INONU MAY CLARIFY TURKEY'S ATTITUDE

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24094, 2 November 1943, Page 4

INONU MAY CLARIFY TURKEY'S ATTITUDE

FOREIGN POLICY

[By a Correspondent of [Published by

The Turkish attitude _ towards the war has been much discussed here lately, and - Turkish political writers have struck different notes, some putting the accent on Turkish neutrality while others have dwelt on Turkish obligations arising from the Anglo* Turkish alliance. No comprehensive view can be formed on the present state of AngloTurkish relations unless it is borne in mind that at the time' when Britain, France, and Turkey signed the Tripartite Declaration of May 12, 1939, which was converted into the Treaty of Alliance of October 19. 1939, none of the three signatories had more than a vague conception of the technique and requirements of modern warfare; all three of them were still under the influence of tactics used during the last war and were more or less imbued with the Maginot complex. The collapse of Poland, and later of France, opened their eyes to grim realities. Britain acquiesced in a tacit understanding whereby Turkey, although abiding by her treaty obligations, should not be pressed to execute them, on account of Britain’s inability, at that time, to supply her with weapons required for putting the Turkish army on a war footing, as stipulated by the Treaty of Alliance. That situation continued till the autumn of 1942, it being admitted that Turkish neutrality. assured by the Turkish-German pact signed on June 18, 1941, was useful to Britain, and subsequently to Russia, as covering from German attack the British positions In the Middle East and even the Caucasus from the south.

Hitler’s Miscalculation

It was suspected then, and it is definitely known now, that in the spring of 1941 Italy had pressed Germany to pass through Turkey and attack Britain in the Middle East, but that the Germans had preferred to postpone this operation till after the removal of the Russian danger, which they hoped to effect within a few weeks. Hitler’s miscalculation resulted in El Alamein and Stalingrad, which altered the situation completely. ' Turkish neutrality, which till then was favourable to the Allies, began to be profitable to the Axis. Moreover, it was feared that Germany, frustrated in Africa and Russia, might try to retrieve her lost prestige by launching a brusque attack on some weaker spot, and Turkey was considered to be a possible target. Mr Churchill’s journey to Adana, the supply of war material in large quantities to Turkey consequent upon the Adana meeting, and the subsequent visit to Ankara of British Array, Navy, ‘and Air commanders were all part of an effort to meet the new situation created by the Allied victories in Libya and Russia. The Germans were much perturbed by the new impetus given to the Anglo-Turkish Alliance, and last April they made representations to the Turkish Government, which replied that it did not contemplate any change of policy. s The position remains the same today, but several questions are hovering in every mind, questions which might be condensed in these terms. In view of the changed and ever-changing war situation, has the time come when Turkey may be called upon to fulfil her treaty obligations towards Britain, and, if so. how? Is Turkey In a position to fulfil those obligations, and, in the affirmative, would Turkish cooperation be of substantial assistance to the Allies?

Before any attempt is made to reply to these questions it should be pointed out, in Turkish opinion, whether this country enters the war on the Allies’ side, or whether she simply concedes to them facilities such as the passage of Allied troops through Turkish territory, or the use of Turkish airfields by Allied aircraft, the result jvould be the same. Turkey would cease to be neutral and would be considered and treated by Germany as an enemy. Turkish official quarters naturally maintain great reserve on this delicate subject, but it is comparatively easy to form an opinion of what Turkish reaction to the above questions might be.

"The Times” in Turkey.] Arrangement]

It could be summarised under the fol, lowing heads:— First, thanks to the Allies’ ungrudg, ing assistance in war material and sup. . plies, Turkey’s national defence is to. day very efficient for defensive pur. poses, but could not be considered & quate for an offensive war. Second, the Axis forces are at present very close!to the Turkish frontiers from the Aegfta Islands to the Bulgarian border, and they would therefore be able to attack Turkey and certainly to destroy by bombing some of her more vulnerable' towns, like Istanbul, before the Allies could move their forces to Turkish assistance, handicapped as they are by. inadequate land transport facilities and by the Axis possession of Crete and the. Dodecanese, with the result that Ger. many would be provided with a success ' she so sorely needs for home consunS, tion. Third, after four years of neupß. ity it would be difficult to persuadefhj . Turkish people to join the war /jjow without being attacked, and knowing ■ as they do that their Government < fosters no ambitions for territorial - acquisitions. Fourth, as everybody in * Turkey is aware that Germany jj beaten, Turkish participation in the war at this stage would look like a “stab in the back” similar to that which ,■ Italy dealt France, an act loathsome ' to the Turks, especially if perpetrated ' l ' against their former ally in the last 1 . * war. i These are, frankly stated, the ideas' ' prevalent in Turkish minds at the pres- ! ent moment, and one notices great v anxiety that Turkish views should be - explained to, and understood by, British public for two reasons: first, be.'.; cause Britain is the only country to which Turkey is bound by ties of alii. ’’ ance, and therefore entitled to know'-' what her ally’s nttitude is at this crucial stage of the war; and, second, because, Britain being the only country among the Allied nations which chose ‘ ‘ of her own free will to fight the dicta-' ' tors without waiting to be attacked by :- them, she is the only one having?the . right to question the present Turkish * attitude. Humanitarian Duties What, then, is the conclusion of this = . survey of Turkish policy? In shaping that policy during four years of war . the Turkish Government’s primary concern was naturally to safeguard : - Turkish interests and assure the r SH}S»- : fare of the Turkish people. Besides L that, so to speak, selfish objecl^fiieyf' endeavoured to fulfil as far as pomblei , their humanitarian duties, as Sffthe case of the exchanges of prisohtSjjjathl "■ dispatch of food relief to Greec&*nd so on. One further step would h®fo? * Turkey to make her contribution -td* wards the new and better world whidb ' ■ the leaders of the United Nations are >’. striving to create. ■ f It is, of course, most hazardous to in* 5 dulge in any prognostications, but it Iji ’ conceivable that military operations, 'f and a consequent political evolution in 'r South-eastern Europe may take such hj V turn as to bring about the sudden collapse of the “Axis” structure In’ the ■> Balkans. In that case the 15 or 16 Ger. " man divisions now garrisoned in the!?' Balkans may prove quite inadequate to cope with the situation; and in fact th# r ’" Germans may decide to withdraw be*r* yond the Danube if the situation beif ■' comes too critical for them. Isi When this eventually takes place al f state of anarchy and chaos .vnlnv threaten to prevail in the Balkans, witM internecine political passions andft national hatreds let loose. Many TurkS hope that a well-disciplined force liML* the Turkish army may play a promi-Jls nent and useful part in contributing, toLV maintain order in the peninsula and iou;' avert a general violent upheaval until; - the return of more normal conditions, t; In any case, when the summer sealii? son is over and political' activity. rtJ ' turns to Ankara, developments may bcki expected to take a more positive shape? and .when President • Inomr opensthß>* sessionqf the Grand National Assembly!: with his annual speech hn November lr S? us ? 1116 opportunity to definSl. Turkish policy in some precise, authoritative manner. ■ il £