LESSONS OF CRETE FOR FUTURE MOVES

Press, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23351, 10 June 1941, Page 6

LESSONS OF CRETE FOR FUTURE MOVES

BATTLE OF MEDITERRANEAN 1

SYDNEY; June 3. Once again a post-mortem must be held on a decisive Allied defeat in a land campaign, for. Crete is added to the long list that began with Poland 20 months ago. The questions mow to be answered are painfully clear. Wny did Crete fall? What lessons may be drawn from the 12 days’ hqmenc struggle there? Finally, what is the next stage, and is it to be merely a repetition of the previous chapters m Germany’s onward march, . Unfortunately, it is far easier to analyse the causes of Allied defeat than to remedy them in the immediate future; and it must be admitted that Germany’s expansion has not yet reached its climacteric. Wider British strategy must be determined accordihfily As far as Crete itself was concerned and the conditions under which airpower could be most effectively used, it was Norway over again. The outcome was really decided as soon as the Germans established a continuous _axr link with Greece and made the few aerodromes on Crete so- untenable that the Royal Air Force had to operate from bases 400 miles away. Long-range British fighters made gallant efforts with single machines, sometimes fighting ‘‘swarms of Messerschmitts t • but they were overwhelmed. The Germans were in a position to disregard their aerial losses, because they were easily replaceable. They amassed aeroplanes in such great numbers’ that one British aeroplane found a target of 100 German machines on ,a single beach. The Luftwaffe could operate with me greater immunity because of the woeful lack of British anti-aircraft ffljns. To complete the story, swarms dlvebombefrs could go out incessantly after British shipping and ground troops. . Enemy’s Advantages If it be asked why the Germans were able to make so much use of the Greek aerodromes; which apparently could, not serve the purpose of the Allies before Greece fell, the answer is that the Greek aerodromes are now no longer waterlogged, as they were a few weeks ago. and the spasmodic bombing to which they were subjected, by the Royal Air Force in the last fortnight was not comparable with the concentrated bombing of the Luftwaffe when the fields were in British occupation. German aerial superiority in Crete

meant that the initial parachuted landings could be quickly consolidated. Air power permitted the first landings at Malemi. and made possible the bring* inp in of endless reinforcements and supplies. In addition, it played a decisive part in the actual fighting on land.. The British ground troops were ceaselessly harassed by enemy bombers, and frequently had to restrict their activities to the hours of darkness. German air power also allowed the diversions in the centre and the east of the island, and, in short, compelled +h'e defenders to make preparations against potential threats anywhere in an area of 3320 square miles of most difficult country. Finally, air power facilitated the outer move from Malemi to Canea and Suda Bay, and the loss cf Suda Bay was evidently the beginning of the end,' ■ Germany could use internal lines of communication, and could concentrate on Crete alone, whereas the British had to keep alert on many fronts, especially in North , Africa, Iraq, and Palestine. The striking power of the Geimans, already greater than that of the British, was accentuated still further by this power of concentration, -while that of the British wais greatly reduced by the circumstances which made a policy of diffusion of strength inevitable. Air Power All-Important The 12 hectic' days in Crete' show once more the true role of the air arm in this war. Once again the necessity of having at least parity ,in air strength has been demonstrated, and this does not merely mean numerical (equality, but operational equality under all possible conditions. Sepond, - the, Cretan episode has stressed the relationship of the air arm to the Navy aiiid Army.,, The’ function of air power is not merelyi to support the other service arms, but’ lo co-ordinate with them to? the ; point of merging in a single fighirig organism. The organic analogy must not be forgotten for a moment; It has applied ever since the Germans made; such good use of their air force in Poland; and each successive campaign has hammered hi the lesson. . , i On land, whatever the result, the Cretan story must enshrine itself on the epic list of “soldiers’ battles,” after the original parachutists were, reinforced by the ferrying activities Of at least 500 troop-carrying aeroplanes the British continued a hand'-to-hand resistance; harassed the whole time by, virtually, unopposed dive-bombers. German aerial ascendancy was reinforced by a rapidly-growing numerical superiority on land, and the enemy was able to show a complete disregard for. losses. Once. the landing around Malemi was consolidated the’invaders had the advantages of a rapidly-grow-ing land base. The part of the Royal Navy is also clear. . The'fleet had to operate? in dangerous closed waters and in the face of overwhelming dive-bombing

[By the Military Correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald. ]

attacks. Operations under such condi - tions were very costly, and would have!] beeh increasingly so. Three i: „j and four destroyers were lost in th»|.|ii first stage of the fighting alone, Navy, .it is true, prevented any cba/V" siderable sea-borne landings, and, pro- ,f. : tected by fighter patrols, were able to M ■■ evacuate 15,000 troops to safety; bubt-., the advantages of sea-power m were largely countered' by the of German air-power to take all n?ces/ ‘7 sary steps for local victory. [’ It is useless to appraise the Cretan' battle in terms of what might have been. Many of the soldiers themselves believe that the invasion could havtf' been smashed if the Air .Force could have operated in sufficient strength.' But the stark fact is that the Royal Air; , Force could not so operate, and it is now clear that no land operations' whether of a defensive or an offensive character, can succeed against a vastly Superior enemy if that enemy aerial supremacy • and uses air-powee as an integral part of a “total attack,". Nazis’ Next Moves In general, the Battle of Crete shows; ■ the terrific power of a well-planned*,V aerial Offensive, especially if the enemy, -., can choose the time and the - manned ~ of his offensive. It shows again thf ': clamant nieed for more mote anti-aircraft guns, and morg|.;;.“ arms of all kinds; and in this ion it must be 1 asked whether, in spittf' x' of their inevitable preoccupation with iv so many theatres of war in the Middlf East, the British authorities made a*. % much use as they might have done of the months available for them in pre-' parations in Greece, or whether they ■ «'i left the task until the fall of Greece^:-;'; became inevitable. Rrobably nowhere else could condr- - ■ tions so favour the enemy as in Crete, : and- this fact is of paramount importance in view of the next phase of the ■ •battle for the Mediterranean—of which, as Signor Gayda has rightly pointed out.the struggle for Crete was only a single phase. The positive side. ( of the ledger in Crete is that the wider . German advance has been held up for a fortnight, while the enemy has suffered heavy losses in aeroplanes, and especially in highly-trained air-troops, instead of the walk-over he expected ? within 48 hours. He has had to fight bitterly for almost a fortnight. On the other hand, the strategicalgains made by the Germans in Crete cannot be lightly discounted. Germany now has all the advantages that have been pointed out as directly, accruing . from the possession of Crete ]in the . present state of the Mediterranean and the- Middle East. Whichever side holds it, Crete is now the crossroads of the Mediterranean. The British Navy is forced back on Alexandria, for Cyprus ; ? is only a very secondary base. The ;>1 Germans now have an admirable 1 step-ping-stone towards Cyprus and Syria. ? Although the factor of distance will ■ operate inereasingly-against them, they can proceed with the next stage of their offensive against the entire Middle East. They have closed the Aegean Sea and have encircled Tut*, key more than ever. They are much nearer to North Africa in general and to Alexandria and the Nile delta, in particular, and their bombers can at-, v tack British posts from the Western ■ ' Desert to the borders of Palestine. From all points of view they now present a more immediate threat to Britaih’s positions in the' eastern Mediterand its various hinterlands; . Cyrenaica and Syria Whether, in their next move, the Germans concentrate on a drive to Asia Minor or to the canal zone, there is no doubt that both Cyrenaica and Syria have obtained a new strategical significance. If the Germans continue to- J hold Cyrenaica they can render the passage between North Africa and ... Crete .almost as dangerous: as the lian strait, and they can also continue .* to use fighters an<f diVe-bombers.. But*.- ' deprived of Cyrenaica, many of the advantages they derive from the pcciipa; .... t tion of Crete Would be lessened- ' Similarly, If they strengthen tlWr a rib on Syria.' they can deal with yprus from the mainland just as they dealt with, Crete; whereas if the British wrest away control of Syria, the , Germans would only be able to operate from Crete and the Dodecanese, and the distances would thus- militp.te ' against them. That is why it is allimportant to capitalise the suppression of the Iraqi revolt and oust the Germans from Syria before that territory becomes their consolidated Outer base. Recovery in Syria and Cyrenaica is the more important’for the. sake of-the naval base at Alexandria. Germany* is now in a position from which her bombers can easily raid Alexandria and any further developments in thif regard may well raise the question whether a large battle fleet can be Indefinitely stationed at Alexandria in safety. There is no doubt whatever that the change in Crete raises the problem of the Nile delta and the canal - in a form which it will take every ounce of British energy and every possible resource to counteract.