RUSSIA AND BRITAIN

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24152, 11 January 1944, Page 5

RUSSIA AND BRITAIN

Future Policy In Europe

COMBINATION AGAINST GERMANY

LONDON, December 3.

In Europe the passage of time has not diminished the force of the lesson first learned by Britain 40 years ago that isolation from the Continent spells the risk of a Continent united against her, says "The Times.'’ Just as in the 1900’s, the Japanese alliance with the united strength of the British Empire did not make the French entente any less necessary, so to-day the most binding American alliance reinforced by the closest understanding with the Dominions could in no way diminish the necessity to Britain —and thus, at one remove, tq the United States itself — of an ally in Europe. Theoretically a threefold choice of allies in Europe would seem to be open. But on closer inspection the choice becomes largely illusory. What was in essence an alliance with France, supported by a number of minor countries, but not including Russia, was tried in 1919, but lacked by itself the resources necessary to sustain the burden. Such a combination would be far weaker to-day, when the military capacity of the small Power has been still further reduced by the technical developments of modern warfare. There is little likelihood that it would appeal to a restored France: and for Britain any attempt to make the alliance of a large number of relatively weak Powers a_ basis of policy would mean certain disaster. Of the second solution, which has from time to time had its superficial attractions in the past, it is perhaps necessary to say only that an Anglo-German alliance would in the long run prove as disastrous to Britain as would a Russo-German alliance to Russia. Basis of Security

A third solution remains. The conditions which have made Britain and Russia allies in war have also inspired the Anglo-Soviet 20 years’ treaty of alliance. Measures of wcurity imposed on Germany after the war will, as experience proves, remain effective tor precisely so long as the force which imposed them continues in being. The major part of this force is constituted, and must in future be constituted, by the Anglo-Rsssian alliance, though the unity of Euro~c —which must be achieved if a return to anarchy and disaster is to be averted —will rest on a far broader basis of constMt than a mere Anglo-Russian hegemony of power. In particular, France will remain an important factor in the security of Britain and in the unity of Europe. The British contribution to this unity must be a greater willingness than in the past to take a permanent share in European security, including, perhaps, the maintenance of joint bases —in which the United States might also be willing to participate--on the European continent. On the other hand, the Anglo-Russian alliance presupposes that Britain will not intervene in eastern Europe except in agreement with Russia, any more than Russia will intervene in western Europe except in agreement with Bnta£ut in order to deserve and secure the alliances which she needs. Britain must herself be a worth-while ally. If what Mr Eden recently called Britain’s “alliance potential” has always been high, this is because she has been the centre of a vast agglomeration of peoples all over the world—another way of saying that Britain would not be, and would never have been, a Great Power if “Britain” meant merely the people and resources of the British Isles.

Unity in Commonwealth Nor is it sufficient merely that relations between Britain, the Dominions, India, and the colonial empire should be close and harmonious. The British Commonwealth of Nations can h°P® to play Its full part in the world of the future only if it is able on vital issues to express its unity oi purpose and interest with one voice. The days when the foreign policy of the Empire could be settled in Downing Street are over. But the changed circumstances have not diminished, they have rather intensified, the need for a unfled foreign policy. The intimate quality of Anglo-Amer-ican relations has from time to time tempted idealists in English-sneaking countries to envisage the drawing together of the British Empire and the United States into an exclusive and self-sufficient partnership whose power would in itself guarantee world peace. War-time experiences and emotions have appeared to give substance to this vision. Yet clearer insight on both sides of the Atlantic has always discerned its impracticability, and there are several valid arguments against it:— It would not fulfil the purpose of assuring British security, since it would make the British Isles the remote, exposed, and not easily defensible outpost of an English-speaking world whose centre of gravity would be far away from Europe. It would raise the spectre of an “Anglo-American hegemony” and provoke hostile reactions all over the world, and especially in Europe. It would not accord with the economic' interests either of Great Britain or of the British Commonwealth as a whole, which must rest on a broader basis than that of co-operation with the United States. No foreign policy can be acceptable for Britain which exalts the oversea sector at the expense of the European sector, or vice versa.