CHINA’S SITUATION IS NOT YET ACUTE

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24021, 9 August 1943, Page 4

CHINA’S SITUATION IS NOT YET ACUTE

THE FAR EAST

CHUNGKING, June 12. Apparent anxiety abroad, underlying American and British inquiries as to how long the Chinese armies and home front can be expected to stand up, does not seem quite justified by actual conditions as far as the immediate future is concerned. Statements of well-informed friends of China, such as Rear-Admiral Harry E. Yarnell’s testimony before the House Immigration Committee that “China’s position is desperate,’’ implying the grave possibility of the National Government’s collapse unless speediest help was dispatched, may have surprised the American public, since Chungking correspondents have been unable for some time to give details of certain developments which indicate growing difficulties. The seriousness of the Chinese situation is undeniable, although at present it is not acute. Moreover, the Chinese Government still is in a position to initiate considerable improvements in practically every field. The military position does not threaten acute dangers. Recent fighting in the Middle Yangtse resulted in the following lessons: First, the Japanese are unable to undertake sufficiently large and determined actions against China to change the status quo materially unless they can reinforce their diminished over-all establishment in China. However, danger may arise if the Japanese decide that progress in United Nations’ preparations for using China as a large-scale base necessitates employment of large forces for a fullscale offensive, at least against areas within bombing range from Tokyo, before China is sufficiently strengthened for adequate defence. • Second, that a sufficient air umbrella can provide an effective substitute for largely lacking heavy ground equipment on the Chinese side. Third, China’s best nourished, best equipped, and best trained elite armies, such as those used in the Middle Yangtsc, are able largely to offset shortcomings of other troops. Present efforts to increase soldiers’ food supplies and the collection of socks and shoes through a popular campaign of the “Troops' Comforting Association” are attacking some of the most important problems. Newspaper’s Protest The “China Times,” demanding better living standards for the army, said: “It is irrational that the troops have the hardest living conditions of all Chinese people.” It is also hoped that more effective price control may restore some of the lost purchasing power of soldiers wages, which are normally used for supplementing issued rice rations with other foodstuffs. In this connexion, it is encouraging that General Pai Chung-si, chief of the Military Training Board, recently declared that the much-criticised emphasis on sheer numbers of soldiers is being replaced by more emphasis on quality, apparently referring not only to choice and training of recruits, but probably also to food and other supplies. The press urges the well-to-do, especially merchants, to contribute to the army.

(By GUENTHER STEIN in the "Christian Science Monitor") (Published by Arrangement.)

Meanwhile, main features of T 9 „ a „ ese action in China are small aidS* hit-and-run raiding parties where the Chinese lines seem weakly defended aiming at temporary occupation of S sirable areas for purposes of seizini food and other supplies attract«! large Chinese forces in f 9 rce them to expend as much as po 2 sible of precious munition reserves and also providing training for Japanese troops which consist in consider vie part of recruits. r China’s home-front morale nr/ sents no danger. Generalissimo Chiafi 4 Kai-sheks determination to carry on the victory, and especially general absolute certainty that the Allies'are winning the war, are completely banning defeatism in the sense of any advocacy of compromise with Japan On the other hand, the Government is finding it difficult to increase popular war efforts, especially among the well-to-dos, whom General Chiang and the press are constantly exhorting. Mobilisation for anything like "total war" is naturally impeded by the so far undeveloped state of political democracy and general administration. Difficulties resulting from these factors in every field of China’s war effort are uneasily envisaged by Americans. They are increasingly impressing the modern Chinese, with the intensifying effects of six years of war, in which the consequences of three years of a semi-blockade and one year of almost complete blockade are weighing more heavily than those from fighting and bombing. For all these reasons the price rise continues and the economic front is the main object of concern. For example the average cost of living in Free China is now almost 100 times as high as before the war. But the mere fact that China still is proceeding on a basis of price increase which would have completely destroyed an economy like America’s, demonstrates the power of resistance of China’s primitive and mainly agricultural economic structure. Undeniable Suffering There is undeniably much suffering, especially among all groups dependent upon Government wages and salaries, which provide a mere fraction of prewar purchasing power, and accordingly, in spite of predominantly good spirit, there are also unavoidable effects on efficiency. But no one is able to tell when the end of endurance'may be reached. Possibilities of further manifold reforms remain considerable even in the face of war-time complications, especially since the best elements are eager to support them on a basis of closer democratic co-operation. It still is hoped that further aggravation of difficulties w ;i l rather cause reforms than consequences leading to an acute crisis. Continuation of good crops which so far have attended China’s war unprecedentedly, with only the exception of last year’s harvest in Honan, would still allow China to hold out for a considerable period, especially if timely United Nations action against Japan shortens the prospective duration of the war. All well-informed observers agree this is probable next year and that no predictable factor indicates acute danger.