The Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 16, 1942. Air Power in the Pacific War

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23538, 16 January 1942, Page 4

The Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 16, 1942. Air Power in the Pacific War

Three recent statements have helped to define the strategic problem confronting fhe Allies in the South China Sea and the countries bordering it. The first is Colonel Frank Knox’s warning that “ favourable “ and dramatic developments ” in the Pacific naval situation cannot be expected in the near future. The

- elements of distance and time,” he added, “ and the necessarily wide ‘‘distribution of our naval forces “ preclude an early conclusive showdown with the Japanese Navy. “ _ . The second statement, credited to “ a high British authority “in Singapore,” is that the Allies will have air superiority in Malaya and the outlying islands within three days. The third statement, which seems a partial contradiction of the second, is that no aerodromes now remain in British hands on the Malay peninsula, though there are several landing grounds, while Singapore island itself has several aerodromes. The Allies will not begin to regain what they have lost in the Pacific theatre of war until they have succeeded in bringing together, within striking distance of the South China Sea, a concentration of naval forces strong enough to challenge the Japanese Navy. Colonel Knox has made it clear that it must be a matter of months before this concentration of forces is achieved. In the meantime, lacking command of the seas, the Allies will find the task of reinforcing their armies in Malaya and the Netherlands Indies at best hazardous. Those armies must continue for many weeks to fight delaying actions. relying mainly on such resources as are now available to them. Allied air forces in this area, however, can be and are being reinforced because bombers can be flown there from the United States. Even now, the Allies probably have parity with Japan in bomber strength in the South China Sea and will therefore be able to restrict Japanese shipping movements and to damp down Japanese air activity by bombing enemy aerodromes. Two factors, however, are limiting the development of Allied air superiority. One is the difficulty of retaining sufficient aerodromes. The other is the continued acute shortage of fighter aircraft, which have to be shipped from the United-States. The next few months will provide, in the South China Sea, the supreme test of the bomber’s usefulness in war.