The Press THURSDAY, JUNE .12, 1941. War Government in Britain

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23353, 12 June 1941, Page 4

The Press THURSDAY, JUNE .12, 1941. War Government in Britain

Within the last three months there have been three major debates in the House of Commons on the conduct of the war. On April 3 the House discussed the organisation of industrial manpower; on May 7 it held an inquest on the defeat in Greece; and this week it has been discussing the loss of Crete. From each of these challenges the Government has emerged with an overwhelming majority. It is becoming clear, however, that the size of these majorities is deceptive if it is regarded as an indication of the House’s confidence in the Government as a whole. Even the most severe among the Government’s critics—with the exception of two or three on the extreme left—do not go to the lengths of voting against the Government on a confidence division, their view being, presumably, that any large adverse vote would have a bad moral effect. All three debates have shown that Mr Churchill’s prestige stands as high in the House of Commons as it does in the nation and that defeats and mistakes have not in the least diminished it. There is, however, a certain danger in the ease with which Mr Churchill can meet even the most devastating criticism and carry the House with him on a wave of emotional enthusiasm. For it is now clear that a large section of the House has begun to be disturbed not so much by military set-backs as by accumulating evidence that Great Britain has not reached full war efficiency, either administratively or economically. The difficulty is that, under the rule of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, effective criticism of individual members of the Cabinet is not possible; the canopy of Mr Churchill’s prestige protects all his colleagues. In the debate on Crete several members tried to get round this obstacle by saying bluntly that Mr Churchill needed a better team. The members of the Wpr Cabinet against whom this attack is directed are probably Mr Arthur Greenwood, Sir Kingsley Wood, and Mr Eden. Though Mr Greenwood has been side-tracked to an investigation of post-war problems, he is still a member of the War Cabinet; and it may be questioned whether it is expedient to have any superfluous members on a body which is directly responsible for the conduct of the war. Sir Kingsley Wood is Chancellor of the Exchequer; and his Budgets have provided the clearest evidence that, on the financial side, Great Britain is not yet organised for total war. The political calibre of Mr Anthony Eden has always been something of a puzzle. His undoubted popularity is due not so much to his actual achievements as to the fact that he stood out against the unpopular foreign policy of the Chamberlain Government. Whether he is a capable organiser and leader has yet to be demonstrated. Both as Minister for War and as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr Eden has been the liaison between the War Cabinet and the Middle Eastern Command. It has been said in the House of Commons, with what truth the public has no means of knowing, that the political mistakes which have been made in the Middle East are his responsibility. '