Germany and the Caucasus

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23535, 13 January 1942, Page 4

Germany and the Caucasus

Most notable of Russian successes in the last two weeks has been the recapture of the Kerch peninsula in the Crimea, while, by further landings at Eupatoria. north of Sebastopol, a military situation has been developed, threatening the whole of the German forces in the Crimea. The Germans themselves, according to cable messages, now admit that fighting in the Crimea has reached a critical stage. Defeat of their forces here would mean far more to the Germans than the loss of hard-won territory; it would wreck a whole strategic scheme for the capture of the oilfields of the Caucasus. Six weeks ago the Germans were in sight of their goal. Their advance along the shores of the Sea of Azov had given them Rostov, key town on the railway linking the oilfields with Russia's industrial centres. Except for a small area round the Russian naval base of Sebastopol, they held the Crimea and at Kerch on its eastern tip they were separated only by a narrow strait from the Caucasian mainland. Everything was being prepared for the final stages of the German drive to

the oilfields. In part the original plan had been modified under the pressure of timely British and Russian action—the suppression of the revolt in Iraq, the Syrian campaign, and the occupation of Iran; but the threat from the German armies so strongly placed in the north, the probability that the fall of Sebastopol would be followed by an attack across the Black Sea to Batum, and the possibility of a move through Turkey to provide the southern arm of the pincers, made the position serious for the Allies. Just at this stage Marshal Timoshenko turned back the German armies at Rostov and so developed his initial success that they were soon in full retreat beyond Taganrog, ultimately taking a stand to defend Mariupol. Part of the German threat to the Caucasus was removed, at least for a time. This was the first important Russian success of the war. Even more important was the recapture of Kerch and Theodosia in the Crimea, which demonstrated Russian ability to undertake the most difficult form of of-fensive-assault from the sea. If this Russian campaign results in the relief of Sebastopol and the recapture of the Crimea, possibilities of early German action against the Caucasus will be reduced to assault by sea-borne troops across the Black Sea and to the opening up of a new campaign through Turkey or Syria. So long as Russia holds Sebastopol and can use its Black Sea fleet from there, a sea-borne invasion of the Caucasus must be hazardous. But other possibilities cannot be overlooked. It is characteristic of the German manner of war, whenever things are going badly on one front, to open a new campaign elsewhere. Although it might be a desperate throw, a new front in the Near East would serve a triple purpose for the Axis just now, by furthering German ambitions towards the Caucasus and the Suez Canal, drawing off British strength from Libya, and possibly delaying reinforcement of the Far East. Certainly other lines of action are possible, particularly an assault through Spain on Gibraltar, or the taking over of the French fleet; but these could be simultaneous with action in the Near East, and not necessarily alternative to it. Turkey is a focal point of German strategy in the Near East, although not the only such point. Everything would depend on whether Turkey would yield or oppose the passage of Axis armies through her territory. The Russian successes which may drive Germany to try this new front are very likely to stiffen Turkish determination to resist. Apart from this, it may be a question whether the German threat, or the price offered, is big enough. The threat would depend on the forces Germany could add to those already in the Balkans for joint action with the armies of her subject nations. Should the Germans decide against a Turkish venture, the possibility remains of an attempt to by-pass Turkey with a sea-borne attack on Syria. That such an operation would be extremely dangerous is no guarantee that it would not be attempted. Cable messages a month ago suggested the possibility of German attacks on the coasts of Syria, Palestine, or even Egypt, either as part of a major strategic scheme or for diversion purposes. The reported massing of Axis troops in Western Thrace, near the Turkish frontier with Greece, would fit in equally well with an attempt to coerce Turkey or with coastal attacks in the eastern Mediterranean. Whatever Germany’s action may be, the reassuring fact is that it must now be an improvisation, or an attempt to carry out part of a scheme originally larger, and consequently cannot be so formidable. For that, Russian successes on the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov are mainly responsible.