REASONS FOR JAPAN’S UNEXPECTED STRENGTH

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23859, 30 January 1943, Page 4

REASONS FOR JAPAN’S UNEXPECTED STRENGTH

BRIDGE OF SHIPS

[Published by Arrangement with Ever since the siege o£ Singapore the Allies have been hoping that the length of Japan’s maritime communications and her limited reserve of merchant tonnage would put a brake to the oversea expansion of the Island Empire. By October 10, Japan had lost 93 transports, 12 supply ships, and 99 merchantmen. In the Solomons and around New Guinea many more enemy ships have been sunk; scores have been damaged. But Nipponese ships keep coming, and the supply services of the Mikado’s forces are being maintained more than 3000 miles off Tokyo. Fuel depots have been established on numerous islands from the Gilbert Archipelago to the Bay of Bengal. Troops and equipment are carried to Kiska and Guadalcanar, to- Burma and Timor. Reports about raw material shortages in Japan have not been confirmed. The unexpected strength of Japan’s system of maritime transportation is due to four factors; (1) In Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines Japan has gained a solid anchorage for her bridge of ships; (2) _ her merchant marine turns around quicker than American and European vessels; (3) Japan has been able to divert almost all her fast and modern ships to military purposes; (4) Japanese shipbuilding and repair facilities are greater than generally assumed. Security of Harbours The strength of Japan’s bridge of ships, like all bridges, depends upon the anchorage that supports it. Had the Allies been able to maintain positions permitting • aggressive action against the ports of Japan and her principal supply stations on the mainland, Nippon’s bridge of ships probably would have collapsed. Instead, Japan has sealed her harbours by forcing the Allies out of bomb range. In Hong Kong, Saigon, Manila, Singapore. Penang, and Batavia Japan has captured extensive docks, repair shops, and supply stations which provide her merchant marine with secure bases close to the theatres of war, shorten her maritime routes and accelerate the turn-around of ships. Although many permanent installations have been blown up, enough.was left that the enemy could use. Docks and piers are difficult to destroy. It took the Japanese only a few days to repair the cause-, way to Singapore Island. To-day, Japan’s bridge of merchant ships is anchored all along a semicircle from Manila to Batavia and Rangoon. To Australia and India this means what the establishment of Allied bases in Brest, Bordeaux, and Algiers' would mean to Hitler and Mussolini, or what Axis bases in Bermuda and Puerto Rico would mean to the United States. In reality, Japan’s present position is even more favourable. Three and a half thousand miles of ocean separate New York from Bordeaux, but the routes from Nippon to Manila, Batavia, and Rangoon are studded with islands, roadsteads, and harbours. Bermuda and Puerto Rico would be within easy_ bomb range from the’ continental United States, whereas most of Japan’s new anchorages in South Asia can be reached with difficulty only by long-range raiders or from precariously supplied bases in India and China. Many Small Vessels In proportion of her total tonnage, Japan has a greater number of ships than .the Allies. The average tonnage of a Japanese merchantman is round 2400 gross tons, against an American pre-war average of 3400 tons. Wartime shipbuilding increases the average size of Allied ships. In the Philippines and in the Malayan campaign. the Japanese frequently used ships of 500 tons and less. According to Lloyd’s, there were almost 900 ships of this type under Japanese register in 1939—246 of them less than fiye years old —and all seagoing. In reality, there must haye been more thaitytwice ;thig number. Japan is the' only maritime country which never listed her composite ships between 300 and 100 tons, allegedly because their measurement could not be established according to the usual rules. ■ It is much more difficult to sink between 20,000 and 25,000 tons of shipping consisting of 40 and more small ships than to torpedo or to bomb three large Allied cargoes. Japan has'the world’s fastest tanker fleet; her tankers make 18 knots against 16J knots of America’s Liberty ships. There are proportionately more middle-sized ships from 1000 to' 4000 gross tons under Japanese registry than in the American and British mercantile marines. For fast, long-distance transportation of bulk commodities. Japan has a substantial number of large and modern motor ships of more than 10,000 tons. There are relatively few Japanese vessels of the 7000 to 8000 gross ton standard type of the Allies. ~ This peculiar composition of her merchant marine has enabled Japan to assign to the various types of ships tasks for which they are best suited and to obtain maximum results with

[By PAUL WOHL.]

the “Christian Science Monitor."] a minimum of tonnage. The units seem to have been withdS to home waters, the fast and valuable large vessels ply secure Si lanes between Formosa. Ind(£o»ws and the new bases on the frimreJ the South China and the Java Sea? whereas the actual combat zone visioned by middle-sized unite pick up supplies from depots at tK.I southern anchorage of the bridge ■ ships. The vast labour supply in Asiafie 1 ' ports and certain technical devio*' adopted by the Japanese merchant' ; marine facilitate these Most Japanese vessels have natli hatches and holds than similar tySi' v in other countries. The average nS 5 • of loading and unloading in Ajneriai ’ is 30 tons a hatch an hour. If a has six hatches instead of four it stow and break out 180 tons insteSj of 120 tons an hour, leave port sevenr days earlier and turn around qpiow,' than a vessel with fewer holds. *. ■ ;,’i The entire Japanese shipping pMWi has been predicated upon shorteSi!! the stay of ships in port. Many 5*2. . merchantmen are equipped with bSS. cranes, which enable a ship to dj?* - charge at least 45 tons a hatch an uSt instead of the customary 30 handled by manual labour. i Coast Creeping i To-day, the quick turn-around, ' her merchant marine allows Japan"v( ■ transport a greater amount of • sqa. l l !> plies with less tonnage. Another .Si}vantage is the replacement of moijKf units in Japan’s home trade by'* 1 -® 1 number of small vessels. ■’ may not be ocean-going in the motiftl i sense of the word, but they ’ar^|, * effective in inter-insular and4UMmp [ shipping as the schooners ; which America is employing in the Cvibb(*n.‘ ? Coast creeping has been Japatf* toJU,' i! tary strategy; it is her strateffijn £ battle of transportation. a In December, 1939, the official tetetlr Japanese shipping was tons. The visible and official shinpif reserve was around 640,000 grog* SS' «fi Since December, 1941, most |S| ships previously in waters crate® SI by the Allies have been added to;®* pool—around 900,000 tons. two-thirds of the tonnage engjffi-'j.S along the coasts of Japan and believed to have been freed foxmC’M tary purposes. This would Mikado's armed forces a reserve around 3,500,000 gross tons of fast!ffi'||| modern shipping. Great Britain in World War 1 kept more than 2,000,000 tons of ping at the disposal of her militifew authorities. Considering turn-round of. Japanese ' ships, 3,500,000 gross tons are so great rag® serve that the United Nations. atlpM present rate of sinking, cannot : %m|||| upon the collapse of the enemy’s!l>rimm| of ships, r jMjm Building Capacity V ||||| On the basis of Japan’s 2400 average, the transports, supply. stow and merchantmen sunk by-... AjM raiders in the period l| Harbour and the first part of Octo® sS 1942, aggregate 490,000 tons. But ctb| tsj. if every ship'sunk measured 40001* on the average, which for Japan w|ffl be very much, the total destroyed only a little more than 800,000 vgMi! f tons or about 75,000 tons a montt|l||.. ; | This is less than Japanese shipy<®;;;| are able to produce. Japan’s shipbuilding capacity, must be 1,000,000 gross tons a year. In which has been the official of Japanese merchant ship productionMl Nipponese yards—according to —launched about 612,000 gross shipping. Japan’s steel producti®p|||| day is more than 10 times as geM||BK in 1919, and although the lastlrOMiMß launching figure for Japan nroPefcwmß only 440,000 gross t6ns in 1938-dhei|||i can be little doubt that actual launqPM ings all over the Mikado’s realm sent a much greater amount of tobnagiiil Japan at present; should be ahle-’.ti||| produce considerably more ships after the last' war. , ‘ >■'3® In Hong Kong, the Japanese ,'hayj® conquered some of the most modaipl shipyards and repair shops in the.jrojpFast. Shipbuilding facilities also in Penang on the Malayan Peh|M|® sula, which fell almost undamaged MSB the enemy, and in siege-battered Smji|p pore. Indo-China and Thailand; as.wfflfe' as Shanghai, have extensive ress|fi|| shops, docks, and long experience ihl |f|| construction of middle-sized wqod| Ki and composite ships. I Several hundnflli wooden ships are at present undefico|®| struction in the Philippines; K Sumatra, and other places in the Dun K East Indies under the direction of tfejivH nicians and supervisors recently rived from Tokyo. ‘ .U|nH ' The exact amount of tonnage builifni Japanese-controlled ports is not kpodwH but the fact remains that ttwH launch more ships than PvH war statistics indicate, and appaiep9fl| more than the Allies have so far chlmß able to sink. Allied undersea and air operating from so distant baseffiMf® their striking power is consideraßp»|^