The Press MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944. The Russian Army

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24329, 7 August 1944, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944. The Russian Army

When Hitler treacherously turned upon the U.S.S.R., with which he had signed a non-aggression pact, the preponderance of opinion among the Allied military experts was that he could defeat the Russian armies as he had hitherto defeated other European armies. Nearly all, including the German High Command, believed that it would be only a matter of months before the Nazis would enter Moscow. Probably no secret has kept in this or any other war than that of the strength of the Russian Army and of the industrial resources behind it. In his recent book, “The “ Russian Army,” an American war correspondent, Mr Walter Kerr, who spent in Russia the 18 months during which the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad were fought, describes as he saw them the causes of its power and success. In an arresting sentence he says:

The strength of this army lies .not only in its manpower and munitions, but in the fighting heart of its soldiers, in iron discipline, and in the support it has received from ruthless organisation of the country’s wealth and civilian strength.

Mr Kerr found nothing astonishing about the army’s equipment but is careful to point out that it is all effectively Adapted, to the conditions in which the army has to fight. While the Germans largely relied in their great attacks on their armour, the Russians’ strength was chiefly that of superbly disciplined infantry and of their artillery. Each learnt lessons from the other; but the Russians were the quicker to adapt their equipment production as battle exposed weaknesses. But in the quality of its infantryman the Russian Army has shown its best. He has been trained to fight in all conditions, with or without air or armoured support, and to take the offensive whether in retreat or attack. Here is disclosed the German weakness, which is more psychological than physical; for the Nazi soldier has become so accustomed to fighting with air and armoured support that he is at a loss without it: “He did not like it. He was rier- “ vous.” Thus, when winter prevented the widespread use of tanks and tied aircraft to the ground, the Nazi infantryman hesitated. The Russians, on the other hand, are txained to fight equally welljn the conditions which make Russia in summer and Russia in winter two different campaigning countries. The difference between the two armies therefore becomes one of training and morale. In artillery, as well as infantry, the Russians have always had a definite superiority over the Nazis. They had underestimated the value of mortars; but this deficiency was rapidly made up by the formation of a People’s Commissariat of Mortar Construction. The Nazis were never able to put more guns into the field than the Russians. The Russian Air Force is still largely an unknown quantity, secret even from Russia’s allies; but unquestionably the pilots are good and the aircraft, though possibly (but not certainly) not as good as German, British, or American in favourable conditions, are better adapted to fly under all conditions- - a point of very great importance in the Russian winter, Russia has never been able to muster as many tanks as Germany; but here again, in adaptability to conditions, Russian armour is probably superior. Of the superiority of Russian leadership in the most recent phases of the war, and possibly throughout, no doubt can be entertained. In Marshal Stalin as Commander-in-Chief the Russians are led by a ruthless realist. The same can truly be said of the Russian generals. All are comparatively young, all are members of the Communist Party, all spring from humble stock, being the sons of peasants and factory workers. All, too, have risen from the ranks, and have passed through strenuous courses in military schools. All therefore understand the viewpoint of the private soldier but are nevertheless rigid disciplinarians. Russian leadership has never hesitated, to sacrifice the few for the benefit of the many, as Moscow and Stalingrad prove; and this ruthless policy has paid for, and won, long-range objectives. Behind and in front of the Russian armies • are unsung heroes and heroines. Behind, the civilian population has been regimented as sternly as the army itself and by sacrifice and work has kept its fighting men supplied. In front, volunteer guerrilla bands of men and women have relentlessly harried the enemy’s communications. Hate for the despoilers of their country is at the back of every Russian mind. To-day the Russian armies are hammering at the gates of Germany itself.