HAIR WAVING PATENT

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23415, 23 August 1941, Page 11

HAIR WAVING PATENT

SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT

(P;A.) WELLINGTON, August 22. In a reserved judgment which covered 64 foolscap typewritten folios, Mr Justice Smith, in the Supreme Court in Wellington, gavd judgment for the defendants in the case of Frederick Maeder (Adelaide, South Australia) v. the Ronda Women’s Hairdressing Salon (Wellington), Arnold McKnight (Wellington), a women’s hairdresser, Benjamin McKnight (Wellington), a women’s hairdresser, and Mary McKnight, wife of Benjamin McKnight. The hearing lasted 18 days. In his judgment, Mr Justice Smith said the plaintiff was a hairdresser of Adelaide, South Australia. He was and had at all material times been the patentee in New Zealand under a convention patent dating as from June 20, 1934, for an invention entitled “process of and means for producing permanent waves in hair.” He sued the defendants, alleging that they had infringed and intended to infringe his patent. The defendants denied infringement and attacked the validity of the patent. Three Claims At first, three claims of the patent were in issue, his Honour proceeded. They were amended on March 11, 1935. Both sides had regarded the amended form as relevant to all the matters in dispute. These claims were as follows: (1) A process for permanently waving hair characterised in that the hair is moistened with a sulphide solution, the hair being thereupon waved and warmed. (2) A process for permanently waving hair characterised in that the hair is moistened with a solution of hydrosulphide, in particular ammonium hydrosulphide, the hair being thereupon waved and warmed. (3) A process for permanently waving hair characterised in that the hair is moistened with a sulphide solution such as hydrosulohide, in particular ammonium hydrosulphide, the hair being thereupon waved and subjected to a temperature of approximately 100 degrees Centigrade in warm packing, for instance, in a tubular clip. The plaintiff held a convention patent for these processes in South Australia. In 1937 he brought an action for infringement in that state. The Supreme Court of South Australia held as a fact that prior use had been proved and this decision was upheld in the High Court. “Claim is Bad” “To summarise my judgment,” his Honour concluded,' “I am of the opinion (1) That the patent in the suit is invalid because the effectiveness of the example given in the specification is an ail-essential part of the consideration for a grant and the example lacks the utility which is legally required; (2) that claim 1 is bad because it includes sulphide solutions that will not work and because the word ‘warmed’ is too indefinite to define the limits of the claim; (3) that claim 2 is bad because of the word ‘warmed’; (4) that claim 3 is bad because it is a claim to the use of the process according to the example and the example lacks utility; (5) I think the other defences fail; (6) as the patent is bad, I have not considered the question of infringement, save to say that if claim 3 were good the defendants would not have infringed it. In my opinion, the defendants are entitled to judgment, and I am prepared to hear counsel in chambers op the question of judgment and iCoaW ' i