Change in Pacific

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23973, 14 June 1943, Page 4

Change in Pacific

Mr Curtin’s most encouraging statement—“l do not think the enemy “ can now invade Australia ”—followed so hard upon his conference with General Mac Arthur that a connexion must be assumed, There was, and is, no reason to believe that Mr Curtin spoke irresponsibly, earlier this year, when he warned Australia that the danger was near and real. The authority for his warning could be traced in General MacArthur’s headquarters reports. There is no reason now to suspect that Mr Curtin has swung to an optimism unwarranted by later reports. It should not be forgotten that General MacArthur’s report of March 1 stopped short of interpreting Japanese intentions. It declared the facts established by reconnaissance; and these, in brief, were that the Japanese front enveloping northern Australia was being constantly strengthened, and that major forces were taking up positions “ in readiness,” As was suggested here at the time, this account of the facts left their meaning open. They could signify an offensive aim; and that might be local and limited or, as developments ran, be extended. They could signify a defensive aim, the obvious one of fastening Japans hold immovably on the southern edge of an already huge and valuable conquest. Either way, the facts were sufficient to justify a warning to Australia, whose sense of security was premature, and to justify, also, a warning to the United Nations. The holding strategy, it was necessary to say, must be armed so powerfully as to serve all its purposes effectively. If it did not prevent Japan from assembling and maintaining a relatively greater strength, on her striking front and at the bases behind it, it could not prevent the initiative from passing to her; and if it could not prevent that, it would fail. A situation which, defined in those broad terms, explained and necessitated Mr Curtin’s earlier statements may be said both to have been clarified and to have been changed. More is known; much has been done. A few words from a statement by Mr Churchill in Algiers, last week, point to more accurate knowledge of Japan’s resources. Japan cannot, he said, make up her shipping losses: and the Japanese air force is “ just treading water.” These two short statements, in which, it may be confidently assumed, recent and certain information is embodied, exceed previous conjectures and estimates; and they justify the inference that Japan is not in a position to mount and maintain a full-scale offensive' to the south. In other words, what could, a few months or even weeks ago, be regarded either as offensive or as defensive preparations are now seen to be de-

fensive—unless desperation takes charge of strategy. As for material change, there has been evidence of that in Mr Stimson’s references to increased allocation of air strength to the Pacific fronts, in the reinforcement of the Chinese air arm and of the Allied air force in China, in Colonel Knox's reference to increased naval strength in the Pacific, and in the United States allarms offensive against Attu in the Aleutians, In the last connexion, the newly reported fact that the Japanese did not risk naval intervention has a direct bearing on the Pacific situation as a whole. The initiative is being firmly seized by the United Nations.