The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1942. Darlan and North Africa

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23818, 11 December 1942, Page 4

The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1942. Darlan and North Africa

Admiral Darlan’s status in North Africa was not set clear of ambiguity by Allied statements three weeks ago. President Roosevelt described his administrative authority as “ temporary ” but did not indicate what conditions would limit its duration or its extent. His statement that the future French Government would “ not be established “ by any individual in metropolitan “ France or oversea, but by the “ French people themselves,” was important as a statement of principle; but there were problems it did not solve. It did not, for example, even suggest how Admiral Durian’s powers and pretensions would be limited; and it did not solve or ease the obvious difficulty of reconciling Allied relations with Admiral Darlan on the one hand and General de Gaulle on the other. British official comment showed that Lieutenant-General Eisenhower’s negotiation with Admiral Darlan had been carried on and concluded without reference to the British Government. As a purely military negotiation, with the commander of the French sea and land forces, it was in every respect advantageous, and as such it is still defended, Thus, a Washington spokesman, on December 2, said; “We are working under a purely “ military understanding, without “ political implications.” Mr Cordell Hull is reported this morning to have said that, at the time of the British and American landing, “ the “ military problem was necessarily “ paramount,” Lieutenant-General Eisenhower did “ the most effective “ thing ” to solve it, and his “ ar- “ rangement continues to be a “ purely military affair.” Mr Roosevelt, also, as quoted by Mr Nash, reiterated to the Pacific War Council his explanation that the arrangement is a “ temporary military ” one. But these comments follow some disturbing developments, and do not make them look less disturbing. Admiral Darlan has proclaimed himself head of the State in North Africa, In that capacity he has, apparently with success, attempted to obstruct Allied propaganda from the French colonial radio stations and maintained his own. From affecting to speak with Petain’s authority he has passed to the assertion of his own. He has conveyed to Lieutenant-General Eisenhower “ French Africa’s best wishes for “ the Allied cause,” against which he was until a few weeks ago preaching and pursuing Vichy's policy of collaboration with Germany. “ I desire the victory of Ger- “ many,” said Laval; and Admiral Darlan continued to serve with him and under him. In these circumstances, references to the “ purely “ military ”, and “temporary mili- “ tary ” character of the arrangement under which Admiral Darlan speaks and acts in North Africa have little meaning. The powers he claims and exercises exceed those of any “ purely ” military arrangement. They are political—and farreachingly so. Either the arrangement approves or at least tolerates them; or else it fails to restrain a very able and ambitious man. The question is at what stage and by what means the necessary restraint will be imposed. Mr Eden has declared that the British Government is not in any way bound by Admiral Darlan’s proclamation. Such a disclaimer is not enough. President Roosevelt is reported to have “outlined steps to relieve the political difficulties in North Africa”— an indirect but sufficiently plain admission that the Eisenhower formula is inadequate: but what these steps are remains to be learned. It is to be hoped that they are not steps towards a compromise, though Mr Hull, in saying that the French will be able to choose their leaders “ after the war,” seems to hint at the possibility. There are clear leasons for uncompromising decisions. One was stated by General de Gaulle, when he said it was impossible to “ permit a situation where “a handful of men symbolising “ capitulation, collaboration, and “ usurpation ” could “ rot the libera- “ lion of France.” Another appears in the simple fact that it is safer to prevent men from assuming and wielding power than to rely on being able to deprive them of it later.