The Press MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1943. Guadalcanar, and After

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23884, 1 March 1943, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1943. Guadalcanar, and After

The United States Navy Department’s silence about the naval, battle in the Solomons area, in i which the Japanese claimed to; have “ overwhelmed ” the Ameri-1 can naval force before it could “ escape,” was broken by the care-1 fully restrained statement that in a; prolonged action of manoeuvre the; American losses were the heavy! cruiser Chicago, one destroyer, and| three torpedo boats; the Japanese,! 14 destroyers. These figures, on the; face of them, show a balance greatly against the enemy, even though the loss of a single fast, heavy unit like the Chicago is seri-, ous. But such estimates are uncer- ■ tain. For security reasons, the re-1 port is blank on the subject of ves-; sels damaged; the relative strength; and composition of the opposed; naval forces were previously un-j known and are still unknown. It is, ■ however, safe to draw considerable encouragement from the back-; ground evidence. It is clear that the Japanese wished to hide the;

real truth from the Japanese people or to prevent its being believed. There was no “ naval ” action, strictly so-called; all losses were inflicted by aircraft. It was not the American naval forces that attempted to “escape” but the Japanese that avoided action. If it had been part of the Japanese plan to attack, the opportunity was measured and refused. The only part of the plan fulfilled was the withdrawal of the ' remaining Japanese land forces from Guadalcanal and it was certainly an expensive operation in ships and probably in men. This seems to mean, first, that Admiral Halsey’s naval force is strong enough to compel the Japanese, though recently reinforced from Truk, to steer clear of it; and second, that this naval advantage is confirmed by superiority in the air. The long-drawn struggle for Guadalcanar has ended in a way that emphasises it and gives it new scope. From Guadalcanar, developed as an advanced striking base, Truk can be brought under attack by heavy bombers, for instance.

Nevertheless, it may be a long while before that advantage is freely exploited. The Japanese did not give up Guadalcanar before they had established powerful bases at Munda, in New Georgia, and Kolombangara, conveniently placed both to trouble the Guadalcanar approaches and to cover those, by sea and air, to Rabaul. The importance of Rabaul in the Japanese defensive system, arid as the base from which their threat is still directed, west, south, and east, remains all that it was, or is greater than ever. No development is more significant than the sustained and iricreasingly heavy bombardment of Rabaul, Munda, Buin, Lae, and other Japanese air establishments over the full extent of the frontal arc from the Solomons to Timor. But its limits are part of its significance. In one of the largest raids over Rabaul, 30 heavy bombers were engaged; and until quite recently such concentrations have been impossible or very infrequent. Even now it is premature to assume that they can be maintained, day in and day out, so as to make one Japanese base after another untenable. Their scale is now such as to make, in the “ Sydney Morning “ Herald’s ” temperate phrase, “a “ useful contribution to the war of “ attrition,” but yet far from that on which air power will introduce and share a major offensive, Within this context, it seems, Mr Curtin’s recent warnings and demands can be interpreted in a sense that does not reject the holding strategy in the Pacific. To widen its purely protective margin, to increase its attritional effect, to exploit that in limited offensives of some present and greater potential value, comparatively small additions to the United Nations striking force would suffice: small, that is, in relation both to the importance of the strategic area and to the total resources of the United Nations. Dr. Evatt’s new mission must be supposed to include this object. The holding strategy is dangerous if it is conceived, and armed, as a mere hold-ing-on strategy. The case for building it up as fast as possible from defensive to offensive-defensive and offensive strength ought to be steadily urged. But while this is beyond question, it is easier to think of 50, or 500, heavy bombers being flown to the Solomons than to remember that fighters must be shipped there; and that fuel, parts, bombs, all ground and repair equipment,, and ground staff must be shipped, too. The rate at which strategy in the Pacific can be transformed is set by the rate at which shipping can be freed to supply it.