WEAKNESSES SHOWN IN JAPANESE ARMY

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23493, 22 November 1941, Page 8

WEAKNESSES SHOWN IN JAPANESE ARMY

[By H. G. W. WOODHEAD, Far Easl SHANGHAI, October 28. Sino-Japanese hostilities are now well into their fifth year. During this protracted war Japanese forces have succeeded in occupying practically all of China’s important coastal ports, and have advanced inland, up the Yangtse, to a maximum distance of about 965 miles. What forces have been employed, what casualties have been sustained, have never been officially revealed. For the last two years Japanese official quarters have been talking of the loss of 100,000 men in what has been described as a “hoiy war.” Losses in dead alone must have been four or five times that figure. The number of men rendered unfit by wounds and sickness may be conservatively estimated at a million. So that if one placed the total casualties of this costly venture at two million or more orje would be making a conservative eptimfte is generally believed that the maximum number of Japanese troops overseas —in Manchukuo, China, ana Indo-China—at any one time has not been more than one million. The total maie population of Japan proper is between 35 and 40 millions, of whom about 50 per cent, are of military age (between 17 and 45). The average physique of the Japanese is poor, and their stamina unsatisfactory. But it may be assumed that in an emergency five to six million men could be conscripted for military service. So that it may be said that at no time has Japan had in the field in China more than 20 per cent, of her potential military strength. The difficulties of transporting and maintaining an army of more than 1,000,000 strong overseas are admittedly serious, though they are not so serious in the matter of foodstuffs, owing to the ability of the Japanese to live on the country—and even to requisition and export foodstuffs to their native land. The equipment of an army of more than 1.060.000 or so with modern tanks, artillery, and aircraft is probably beyond Japan s capacity. Moreover, in the initial—and more especially in the later-phase of the conflict the Japanese general staff has felt it necessary to maintain large forces in Manchukuo, Korea, and Japan itself in case of hostilities extending to the north or south. Japan* military operations m China, therefore, cannot- be considered to have been an all-out effort, in which her full military strength has been exerted in an attempt to conquer the country.' Fighting a foe which has been sadly deficient in modern equip-ment-including light and heavy artillery tanks, and aircraft— relatively small Japanese forces hive been able to smash their way through Chinese resistance at any -selected pomt.ln many instances, however, they have round it impossible, or mexpedient. to hold their gams, and, latterly, more than ever, their operations have assumed a “hit and run" character. In no single instance have. they gamed a victory over the Chinese armies comparable—if one may Judge from captures of prisoners and equipment with German in France or Russia, or British victories in Northern Africa. No recent statistics of. capture* have been published, but seeing that the official estimate of rifles captured between July, 1937, and June, 1940, was only 357,701, it would appear that the total number of prisoners takeh in the first three „J e j rS cnn f nM° St Time .•annot have exceeded 500,000. imae and again Japanese military spokesmen have announced-that large Chinese forces have been encircled and unable to escape capture. But even m such extensive encircling operations as those which resulted in the capture of Hsuchowfu, all but. a few thousand o the surrounded Chinese troops appea to have made good their escape. What is Wrong With Army? The conflict in Europe— especially recent operations in Soviet Russia should have given the Japanese High Command “furiously to thmk Both in France and in Russia the German armies have made advances and achieved in a few weeks, or eygn days decisive results more subptentialafha those accomplished by the Japanese in China -in more than 50 months of warfare. The same has been of British operations in Northern and North-eastern Africa. Here, moreover, the terrain and dimatic co^iti were even more difficult than m China. British troops had to fight m extremes of temperatdre, in areas devoid of roads or water transport m waterless deserts and ram jungles against forces which boasted of their modern equipment One is tempted, therefore, to ask, what is wrong with the. Japanese Army. • Admitting the vastness of China and the difficulties of transpor-. tation, it nevertheless appears that, ij Japan had possessed an army equipped according to European standards, and employed at its full strength, the conquest of all China ought to have proved possible within a maximum period ot two years. It has not only not been effected; it now seems improbable that it ever will be, as material aid to the Chungking Government from the United States and the British Empire increases in volume. The Japanese in 1937 considered that they had an army equal in leadership and equipment to that of any European Power. They must since have been sadly disillusioned. Their first expeditionary force took four months to dislodge the Chinese armies from the

ern Correspondent of “The Press.”] Shanghai area—a task which either the British or the German Army would undoubtedly have completed within as many weeks. But it was perhaps at Changfukeng and Nomenhan that the Japanese Army received the greatest jolts to its pride. The Kwantung Army, which had always affected to regard the Soviet forces with contempt, found that on both occasions it had made a costly mistake. It was admitted that it sustained 18,000 casualties at Nomenhan—without distortging the Soviet forces from their poaftions. And no one credited the fantastic figures of Soviet aircraft losses issued : by the Kwantung High Command. Observers Not Impressed ■ It may be doubted whether relatively the Japanese Army of to-day i$ any more efficient or well-equipped, compared with the British and German Armies, than it was in 1937-39. Military science has advanced by leaps and bounds since the outbreak of the European war, and the Japanese, even if furnished by their Nazi friends with the latest designs of aircraft and mechanised armaments, would still be, months behind in bringing them up to production stage.' No neutral observers ■ have been greatly impressed by their . bombing—though most of it has been carried out without serious opposition —or their use of mechanised equip-., ment and artillery. General von Falkenhausen, former Chief German Military Adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek, made no secret of his : opinion that the only large European Army that would experience any diffi- ’ culty in coping with that of Japan was the Italian, If the assumption is correct that the Japanese Army is deficient in equipment and leadership—and its record in China makes it difficult to come to : any other conclusion—it must be re- . garded as sheer madness that it should . embark upon further and even more difficult operations overseas while a - million men or more are bogged down and unable to force a decision in China. We all know now that Chinese reports of the successful defence of Changsha, and of the infliction of crushing defeats upon the Japanese columns that attacked the Hunan capital, were mendacious. But Japan's explanations of the withdrawal of her* : forces from Changsha, after occupying!, thev city, do not ring true. Its im-’ portance as a strategic and commumcations centre cannot be disregarded, and foreigners on the spot- seem to have felt no doubt that the occupation was intended to be permanent. ■ They also agree that the withdrawal was accompanied by very heavy losses. The net result of what was admittedly, a “major military operation” appears to have been a heavy casualty list, and a certain amount —limited by the short duration" of the occupation —of. loot. ? « Navy “Itching For Action” ...-Vr; Unless the Soviet Army in the Maritime Provinces has , been substantially reduced in strength in order to reinforce the European front, the Kwantung Army, if it insists on an.attack upon the U.S.S.R., is likely to| . find its experiences at Changfukeng and Nomenhan repeated, but with the - difference that on this occasion Soviet" , long-range bombers will make mass.;*! raids upon Japanese cities. Vladivostok; ■ is within easy bombing range Tokyo, Osaka, and Japan’s other in-, dustrial centres, and as woodwork; still plays such a large part in the con*; • struction of Japanese dwellings, cendiary bombs would have an - . ( palling effect . ... .if -jv If the Japanese Army elects, instead] ,i| to move south, it will have to operate'. over long and vulnerable lines of sea communication, and engage British, f , Empire forces which have been brought* up to formidable strength, and equip-y ■: ped with the latest aircraft and other* •• armaments. ■ , Japan’s Navy is an unknown quantity, and its influence, hitherto, has been reported, to have been conservative But the broadcast address to the nation given by the Navy; spokesman,.. Captain Hideo Hiraide, on the even-, , ing, of October 15, and the changes; t, made in important naval commands, about the same time, suggest that mKj this -service, also, the extremist element has been getting the upper hand.| Capain .Hiraide is reported not only, ; to have boasted that, the Japanese, Navy was prepared for . the worst and in “a perfect state of repletion” but, to have asserted that it “is itching for action.” It is not always wise to attach; too great importance to the utterances of Japanese service spokesmen, which are only too often provocative and irresponsible. But hitherto this failing has been less apparent' among naval than among military spokesmen. It M ominous, to say the least, that what amounts to a demand for war should come from the navy, and that his ruinations should have been directed,- 1 chiefly against the United States. The resignation of Prince Konoyft from the Premiership was announced while this article was being written. It can hardly be doubted that it was brought about by the attitude of the extremist service elements. It-..* 6 ? I ®*-: ; too much to hope that the crisis will be resolved by the ascendancy -of. the moderates. For it has been evident that most of the Japanese press has been encouraged to .foment a war psychology, and to foster the belief that the encirclement of Japan has now become so acute that force must DO employed, whatever the risk, to end. it.