The Press WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1942. Allied Commands

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23810, 2 December 1942, Page 2

The Press WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1942. Allied Commands

Mr Churchill’s disclosure that the North African enterprise was “ under “ the direction and responsibility of “ the President of the United “ States,” who delegated the task of planning it in detail to LieutenantGeneral Eisenhower, throws an interesting light on the method of conducting joint military operations in the present war. This method has been frequently and sever, ly criticised, usually by those who advocate a “ unified command ” over all the armed forces of the United Nations. Thus, New Zealand’s Minister in Washington, Mr Walter Nash, has gone to the limits of diplomatic discretion in advocating the creation of a Supreme War Council. And in the latest issue of "Foreign “ Affairs ” Major George Fielding Eliot, the well-known American military writer, has this to say on the subject:

Twenty-five years ago the leaders of the Allied Powers had learned by defeat and cruel disappointment, at the price of the lives of thousands t of brave men and the untold suffering entailed by the unnecessary prolongation of the war. the fact that a coalition cannot successfully make war unless and until it possesses an authoritative inter-allied agency for the unified direction of the war. It is a sad commentary on human intelligence that this lesson, bought so dearly at the price of blood and treasure has now apparently to bo relearned all over again at the same price before it can be applied to conditions almost precisely identical to those of 1917. Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt have, it is true, made some tentative steps towards the creation of a unified command, as for instance in the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. So far, however, this and similar agencies have functioned purely as advisory bodies. In the main, it would seem that the object of Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt has been to keep resp. .ribility for grand strategy in their own hands, to allocate responsibility for particular enterprises m one or other of their governments, and beyond that to place each enterprise under the direct control of one man with plenary powers. They have concentrated above all on ensuring that in each enterprise there is a clear allocation of responsibility and no possibility of timewasting disputes between governments or services. It should be noted that in the last war the unified command established by the Allied Powers in 1917 did not achieve either of these things. Foch was a figurehead—a most valuable figurehead because his own confidence never failed and his mere physical presence inspired confidence in others. But the fact re-

mains that he seldom gave detailed orders and that when he did give them they were seldom carried out. He was a source of inspiration to all who came in contact with him, but he was in no real sense the commander in chief of the Allied armies, Mr Churchill and Mr Roosevelt have understood much better than some of their critics that it is much easier to create a command which is nominally vested with authority over the armed forces of a coalition than to create the administrative machinery which enables such a command to reach decisions and to carry them out. In the face of the great political and geographic difficulties which stand in the way of establishing a real supreme command, they have preferred to seek effective unity on a small scale in preference to ineffective unity on a grand scale. The advantages and the shortcomings of this limited unity are seen in the Pacific. The success of the United Slates forces in the Solomons habeen due to the fact that the United S'ates Government has sole responsibility in the Pacific and that in the South Pacific this responsibility has b cn delegated to one service—the United States Navy. By this means planninr and execution of operations have been greatly simplified. The defect of the system is seen in the artificial and harmful separation between General MacArthur’s command, which is an Army command, and the South Pacific command.