The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1942. Italy and the Future

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23802, 23 November 1942, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1942. Italy and the Future

The shattering of the Axis army in the Western Desert, the Allied occupation of French North Africa, and the prospect that the Allies will shortly control the Mediterranean have revived speculation about the possibility of an Allied offensive against the Italian mainland in preference to an attempt to break through the strong German defence line in western Europe. Economically and militarily, Italy has always been a liability to Germany. Shortly before the war, a German military publication thus estimated (in percentages) Italy’s capacity to supply herself with essential war commodities: mineral oil, 0.7; rubber, 0; coal, 3.2; chromium, 0; iron and steel, 37.1; wolfram, 0; phosphates, 0; manganese ore, 14.2; tin, 0; machinery, 14.2; nickel, 0.1; lead, 69.7; copper, 3.2. There were only two possible benefits in Italy becoming a belligerent: her North and East African territories might have been the means of establishing Axis control over the Mediterranean and of breaking through the sea blockade, and her numerically large army, navy, and air force, thrown into the scales at the crucial moment, might have enabled Germany to deliver the knock-out blow. But it was always obvious that in ? long war Italy’s inability to keep up the equipment of her armed forces would make her a liability to her partner. On the balance, she has been a liability ever since Graziani missed his chance in the Western Desert, and now that Italian North Africa is as good as lost she is an almost total liability. Her air force is now negligible; her army is deficient in morale and equipment; only the carefully-husbanded Italian navy remains a tolerably efficient fighting force. Moreover, the amazingly small losses of British bomber forces in the recent heavy raids on northern Italy show that Italian air defences are inadequate and inefficient. In the circumstances, the long Italian coastline seems to offer the Allies the easiest point of entry to continental Europe. Whether an invasion of Italy would be the quickest and least expensive way to victory over the Axis is, however, a question not easily answered. The strength of the Axis lies in German industry and the German military machine; as long as they remain intact the Allies are a long way from victory. The defeat of Italy will not weaken the German economy; it will on the contrary relieve it of a heavy burden. Nor will the defeat of Italy uncover a vulnerable German flank, for in the south Germany is protected by vast mountain barriers. Moreover, if the Allies elect to fight in Italy, they once again give the Axis the benefit of shorter and more secure lines of communication. The short route to victory, the route which involves for the Allies the shortest line of communications, is the historic route through Flanders or the Low Countries to the Rhineland. Whether it is a practicable route depends, in the last analysis, on whether the offensive weapons at the disposal of the Allies are strong enough to avert the sort of deadlock which occurred in the west after the first few months of the last war. It is at least arguable that, while the defensive is in the ascendancy, as; it was from 1915 to 1918, the circuitous flank route is in the end shorter than a batteringram assault on the enemy’s main positions. These are matters on which only experts can have a useful opinion. But whatever course may be decided upon, it is necessary not to lose sight of the obvious truth that the elimination of Italy would be only a small step towards winning the war.