■end of the war these areas will be largely controlled by the Red Army working through the civil authorities. The Curzon Line The most recent official maps do not indicate any., frontier between the Soviet Union and Poland other than the Curzon Line, and in view of the Soviet offer to delimit the frontiers on the basis of this line it is unlikely that Soviet institutions will be definitely reestablished in its vicinity until the position has been clarified by a SovietPolish understanding. There is a difference between a Soviet Union anxious to consolidate its strategic frontiers in face of a Germany preparing to pounce on it, and one which is organising those frontiers on the assumption that Germany will be broken and pinned down and that Poland and Czechoslovakia will be governed by the principles of regional collective security. Pending final decisions, the Poles connected with the Committee of National Liberation express the view that the firmer is Russian confidence that the future Poland will associate itself unreservedly in the organisation,of security in Eastern Europe, the deepef will be Moscow's sympathy for Polish aspirations. Meanwhile, in the liberated part of Poland, the inhabitants are apparently still in that condition when little matters But their regained freedom and the opportunity to get their own back on the Germans; and although civil administration has already been transferred to Polish authorities .in most of Lublin province, elections to 'village and town councils have been held, State and German property taken over by the committee, and trade unions organised, the energies of the new administration seem almost entirely absorbed in the task of putting the region on a war footing. So far as can be ascertained here, the pace is not being forced except for the purpose of sustaining the war effort. There is much to indicate that in the Baltic lands the Soviet authorities have

[By the Moscow correspondent of "The Times,” on August 18.J (Published by Arrangement.)

not yet resumed the policy of socialisation begun in 1940 and that particular care is being taken to ensure that whatever steps are taken they will be under • the direction of their own elected representatives. It is not, perhaps, sufflciently known that in 1940 Moscow on ; several occasions opposed the more extreme demands of the revolutionaries in these lands, so that in Latvia and . Estonia prominent Socialists and Liberals were prepared to join the Governments while keeping aloof from the Communist Party. The number of persons adversely affected bv land reform in Latvia amounted ’to about 2 per cent, of the total population and less than a fifth ’ of the total landowners; in Estonia the figures were about 2.5 per cent, and a fifth respectively. In each country the landowners whose individual holdings were increased by land reform far outnumbered those whose estates were reduced. In Lithuania only about 5000 landowners had reason to complain, while the great majority of peasants had their holdings increased. Unless there is a wholly unexpected development it is unlikely that the Soviet ~ authorities will change their policy of seeking to enlist popular support on the broadest possible scale. The in- ' telligentsia and technicians may look forward to a life with the whole of the ' Soviet Union as- a field for their talents and a market for their products. Here, as elsewhere, contemporary life in the Soviet Union, with its welldefined scale of rewards and honours for merit in all fields of ser* - -e, availability of work in the governmental machine, opportunities - for swift advancement in the Red Army and Red ' Fleet (including the merchant ser- ; vice) and in industrial management, , is likely to make no inconsiderable , appeal to members of the middle class, . the foundations of whose security have i . been swept away by the war. Two features of the process of re-,, ■ habilitation common to all areas liber- : ated by the Red Army are the import- :1 ance attached to the restoration of cultural facilities and the mildness of ; treatment of persons who have strayed „ from a fully loyal attitude under enemy pressure. Over half the budget for the restoration of liberated ' areas 4s devoted to the provision of.. cultural facilities, including capital ex- / penditure on schools of all kinds, - theatres, libraries, cinemas, and clubs. Criterion of Guilt r A Leniency towards those whose '■■■:• powers of resistance have not been strong enough to withstand economic , and other forms of pressure during the; fV; occupation has not caused the author!-, /; ties to relax their sternness towards’ ; - those who chose to serve the enemy of their own free will, but a foreign r 'i‘ investigator who was recently exceptional facilities to study the tion found that of the school teachers'? :; who for a period of years taught under - 1 - the Germans without giving the in- ’' vaders reason to complain only about 5 per cent, were considered punish-,; s able, the rest being transferred to other i posts without loss of reputation. .3; Generally the criterion of guilt is sup-'• plied by local public opinion, for, SsV>ii it was neatly put, only strikers really understand the attitude of a “black- - leg.” • Conditions remain very hard in the liberated regions. The arduous and ,. 1 ’; delicate process of evolution from ~, slavery to freedom is being directed vi with prudence, understanding, sympathy, and often forgiveness. . ':JJ