The Press WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1941. Berlin Learns

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23430, 10 September 1941, Page 6

The Press WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1941. Berlin Learns

The people of Britain, Londoners in particular, have long looked forward to the time when Berliners would learn what a mass air attack was like. On the anniversary of the fearful German air assault on London of September, 1940, their wish has been gratified. The results of Berlin’s heaviest air raid of the war, described in the cable news this morning, are sobering as well as encouraging. The hysterical fury of the German press shows that the raid, besides doing heavy material damage, has left a deep scar on Berlin’s morale and seems to confirm the almost unanimous verdict of neutral newspaper correspondents that the Germans have no stomach for this sort of warfare. But the Royal Air Force’s losses—2o bombers —are a reminder that this form of air attack is expensive. What ratio of losses this represents is not known, since the number of machines taking part, is not disclosed. If “ hundreds ” means 300, then the cost of the raid was probably disproportionate, having regard to the limited military importance of targets in the Berlin area. The Germans, as the Air Ministry itself pointed out some time ago, have not been behind the British in their development of the night fighter, and the shooting down of 20 British bombers over Berlin is probably (on a percentage basis) comparable to the record bag of 33 German bombers over London on May 11 last. There is, perhaps, some danger of recent successes in the air causing the British peoples to underestimate the disadvantages which the Royal Air Force has to overcome. The mathematical aspect of the bombing match between Britain and Germany is put thus in a recent number of the “ Aeroplane”:—

We have fewer bombers in operation than the enemy, we have to fly three times as far, and we have to operate against a country which is eight times as big. Thus even had we an equal number of aeroplanes in operation the odds would still be 24 to one against us. Fortunately things are not so bad as that. The industrial areas of Germany are concentrated in not more than four times as many centres ag there are in Great Britain. Furthermore, the speed and bomb load of our latest Stirlings, Manchesters, and Halifaxes and the precision of their flying make them at least doubly effective in comparison with the German types. That shortens the gap materially.

Hitherto, the battle between the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe has been a battle between a boxer and a slogger. The Royal Air Force has used superior technique to compensate for inferior strength, striking always at the most vulnerable spots. The Luftwaffe has swung wildly and prodigally, seeking to batter and intimidate the adversary into an early submission. The time has not come, and possibly will not come, when the Royal Air Force can profitably abandon its policy of pounding systematically at oil refineries, oil stocks, synthetic oil plants, communications, power plants, armament industries, and aerodromes. In a long battle, it is these body blows which will tell. Moreover, the Royal Airforce still needs to use its strength economically, for although the Luftwaffe has suffered enormous losses in the east, its reserves are enormous. Lord Beaverbrook recently announced that there was now a. 100 per cent, reserve behind Britain’s front-line air strength. Before the war in the east began, Germany’s air reserves were at least double her front-line strength. Finally, there are signs that before very long it may be necessary either for the Rpyal Air Force to send direct reinforcements to Russia or for a substantial percentage of America’s air output to be diverted to Russia,