WHY BRITISH TANKS WERE DISAPPOINTING

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23740, 11 September 1942, Page 4

WHY BRITISH TANKS WERE DISAPPOINTING

WAR PRODUCTION

(By a Special Correspond! In June two years ago, when he had been in office little more than a month, Mr Churchill called for a new to be designed for mass production. We were then producing Matildas, Cruisers. and Valentines, and since that time 4500 tanks had beensent to the Nile Valley and over 2000 to Russia. Mr Churchill called for a tank more powerfully armed an £ heavier armour. The Minister of Suiply, at that time Mr already decided by the end of May to set up a Tank Board. . The Tank Board was composed of independent members and me *pbers representing the War Office and the Ministry of Supply.' Before, it was fuliy constituted the chairman, Sir Alexander Roger, and the threeoffier independent members were asked to pro ceed “with all expedition to advise the Minister on “the . whol n e nrf regarding the production and design of tanks’’ and the action, Within a fortnight—the time? were desperate—the Minister had> received and considered the report and he and the Minister of War had agreed in principle that the recommendations sholild be adopted. The main recommendations were that; . (1) In-order to secure quick production, control of'the organisation of the Tank Department in the Ministry of Supply must be in the hands o civilians now engaged in rapid commercial production methods; and (2) That the Army must state its demands unequivocally, through one focal point, and -at to this end there should be appointed in the War Office a general officer of high rank and recent fighting experience wuh tanks.. A proviso to the acceptance of the recommendations was that they should be carried out as expeditiously as possible ‘‘always having regard to the fundamental necessity of expanding current production to the utmost. The Year of the Test It was the Government’s policy ter design a new tank not merely to match the German tanks of 1940, but, as Mr Churchill told the House of Commons on July 2, one “adapted to the waf conditions to be foreseen in 1942.’ In 1942 [Mr Churchill repeated]—that was the test.” This is the seventh month of 1942, and the first tank of a type answering to Mr Churchill’s demand has not yet been used in battle. A later type, with greater speed, was designed a year later. Two of the earliest of these tanks were sent by Mr Churchill to Egypt “to be tested and made desert-worthy,” but his statement to the House was that neither had yefc reached a stage where it can be employed at that distance. Mr Lyttelton told Parliament that the defects of the first of the two types have been largely eliminated and that it can be relied on to give half the mileage of a perfect tank. This tank, the Churchill, was ordered “off the draw-ing-board” and without the customary model tests. The reason for taking this risk, which the Government firmly uphold, was that rapid production was of the highest moment; that numbers were of greater importance than maximum reliability, and that “the account still stands heavily in favour of the numbers as against the mileage.” It will not be. forgotten that in the summer of 1940 the Government and the services were confronted with the imminent threat of. invasion and that the danger revived in th 4 spring of 1941. It will also be remembered that Mr Churchill’s demand had been for a new tank for 1 use with “the Army this year, and it may be assumed that, though to equip many panzer divisions with heavy tanks within two years would require a large organisation and the development of much new workshop capacity, there was not at the first the same urgency for production of a heavier tank still to be designed as for the replacement of the equipment which the Army lost when France fell. Now we have reached the time for which Mr Churchill demanded the new tank. Lessons of Libya In Libya our Army had in the re-, cent battles a number of the Americanbuilt General Grant tanks, with an excellent 75 ram, gun, though its arc of fire is restricted, but the greater part of the tank force was made up of Matildas, Crusaders, Valentines,' and Homes, armed with the two-pounder gun which (“The Times” special correspondent wrote in a message from the Western Desert on June 22) “has again and again been proved, almost useless against the German tanks, which arp all equipped with at least a 47 mm. gun.” Even the Italian and French tanks with 50 mm. and 47 mm. guns "outranged and outgunned everything on our side except the “General Grants,” and the Grants were not on the field of battle in sufficient numbers to turn the scale. Again the enemy had the advantage in anti-tank guns. Our new six-pounder, which arrived in Egypt only a short time before the opening of the campaign, pftoved Itself an excellent weapon, but the supply was “quite inadequate.” In the Parliamentary debate the Government spokesman did not come nearer, to the actual and present state of tank production than was necessary to describe the equipment of the Bth Army. The comparison with the equipment, tank for tank, of Rommel’s force was much to our disadvantage, but in comparing, before the operations began, the relative strength of the two armies—a task not attempted here—there was no lack ’ of confidence in

»Nt of the “London Times.’ 1 ) ■ ! the quantity (exceeding the enemy's) - and quality of our equipment to vnr ■ rant an offensive which the enemy’* ■ attack anticipated by only a week » ; two. . ■ ' The anxious thought in th« publie ;r mind extends beyond Libya and con. cerns also our readiness in tanks for “the coming operations" discussed fo Washington by Mr Churchill and Pre. : sident- Roosevelt which “will divert ' German strength from the attack - Russia.” The Parliamentary debate - have not lessened the anxiety. ■ jjf Lyttelton’s speech indeed gave it a i' foundation in official admissions and '■ clearly the facts require energetic and : perhaps drastic action. A series of questions might begin '■ with the second major recommend*.'. : tion of the independent membersrf' the first Tank Board, which was that- ! the Army should be required to‘state i its demands unequivocally and throughan officer of high rank with racial 0 fighting experience with tanks.'; Army stated its demands uneqdmw. ally were they in terms which afi mitted of rapid mass production!- B-f would be essential that the' Army'fy should make up its mind quickly ojT3 a few'types to be produced in the greatest possible numbers and ihjtha 'j shortest possible time. Mass production requires simplifies* << tion of construction and therefore the closest co-operation between the Wtr '*’ Office and industry, through the TMSk ’; Board and the director-general of.tank supply and the chief engineer for. Itank 1 tank • design. Simplification of cdhstructfoh ’; and equipment economises materipjii manpower, and machine-power. -ghd "'f therefore also time. The ordering jig,? the A.22 tank, later named the Churchill, into production from the drgwin# ■ instead of after- model trials hakifot i been a reassuring experiment, but none ! the less it is essential to repress (atc«ki,t sive experimentation. For mass jwoduction industry requires a clear. naUi and that cannot be obtained ifde'gigfa.f or specifications are of a character f which cannot be turned out by existing | and available machinery. In the design- | ing and specification of tanks thlrfi id room for so many opinions that the I Tank Board must have a Jmethfid •of d reaching finality for any fciven 'itype d with no loss of time. Moreover, when manufacturing -ex* “I perience or service, experience pofiStt?;. to modifications—as they may be-ex*i. pected to do—is there an method of profiting from the expert. ’, ence? The service experience and - especially fighting experience should ;} be directly made knowri to the coif. ' trollers of design and research as as the Director-General of Supply; No. ■ thing should stand in the way—neither:? Army regulations, nor .etiquette; .• U?;?’. Fighting Experience- ; Fighting experience is of fee utmost??, importance, and both from.lilbya and?' from Russia that experlenfeags tw ; .?' able. The, could with advantage hjoja>B9Wfe3fc»: presentative with the, any rate in lLibya. Itformed; quarters our Army gained in ago so emphasised the heavily armed -tpnks that s tK(UM|Sm;fef official desire forytwo ’ r 6-pounder guns, for everyJ^ne':. with 2-pounders. The effect oaMamfe and production of the men- fighting the tanks is not kraSmle but the recent fighting revealedl'ifed,'.-; ; the recent Parliamentary. debatj^Myej;,.admitted continued superiority ,“ German tanks,, two years signing of our heavier tanks haddje-? gun. Our Army, with deflcienclef’W-y? made good-, by the number of'GfetiW? Grants at the front, has ; capped by its inferior equiprnCnt-rteidr-. the General Grant is, an tank and not a product of , design and manufacture. ‘ yS-Vl Ip the .i,nqffirx.._that^UW^|kfflKf-I into tank design and ■prdducunfr-,;.'’ which certainly should cal inquiryr-the Tank Boara Jwlf not escape—and will not want-te evafiji; —examination. Men weUvqprifeMß technically and individually xofv«9p positions they hold may lack the power of deeiSlpn 'aßdiOT.,'~; enterprise required by the urgpncTW;'-' military needs.-; Personality and jartvs^.- ; may alike peter out in board’s business and the'inßhnfef/(«5 transacting it are not. mafefeJ-fpr PIW?, lie disclosure, but tain the frequency of its pjeetlnes, W subjects discussed?and the’time lafriff; any, between preliminary • and decision and the application decision 4o actual supply.* ; Board’s Besponsibjdli^p^M If the original authority of thoJjoanlt , remains unimpaired it has ity in both the production and fe&Wiit sign of tanks. The Army’s demand*? stated “unequivocally” will be tolamif. of armament, armour, speedy ana eß*j? durance, numbers and adaptation 1»conditions of climate, and country. CM. a, programme approved by the wa| Cabinet and determining the .types M.be built, the Tank Board’s duty is plan production in every detail. It- naff been proclaimed to the world'that.pufjj tanks in Libya have been inferior ,w«. the German as a striking force—a fle%. hitherto without battleships—and-fet? overhaul of the organisation mui|>. leave out nothing, but must examine, if' ; relation to. the programme laid down? all the stages of design and productions?, and test efficiency with a keen eye simplification of specification, stafli ’- dardisation, the interchange of ence among manufacturers, the ovofccoming of difficulties, and quick W|?, sponse to the lessons of service expert* ence. ' . T