ALLIED AND JAPANESE MANPOWER ESTIMATED

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24270, 30 May 1944, Page 4

ALLIED AND JAPANESE MANPOWER ESTIMATED

PACIFIC WAR

(Published by Arrangement.)

New York.—The margin of manpower in the Pacific' is not a large one. This margin is largely calculated on the statement last autumn >by a spokesman for General Mac Arthur that the Pacific theatre is receiving only about 10 per cent, of American manpower; but this statement is s p ported by the principle of <concentration: that is, every possible man to the main effort, keeping all else at a minimum. , , , Presuming this figure is somewhat near correct, therefore, we have the figure of 10 per cent, of our popmation, or 13,500,000, as the basis of the American manpower effort in the Pacific; we may add perhaps 5 P e J cent, of the British population, or 2,400 000, and the whole of Australia and New Zealand, nearly 9,000,000— a total of 24.900.000. The rule-of-thumb that a nation can mobilise for fighting purposes some 10 per cent, of its population gives us a fighting strength of 2,500,000, from which we must deduct about 200,000 casualties. Australian and New Zealand troops serving in other theatres, etc. That leaves us a net total of 2.300.000. In the European theatre we have calculated that half the mobilised strength is required to guard lines of communication and for base and training purposes of all sorts. In the Pacific theatre the proportion is nearer two-thirds, because of the vast distances. Therefore the total manpower (American, British, and Dominion) available for front line service against the Japanese will not greatly exceed 800.000. Japan’s Potential What has Japan to set against this modest figure? The population of the Japanese islands is about 70,000,000; Japan cannot count on drawing lighting personnel from any other source whatever. There have been many Japanese boasts about “national” armies of Indians, Filipinos, and even Chinese, but no such troops have been encountered on any front. So Japan’s original reservoir of fighting manpower was about 7,000,000. War casualties have reduced this net figure by about 1,000,000. We must assume than an equal number are tied up on the Russian frontier and cannot be moved. While it is impossible to judge the number of Chinese troop? available to our side, we may cancel them out by assuming they are occu-

[By MAJOR FIELDING ELLIOT. Military, Analyst of the “New York Hera*

pying the attention of about 1,500,000 Japanese troops and airmen otf all categories. • A further reduction of. say, 500,000 Japanese troops of occupation must be made for the Philippines. Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Indo-China. Save for the last, most of these troops are pinned down by the need for keeping the populace in order. On the other hand the Japanese are able to use the forced labour of about 85 000 000 people whom they control politically (in Korea, Kwantung, Formosa Manchuria, and Thailand), and such additional forced labour as they can squeeze out of their conquered territory. This should result in a considerable addition to their fighting forces— perhaps as many as 1,000,000. After making all these additions arid deductions we come to the conclusion that the net Japanese manpower pool for fighting purposes is about 4,000,000 as against our 800,000. Allied Forces Outnumbered To our 800,000 of course must be added the actually available Indian ' combat forces: not the 2,000,000 who have been mobilised, but the proportion of those really available for active combat duty—perhaps 500.000. The Japanese still outnumber us three to one. - . i What here is obvious is that we have not yet fully engaged or anything . like fully engaged the Japanese army. We have been fighting the Japanese air forces and we are now superior in the air; we have been fighting scat- .; . tered detachments of the Japanese army on islands all over the Pacific, and we have beaten some and d^-, stroyed others; we have been fighting,,., one fairly large detachment of the Japanese army in Burma, and it ' still giving us a tough fight. But the bulk of the Japanese army is still ~ in Japan or China and still not en-' gaged. Behind it is a considerable re- '-’Vi servoir of available lighting manpower 'M, which is not yet even in military organisations. ' The Germans are at full stretch. Their power is engaged or about W J K£ be engaged. Japan still has forrnidable reserves of manpower which ahei 1 y cannot dse against us now, but which ,/ will be available later when the fight- ' ing comes closer to home. It does not seem likely that Japan will be cop-a' ' fronted by a manpower shortage such;, as faces Germany. Her deficiencies'in 1 ,1 contrast to Germany’s seem likely to- ■„, come in the field of raw materials apd-' to some extent in foodstuffs. .