FRENCH NORTH AFRICA: WHAT THE AXIS LOST

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23809, 1 December 1942, Page 4

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA: WHAT THE AXIS LOST

blockade completed

As General Smuts has pointed out the Axis regard U-boat warfare as their last hope of avoiding defeat xne Anglo-American operations in Norm Africa will, if carried to Bizerte and the Mediterranean is reopened, relieve enormously the whole Allied shipping position, with a consequent lessening effect of U-boat war. The distance from Southampton to Suez by the Cape is 11.070 miles. The reopening of the Mediterranean route will cut the distance from Southampton to Suez to 3070 miles. Thus, ships will be able to make between three to four times as many journeys per year from Britain to the Near East. Likewise the distance from Southampton to India via the Cape is 12,500 miles, and via the Mediterranean 6030 miles, a saving in shipping of approximately 70 per cent. Submarine Warfare Turning now to the Atlantic, there is no official evidence that German 11boats refuelled from African ports, but many press reports asserted this was done. In any case, President Roosevelt on November 8, 1942, declared that the Axis intention was to occupy French North Africa. Thus the Anglo-Amen-can occupation of the north and west of Africa, subsequently extended to Dakar, robs Germany of U-boat bases along 1750 miles of the coast of French West Africa, from the Ivory Coast to Spanish Morocco. The importance of this can be seen from some figures. It is barely 2000 miles from French Guinea to the Brazilian coast across the South Atlantic wasp waist by fat. Helena, which is well down towards the Cape of Good Hope. Within the 2000miles U-boat range from the French Ivory Coast is the South American Guinea coast, and the approaches to the Caribbean are within 2500 miles range from Dakar. The North African campaign leaves Germany with Brest and St. Nazaire the nearest bases for submarines operating on the South Atlantic routes. Next, the occupation of Morocco makes available to the R.A.F. airfields at Casablanca and Rabat within approximately 1200 miles of the nearest point in Britain. This means enormously increased facilities for Coastal Command operations against U-boat patrols over the whole of the Atlantic approaches to Gibraltar. From Britain, Coastal Command aircraft can in future patrol from Plymouth to Casablanca, with refuelling points at both ends. ,For all the above reasons the North African campaign should mean an immense easing of the whole United Nations shipping position. Land Communications Consider next the land lines of communication. So long as the German threat to occupy French North Africa existed, the vital Allied supply route from Takoradi and the Cameroons across the Chad to Khartoum was threatened, since it was outflanked along hundreds of miles by French positions on the Ivory Coast and Dahomey. The last strategic loss to the Axis is the greatest of all: The exposure of the whole south flank of the Axis positions in Europe. This has already been dealt with fully in the press reports, but the following figures may be useful as a supplement. The distances by air from Bizerte to Naples is 350 miles, to Rome 400 miles, to Sardinia a little more than 100 miles, and to Sicily under 100 miles. The flying distance from a point east of Algiers to Marseilles and Toulon is under 400 miles, to Genoa it is 500 miles. One other strategic point little stressed is that the sudden exposure of the Axis southern flank renders obsolete the immense labour Germany has put into developing the east to west strategic lines of communication in Europe, while neglecting the north to south lines. Her whole effort must now be switched to the improvisation of the north to south strategic lines. Economic Balance-sheet The biggest economic loss to the Axis in North Africa is the complete

[By a London Correspondent] tt,. following article is an authoritative assessment of the strategic and eMnlmic gains to the United Nations from their occupation of French North Africa.

stoppage of supplies of natural phosphates. Phosphates play a vital role in European agriculture owing to the particular importance of root tuber crops—particularly potatoes and beets. Before the war the normal phosphate requirement of German-occupied Europe was over 4.000.000 tons, of which over 95 per cent, was imported. Of these imports 70 per cent, came from French Africa. Owing to the leniency of the British Navy to Vichy, ship, ments from French North and West y frica were the last major hole iihggxr complete blockade of German-occjflfW Europe. Consequently, in 1941 j Ge.T. Man-occupied Europe still received jp . proximately 1,500,000 tons of phosphates from French North Africa, that is about 35 per cent, of pre-war requirements. All these supplies will now be cut off. Next year's root tuber har- | vests in German-occupied Europe may be gravely affected, especially since German farmers have already for three years, as pointed out above, been receiving approximately only one-third of their phosphate requirements. The next most important economic result of the occupation of French North Africa is the cutting of the supply of vegetable oils from French West Africa, which mainly came from Senegal via Dakar. From this source German-occupied Europe received in 1941 somewhat more than 100,000 tons of vegetable oils (of which 80,000 tons were ground nut and the rest palm linseed, etc.). This is one basis of the present German normal consumers’ fat ration of 200 grams per week. Cutting this import from French Africa is equivalent to cutting completely the fat ration for a whole year of nearly 10,000,000 Germans. This figure alone shows the great economic importance of the present United Nations action, stopping completely the last hole in the British blockade of German Europe. North African Exports Other imports from French North Africa to German-occupied Europe in 1941 were: Wheat, 200,000 tons; barley. 100.000 tons; wine, 88,000,000 gallons; fruit and vegetables, 125,000 tons. A very large percentage of these food supplies went direct to Germany. For example, the Germans claimed they took only 40 per cent, of the fruit and vegetable imports, but it was more like 80 per cent. Germany took from France in 1941-42, 550,000 tons of wheat, and for the 1942-43 period she demanded 800,000 tons. Moroccan fisheries are also considerable; the Germans had just arranged for the export to them of the whole Moroccan sardine catch. Other imports from North Africa were high-grade iron ore from Morocco, useful for mixing with lower grade German ores. (Approximately 2.250.000 tons of metal content was exported from North Africa to Germanoccupied Europe per annum before the war.) In cobalt for hardening steel North Africa was Germany’s only remaining source to cover the 1942 deficiency. About 7 per cent, of German wool supplies came from North Africa. In view of the desperate German shortage of woollen garments this is important. , , , Finally, it is estimated that between 200.000 to 250,000 tons of French shipping was in North African ports at the moment of occupation. This is a loss to the Axis. Nor can the Germans claim that by occupying Vichy France they have gained any effective economic compensation for these losses, since the Vichy industries were already working completely under German, domination. Vichy food supplies were , part of the German fortress storg.The only possible advantages are Ki k A enforced conscription of French lab*!'l|, in unoccupied France. (Approximately one third of the French workers livf! in Vichy France, but this is outweighed by the German dispersal of manpower owing to occupation troops, administration, etc.) Moreover, the occupation of Vichy France now exposes to the full weight of British bombing both from north and south those industrial areas of occupied France which for a long time have been working for Germany.