The Press MONDAY, MAY 17, 1943. The Aleutians

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23949, 17 May 1943, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, MAY 17, 1943. The Aleutians

The United States attack on Attu, rather than a surprise, is the fulfilment of moves spread over several months. When the Japanese occupied Kiska and Attu in June last year, the nearest American base was at Dutch Harbour, 600 miles away, a distance great enough, in those waters, to limit air attack severely. Even when Attu was attacked in September with such success that, a few days later, the Japanese were reported to have withdrawn, they re-established themselves shortly afterwards; and from Kiska they have never been dislodged. In October, however, United States forces seized the Andreanof islands, which reduced the air distance to Kiska to 125 miles; and in January they seized Amchitka, an island only 72 miles away. These new forward bases, it seems, have been rapidly brought into use, with the double advantage of easing the task of the bombers and giving them fighter protection. The result is apparent in the fact that between March 1 and the early days of this month Kiska was bombed in 220 raids. The methodical advance of the striking points and the powerful use of them plainly foreshadowed the present intention.

That, of course, is incompletely 'represented in the recovery of the islands and the defeat of Japanese aims and operations there. Their enterprise has cost the Japanese a great many ships; it has held a division cf first-class troops from more active employment; it has kept many units of the Japanese navy busy. In the action at the end of March, for example, four cruisers, of which three were hit, and six destroyers were escorting two transports. But the Japanese may well have thought the price not too heavy to pay for holding the Americans out and at a distance, and for maintaining a base opposite the weakest stretch of their enemy’s coast defences. Moreover, they had a good submarine harbour at Kiska and a weather station of very high value in an area of wild storm and dense fog. However the Japanese balance sheet in the Aleutians is drawn at present, it must be the Americans’ object to do more than cancel it, destroy the Japanese assets, and gain equivalent ones. The attack on' Attu can only be regarded as an essential preliminary to the isolation and reconquest of Kiska. If, or when, the operation is completed, the Americans will be strongly established within 1000 miles of the Japanese island chain. From Attu it is less than 800 miles to Paramushiro, the most northerly Japanese naval base in the Kuriles. The threat is important not merely because it may be directly developed but because it will indirectly affect the south-west Pacific front. Japan fears direct attack and has shown herself to be specially afraid of attack from the north. It may b'e 1 ’ iufffiised that, as the menace takes shape, it will be met by concentrations, at sea and in the air, which must either draw strength or reserve strength from her southern and western fronts, Finally, it is not too soon to say that developments fn the Pacific are already influenced by developments in Africa. It has not been necessary to wait for the surrender of the last Axis soldier in Tunisia before preparing for the full concerting of the Allied campaigns, which the opening of the Mediterranean relates more closely than ever before. Mr Churchill’s broadcast from Washington may be read as a signal that the conception of global war is now being fulfilled: “ It is no good "having only one march ahead laid “ out. March after march must be "planned. . . . We owe it to heroic “ Russia and long-tormented China.” It is not coincidence that brings forward together Mr Churchill’s references to the European fronts and the Far East, and times the American assault on Attu so nearly after the triumph in Africa.