Evacuation Plans

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23579, 5 March 1942, Page 4

Evacuation Plans

The Prime Minister’s statement on the possible evacuation of women and children from areas of military danger is clear enough in essentials to dispel some dangerous anxieties and perhaps even more dangerous theories of what should be clone. As the threat of direct attack in one form or another has come nearer to the New Zealand coast, some have asked whether women and children should not be moved from probable danger zones into areas likely to be safe, or safer; others have had no doubt about it. But their belief that evacuation is essential and should be carried out at once is probably drawn from a quite false analogy with the evacuation of children, principally, from the enormously more crowded industrial cities and i ports of Britain. The great difference in population density is not the : ,-inly falsifying factor in the analogy. | Britain’s industrial cities and the i major ports were obvious targets for j concentrated and continuous air ati tank; and when evacuation was or- ! dered, such attack was expected at i ch r ’’.c r.o'ice or none. Though more i rli«tant then, than after the oceupai Lnn. rf L’c Low Countries and the ■ e’e fea: • •[ France, the enemy’s bases ; were within moy striking distance. 'The wCLon in New Zealand to-day ; large!” dissimilar. Nobody can jerric;.,”” contend that the women ; Color of ail major ports and 1.,,-,;;,, w:'l;i:i range of a raiders ' t is w it; aircraft, should be re- ! ~ rv .. i p-,. country because such j„ .. r Code sea and air | cod y.vi'ro at one such port 'coo • wi warning; and it is ; ~r ■ ; t.-.oro iva onaoio to sug,r ,' - i n s”, o si: edd be made : , ro sr- o,' < i’ poinds on .r. c • ti-r e irn’." may attack in if,-',-. c;sw goer! his landirc. and ■ pur.-u” a .-tu'-mpt L- master the Icn'.jrii! . I' i' no. doubt conceivable irymt, : <i a:!, iiugid take the rte* 1 fender.; by .• alter a long I voyage lb: ■ d ■■ r. atcna’l and ! v >i:;.rd.. ‘ bur. ptans lor the proic. lion it' b.c pc-iple must be ha--''d on ca w-fniiv calculated probabilities i■ l l!r. 1 ; tb.r n on tho worst but unlikely no.r-ioildy. Moreover, a large section of the people could not be removed, re-established, and maintained away from their homes without scrjmis disorganisation, in effect diverting time, labour, and re-

sources from the tasks of production j and defence, which are definite and [ urgent, to one that w’ould be pre- :' mature and immoderate; and this 1 sort of disproportion has no place 'in prudent plans. As for the need to 1 consider the conditions in which evacuation may become necessary r and to prepare to meet them, it has ; not been overlooked; and the Prime • Minister's statement that E.P.S. organisers have “ already been ■ “ directed ”to work out transport and accommodation schemes confirms a fact which is fairly well known. These preparations, certainly well : advanced beyond the paper stage in Canterbury, ought to be completed, as Mr Fraser says, without delay. But his comment on this aspect of the subject is less important than the . first thing he had to say: that the War Cabinet and the General Staff 1 are “ the only authorities who can ' “ possibly be in possession of authen- , “ tic information as to the degree of "danger threatening any particular ■‘area." and that the responsibility ; for deriding to move any part of the 1 population and issuing instructions accordingly must rest on the Aimv. : This can, and should, be unhesitat- ; ingly accepted. If it is. neither the Government nor E.P.S. will be ; troubled further by an irrational agitation. If the Army is to decide i and give orders, however, and the 1 E.P.S. organisation is to carry them i out in accordance with a pre- ! arranged scheme, more is necessary ; than that the E.P.S. executive should 1 “ act in close collaboration with the i “ military authorities and the emer- ( “ gency traffic police," as the Prime . Minister says. It will need to con- ; cert plan and action closely with the regular police, with Government de- ; partments, Railways and Transport - particularly, but with others as well. • and with local authorities also. If i this is to be successfully done, it is ■ essential that the E.P.S. executive's i control, subject to military older, t should be complete and unqualified, > and that the co-operation of the i State departments and local authori- > ties should be assured on that con- - dition. Notoriously, Government de--3 partments like their own way and - are inclined to take it. There is 1 sufficient evidence to make it necest sary to say that they must not be [ allowed to take their own way inde- - pendcntly of E.P.S. measures and [ control. ______________