The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1943. Lae

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23843, 12 January 1943, Page 4

The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1943. Lae

Fresh news of the Allied success off Lae, in Northern New Guinea, increases its importance. All, or all but one, of six transports under convoy to Lae were sunk. Upwards of 100 Japanese escort aeroplanes were destroyed, at small cost. If any part of the Japanese reinforcements was landed, it was “ frag- “ mentary.” This brilliant news presents only one shadowed aspect. The convoy was sighted and engaged from the air only; the United Nations bombers concentrated on the transports; the Japanese naval escort seems to have escaped without damage. The facts emphasise again what has been apparent, of course, through the Papuan campaign: that the Japanese maintain with little or no naval interference their command of the waters north of New Guinea. General MacArthur’s troops have been supplied by air or by arduous porterage over the Owen Stanley range; the Japanese, though the process cost them dear and failed them in the end, carried in men and supplies by sea. Whatever has been paid for the complete victory won over Lieu-tenant-General Horii and his 15,000 men—and in suffering and sickness, if not in casualties inflicted by the enemy, it has been a heavy price—the cost would have been less, had the United Nations been able to contest Japan’s naval advantage. They lack a naval base so situated as to counter Japanese action based on New Britain. This factor, probably, more than any other, characterises the problem in New Guinea, now that General MacArthur’s force stands looking north to Lae and Salamaua. From Lae, Rabaul could be brought under sustained air attack, perhaps sufficient to neutralise its value as a forward Japanese base; while the Japanese hold Rabaul, any move against Lae —or beyond Lae—must be exceedingly difficult. Rabaul, the Solomons, and Northern New Guinea, in fact, together form the springboard from which any Allied offensive in this theatre, west or north, must be launched. The extraordinary Japanese concentrations, recently reported, need not be considered only as preparations to recover the initiative for a new southward drive; they may also be seen as preparations to obstruct and defeat the emerging possibilities of an Allied offensive. The heavy loss rates which the Japanese have suffered in the air and at sea may well have given them an additional motive to strike quickly—before the attrition of their offensive power and the rise of the United Nations’ have worked further, and too far, against them. Mr J. C. Harsch’s prediction, reported from New York this morning, is obviously no fanciful one. A critical battle, putting the issue beyond doubt, from the Solomons to Timor, and determining the direction of future action in the southwest Pacific, may be very near. Mr Curtin’s recent statement was significant in this respect, not in relation to the wider aspects of Allied strategy in the Pacific. This is made perfectly clear by his long and careful review of the war, at Canberra, on December 10. He then said in plain terms that, while Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt had not been able to accept in full the Australian Government’s views on strategy, forces, and supplies, he had received “certain assurances”; and the Australian Government had felt “ bound to accept ” the conclusions reached. One of these was that Germany must be beaten first; and Mr Curtin accordingly, in October, defined Australia’s task as that of holding the enemy in the Pacific. Second, Mr Curtin said that the orders given to General Mac Arthur specified the objectives of his operations, and Australia agreed. Third, Mr Curtin said that the Government had accepted General MacArthur’s command in the southwest Pacific area, on two conditions; that the command should, in fact, be unified, and that “ additional “ strength required,” beyond Australia’s maximum contribution, should be “furnished from other “ sources.” Finally, Mr Curtin expressly declared that the Australian Government retained full confidence in General Mac Arthur, and gave him full co-operation. This is enough to show that Mr Curtin s statement, or appeal, a few days ago, could not refer to United Nations operational plans in the area, or even to the broad strategy governing them; it could only icfei to the adequacy of the forces and supplies made available to prosecute them, in and through the situation now developing, particularly. This merely sets Mr Curtin’s complaint in perspective, however; it docs not discount its anxious importance. There may be two reasons to suppose that the United Nations face the Japanese, in the Coi’al Sea theatre, with resources not only smaller than they need but smaller than they could and should have had. One is that, after a year of planning, there is still no supreme Pacific command, with undivided responsibility for the conduct of the war in the Pacific. Second, there is some evidence that “ as “ much as four-fifths of the total “ American war production ” is now being applied to the needs of the vast and increasing American armies under training: in other words, too much is being held, too little sent oversea. But there are two reasons, also, to suppose that, though United Nations resources in the Pacific may be too narrow for safety this has been unavoidable. One, of course, is that priorities must be settled and observed in serving the prodigious demands of the total field of Allied operations. The second is that the rate at which supply deliveries can be increased, af air strength no less

than land, is determined by the number and size and speed of the ships that can be found to carry it. The United Nations want shipping more than they want any other means of waging war.