The Press TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1943. German Air Defence

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24028, 17 August 1943, Page 4

The Press TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1943. German Air Defence

Promising the Germans that, while for the present they must rely on their air defences, the time will come for “mass counter-attacks,’’ Goebbels has reminded some of them, certainly, and perhaps many, that nearly a year ago Hitler and Goering were even bolder. Though the pressure of the Allied air offensive was then much lighter than it is now, it was heavy enough (especially for a people who had been assured of immunity) to make these two leaders declare that the enemy was snatching a brief opportunity: soon the Luftwaffe would be free to carry out smashing reprisals against the “ aircraft-carrier “ Britain.” Goebbels may intend his words to be understood to the same effect. If so, he expects the Germans to be hopefully misled twice in the same way, and he is an expert in deciding how, and how often, and how far the German masses can be deceived; but in the uncertain field of war nothing is more certain than that Germany’s air construction policy has for some months been so developed as to make a heavy and sustained bomber offensive impossible. In that sense there can be no “ mass “ counter-attacks.” The policy the Nazis have followed, however, is not one to be disregarded. In swinging over strongly to fighter and fighter-bomber building, the Nazis committed the Luftwaffe to an essentially defensive role but gave it the best chance of succeeding and themselves the best chance of winning time and further chances. About May of this year it was unofficially estimated, “after a “ most careful review of all the evi- “ dence,” that the Luftwaffe’s fighter strength was stretched far and thin. The air correspondent of the “Sunday Times” summarised the figures as follows; Fighters. Day. Night. Russian front .. 440 60 Mediterranean and Balkans .. 250 90 Northern France, etc. .. .. 350 200 Germany .. .. 220 400 1260 750 thus nearly half of the fighters were in the West to meet day raids and 80 per cent, of the night fighters in Germany and France to repel night raids. Since then, the Luftwaffe has been put under a much heavier strain; but it would be rash to suggest, on the evidence available, that the result has been shown in increasing weakness and inefficiency. On the contrary, there are fairly clear indications that Germany has more, rather than fewer, fighters to put up. If this is so, it is a fact attributable to the constructional change-over. German output earlier this year was estimated, to,be 2800 machines of ail types a’ month, including about 1800 operational types of a total weignt of about 17,000 tons. The effect of bombardment on production capacity disregarded, a change to fighter and fighter-bomber types would enable 3400- to be produced from the same tonnage, an increase of 1600 light aircraft monthly. The Messerschmift 109 went through various stages of improvement, by no means negligible. Increased output, with similar improvement of the Focke-Wulf 190, a markedly better type to begin with, might temporarily at least strengthen the Germans’ counter to day bombardment and, more than that, might build up a formidable barrier to invasion in Western Europe. If.that is yet to come this year, it will be because Britain and the United States know that they have the measure of this Nazi policy and its results. If not, one reason may be that it has succeeded, up to a point and for a time, by increasing the present risks.