BATTLE OF INTRIGUE FOR IRAQ’S CONTROL

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23366, 27 June 1941, Page 6

BATTLE OF INTRIGUE FOR IRAQ’S CONTROL

middle east

(Published by Arrangement with The British decision to move into Syria before that country became the SanWd*eh M d to the MMdtoßrt was precipitated by the recent war •m Iraq between the pro-Nari Government of Rashid AH el Gailam British Imperial forces. At th ® tlf £ Nazi air units co-operating with tne rebels made free use of Syrian air P° The whole episode revealed a new and imminent peril to Britain’s position in yet another vital sector of the Bast. _ Iraq is coveted for its rich oil fields, the possession of which wphW mak a mockery of talk of cuttmg off Ger many’s fuel supply. But even . more important for the £?ategy of the ww the Iraq geographic position. SiWSWt ?he P f a«> “ empire, which since the time of Alex ander has been the road to India and the Orient, Like Suez, roads, and harbours are essential links in Britain’s line of These are the ..reasons why Germany long ago chose Iraq for the thin end of its wedge into the Arab world. The chronicle of recent events in Bagdad, ancient city of Haroun er Rashid and capital of modern Iraq, Is like a modern sequel to the Arabian nights, a story of plotting a nd Intrigue with a strange blend of western and oriental political methods. The villain —or hero from the Nazi viewpoint—of the piece is Rashid Ali el Gailani, leader and founder of tjie extremist Ikha Nationalist Party. At 49 Rashid Ali has a record of serving in seven of Iraq’s 21 governments, thrice as Premier. Recently he threw Off his mask and stood revealed as the direct agent of Adolf Hitler. Threads in Conspiracy But the facts of the developments leading up to the April 4 coup d etat, while known to the Near East, have never reached the world at large. From Bagdad the thread of conspiracy originally led across the desert to the German Ambassador in Ankara. Franz von Papen, and from there to Berlin. Later, Otto von Hentig established his headquarters In Beirut and gathered all the strands of Nazi activity in the Arab world into his hands. Thereafter control was less remote and events moved more rapidly. There existed in Iraq a small but vociferous group of disgruntled and unscrupulous politicians and high mili-. tary men, for the most part products of the old Ottoman empire who had fought the British mandatory power from the very outset. In its efforts to assist Iraq in becoming ,a well-governed national State, Britain encroached on their prerogatives of corruption, graft, and intrigue. It was these elements that provided grist for the Axis mill. The fact that they had no popular following made little difference in a country where nine-tenths of the population are ragged illiterates. And British inactivity and easy going tolerance gave them the semblance of strength. , British Lenient on Rights Neither before nor after the outbreak of war in September, 1939, did the British make any real effort to assert their rights under the Anglo-Iraq treaty of alliance or to combat Axis penetration. Of the surface all seemed well. On September 9, 1939, when war was still less than a week old, the Regent, Emir Abdullah Illah, a staunch friend of England, publicly declared that his country would stand by its treaty of alliance with Great Britain. Diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off and the German Minister was given 24 hours in'which to leave the country. But the German undercover agents remained, and during the fall and winter months more than one Cabinet member made mysterious trips to Ankara, where they conferred with HeiT von Papen. In spite of strong groups who (favoured the Allies by the end of March, 1940, Axis intrigue within the Government had undermined the position of the pro-British Premier. General Nuri Said, who was forced out of office. The Regent then called on Rashid Ali, who though he was known as an extreme nationalist had not yet disclosed his actual colours. Kept Ties with Italy The first indication of Rashid All’s pro-Axis sympathies was his refusal, in defiance of Iraq’s alliance with Britain, to break off relations with Italy when .that country entered the but he managed to head off criticism with general declarations about his desire to co-operate with Britain. In late autumn, 1940, Dr. Fritz Grobba, the former German Minister to Iraq and as such Rashid' Ali’s original contact man, secretly visited Bagdad under the very noses of the British. He gave Rashid Ali a general outline of German plans In the Near East and informed him that a programme was being drafted for the establishment under German auspices of an Ar'ab Federation to include Syria, Palestine, and -Iraq. As the oldest independent State, Iraq would play the leading role. The bait of complete independence, so often promised, so often deferred, is one which few Arab politicians will fail to rise to. Dr. Grobba argued that -the time was fast approaching for an open rift with Britain and an Axis orientation. Rashid Ali Informed the pro-Axis members of his Cabinet and his army friends of what Dr. Grobba' had told him. It was decided to send a secret delegation headed by Neji Sevket, Minister for Defence, to Ankara, timing their arrival to coincide with that of Herr von Papen, who would be returning from Berlin with new instructions and with the draft of the Arab Federation plan.

[By EDMUND STEVENS]

the "Christian Science Monitor.**) r J ; \ Game of Pretended FrlenduM- .1' ' Meanwhile Rashid Ali continued » play his double game of pretended friendship for Britain. . On January 8, 1940 when he was awaiting the return of his emissaries to Herr von Papen, he presided at the opening of the new British-built trans-Iraq highway. He declared in his speech that his policy would be to strengthen relations with Britain on the basis of common in* terests and reaffirmed that the Anglo* Iraqi alliance was analogous to that between Britain and Egypf- wo weeks later Neji Sevket returned from Ankara with the Arab Federation plan. together with an invitation to the liaqi to join the Axis, all contained m the so-called “vOn Papen memorandum.” That * same night the Iraqi Cabinet was called to a secret emergency meeting at Rashid Ali’s house. Rashid Ali. and Neji Sevket pre-: sented the von Papen memorandum and urged its forthright acceptance, including abrogation of the treaty of alliance with Britain end adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis. For those members of the Cabinet who were not pro-Axis' this was a bombshell, ( but they refused to be stunned into acquiescence. Accusation of Betrayal They accused Rashid Ali of betrayal and of exceeding his constitutional* powers. Such matters, they argued, could not be decided by the Cabinet alone but must be referred to Parha- , Silent, which .would, In. : their opinion, ; certainly repudiate it. . After heated words General Tahav el Hashini and General Said, the for* mer Prime Minister who held the port* f6lio of. economics in Rashid Ah i' Cabinet, resigned and left the meeting. In their absence the Cabinet accepted the von Papen memorandum and Rashid Ali’s additional proposals 04 foreign' policy. • The same night- the Cabinet deci* / sions were rushed over to the palace for the Regent’s signature. With a show of'force, simultaneously -orderi were sent to call out the ahny. Mean* while, the three dissenting Cabinet members went straight to the British' Embassy, told the whole story of the meeting to the Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, and invoked his pro* ' tection. That same., night they were smuggled out of town to a refuge is the mountains. Took King to Safety Sir Klnahan promptly telephoned the palace and told the Regent, who therefore already forewarned when the Cabinet, decrees arrived for his signature, refused to see the deputation and escaped through a back entrance of the palace, taking the child King, with him. They drove through the. night at top speed to Diredana, some 60 miles from Bagdad where the garrison was composed of troops personally loyal to the ' Regent/ {here to await developments. The morning after this harrowing night Bagdad was in turmoil. There were demonstrations and counter-de-monstrations marked by numerous clashes and street brawls. Anarchy continued for three days, during which the British were barricaded in their Embassy. At length it became evident that popular opinion was against Rashid Ali and his high-handed methods. Parliament was convened and when after a scathing denunciation by General Hashini, Rashid Ali rose to de- (i fend himself he was booed down. a vote of censure was passed. Rashid Ali was forced to resign and the whole pro-Axis move collapsed. Next day the , Regent called on General Hashini to form the twentieth government in 19 years and order was restored. But Rashid Ali, though momentarily , thwarted and discredited, was Still .. free to plot, nor were his confederates in the Army General Staff removed ; ; from their posts, and it was with co-operation that Rashid Ali and hu ; ; political'adherents engineered the coup d’etat that ousted General Hashini two months later and reinstalled Rashid All, In staging this come-back Rashid Ali also had'the active aid of Haj Amin el Husseini, the rabidly aqtiBritish Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and the advice and guidance of Dr. Grobba. freshly arrived in Bagdad on one of his periodic trips with new directives. Timing Went Wrong Again Rashid Ali resorted to the dodge of professing to support the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, only to turn openly on Britain when it suited his plans. The action was cleverly conceived; with a bit of luck Germany might have acquired Iraq easily. Something had gone wrong with the timing,, however. Either Rashid Ali had been forced into the open too soon by the 'British decision to send in troops, .or the Germans were behind schedule in Crete. The British attitude and policy throughqut these events seem almost unaccountable. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, former head of the Arab Bureau and for 14 years adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, in the days of the mandate, is accounted one of ’the ablest Englishmen in the East. He must surely have known what was - happening. And yet at no time did the British interfere until events had reached a dangerous state. There are times when nothing impresses the Arab so much as a show of force. By taking a firm line the British, with air bases inside the country and troops a short bus-ride away in Palestine, could have nipped the Rashid Ali performance in the bud. It will be the task of the historian, with all the facts before him, to explore the reason why action was not taken until matters reached the brink of-crisis.