JAPAN’S MARITIME POSITION

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23843, 12 January 1943, Page 4

JAPAN’S MARITIME POSITION

EFFECT OF BIG LOSSES REVIEW OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES The increasing success of Allied attacks, principally by aircraft and submarines, on Japanese shipping, both naval and transport, raises the question of how long Japan could support shipping losses at a high rate. The question is governed by two considerations: Japan’s resources of shipping before she entered on an oceanic war; and her current construction capacity, says a writer in the “New Zealand Herald.”

There is a general impression that Japanese industry is neither creative nor particularly efficient. This is entirely untrue of shipbuilding at least. Japan’s naval architects, in particular, have proved themselves both daring and able; and, on the construction side, a generously subsidised industry has turned out warships with a speed that American record-breakers could well be proud of, using home-produced steel, armour, and equipment that have often been in advance of British, German, and American standards. If the quality of Japanese construction is high, capacity is another matter altogether. While such factors as steel production have been unduly minimised in the past, and while it has to be remembered that Japan, well aware of her maritime vulnerability, has been preparing for war for a generation on a colossal scale and with a degree of secrecy achieved by no other Power, nevertheless, the best authorities agree that Japan cannot support heavy losses at sea —not to a fraction of the extent that Britain and America can. Facilities for Naval. Construction Facilities for naval construction in Japan are probably much more highly developed than for merchant construction. There are a number of large dockyards and their capacities must be regarded as likely to be higher than indicated in the information available. The Yokosuka yard, established in 1864, has six slips, three of them large enough for battleships, and five graving docks, including two for battleships. The yard covers more than 120 acres and has been known to employ more than 17,000 men. The Kure dockyard, on the Inland Sea, has seven slips, two of 900 ft. and four graving docks, two large enough for battleships. Kure has launched armoured cruisers in six months from the laying of the keel and destroyers in five and a half months. It has large provision for submarine construction and for heavy-oil and turbine engines. The Sasebo dockyard, near Nagasaki, has five slips of cruiser capacity, six docks, including two of battleship size, and extensive machine shops. The 1920-28 naval programme included an additional battleship dock, a 50,000-ton floating dock, and much heavy equipment—a programme which has no doubt been improved on since. The yard at Maidzuru, on the Sea of Japan, is known ,to have been undergoing rapid expansion some years ago; and there are at least seven known smaller dockyards in addition. Apart from its own equipment, the Japanese Navy has the advantages of the phenomenally expanded commercial shipbuilding industry, the capacity of which was doubled between 1914 and 1920 and increased by half again in the next 10 years. While recent precise information is lacking, a general indication is given by an article six_ months ago in the “Economist,” which states: “Japan's plans . . . were gigantic. In 1941 a plan was officially published with a goal of 15.000,000 tons.

“The president of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha went further. Last November he declared that 20.000,000 tons were required for the post-war period.” Nevertheless, it has to be remembered that expansion has been from a small beginning, and that construction capacity, at least until very recently, was not that of a first-class maritime Power. The same authority considered that capacity up to 1941 was not more than 500.000 tons a year. The most interesting factor about the commercial yards is their adapta-