The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1943. French Unity

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23971, 11 June 1943, Page 4

The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1943. French Unity

It may not soon be possible to de- [ cide exactly what causes have delayed effective unity between General de Gaulle and General Gir?.ud since the latter, nearly three months ago, in a broadcast statement and in a message to General Catroux, emphasised his desire to reach it at once. " I am ready," he said, " to co-operate with all. those " who, accepting the fundamental " and traditional principles of " which I have spoken and joining " in the solemn pledge which I am " giving to the French people, are " taking part in the struggle against "the enemy." To General Catroux he wrote that he was ready to receive General de Gaulle " in order "to give this union a concrete " form." It may be conjectured, however, that among the difficulties encountered, one is indicated in General Giraud's reference, abovs, to his " solemn pledge" to the French people. This was that their right to choose their own provisional government would be safeguarded. Regarding himself as the servant, not the leader, of the French people, he undertook to deliver his powers to the provisional government chosen by them on the liberation of France. General de Gaulle, on the other hand, has been credited with other views, wide enough to include the aim of an immediate provisional government or narrow enough to exclude anything else. The State Department in Washington, it seems, not without awkward results, has always been influenced by the belief that he had political ambitions. It is not easy to find records of any statements by General de Gaulle so framed as to bring this issue out of the background and into the clear. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that when General Giraud on May 17, after his discussions with General Catroux, submitted to General de Gaulle and the French National Committee the broad terms on which they might enter upon " action and . . . responsibili- " ties in common," his letter closed on the following paragraph: We are not, nor can we be, a French Government, and the executive will, from the moment it begins work, solemnly make known to the French peoples that it will hand over its powers to a provisional government as soon as possible. Nor can it be overlooked that Mr Harold McMillan, the British Minister of State in North Africa, and Mr Robert Murphy, the United States Consul-General, in their joint statement a few days ago, applied themselves chiefly to this point: It must be made clear that the meetings [between General Giraud and General de Gaulle! were between two de facto authorities, without juridical basis, who were trying to combine into one, which would be equally de facto until the whole of the French people are able to express their wi'l by constitutional and free channels. There is no question of according de jure recognition to any French authority while free expression of opinion is denied the people of France. * But if this has, in fact, been a difficult issue to resolve, the difficulty must have been exaggerated or complicated by other factors. Some [of them originate in the unhappy political processes of North Africa i since the landings; others may be ' traced much farther back. No one [formula to embrace them all can be found; but it is broadly true that General Giraud's position and l past have made it easier for him to work with former representatives or supporters of Vichy than for General de Gaulle to do so. In addition to every question of principle or procedure or purpose, therefore, there must have emerged many questions of person and personal service. The reports of the last few days have illustrated some of them, the most conspicuous but not necessarily the most troublesome.. It would be a bad mistake to suppose that all could be answered by rule of thumb; X served Vichy, therefore X must go. Vichy did not in all ways and at all times present all Frenchmen with the same choice or the same illusion of choice. Men served Vichy with different loyalties and for different ends. "When, how, and why distinguish them. This real test was defined when General de Gaulle said in Algiers that the new unity must be served only by men "materially and morally capable of " leading France in this conflict in " the interests of the Allies as well " as of Frenchmen." I