The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1940. SIDI BARRANI

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23202, 13 December 1940, Page 8

The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1940. SIDI BARRANI

The recapture of Sidi Barrani by British and Free French forces is another severe blow to Italian military prestige, already badly damaged by events in Greece and Albania. Indeed, the success of this swift and brilliant attack is probably a greater disappointment to the Italian people and their leaders than the debacle in Albania. Diplomatically and militarily, the Italian attempt to subdue Greece was bungled at every stage. The invasion was undertaken st the wrong time of the year by inferior troops operating from inadequately prepared bases. The territory, chosen for the attack was territory calculated to nullify the Italian advantage in numbers, aeroplanes, and mechanical equipment. But there has been no hurry or muddle about the Italian campaign in North Africa. Ever since the sanctions crisis af 1935 the Italian High Command has been building up in Libya an army which, if numbers, equipment, specialised- training, and knowledge of terrain were the main factors, wwuld be the most formidable fighting force ever assembled on the African continent. Marshal Graziani is regarded as one of tho ablest and boldest military leaders in Europe; and of the men under him a large proportion are veterans of the Abyssinian and Spanish campaigns. Opposed to him is a composite Imperial force, inferior in numbers, equipment, and air support, and consisting largely of citiztm-soldiers who have never seen a desert before and have had only a few months’ training. Marshal Graziani’s campaign has so far been conducted with the greatest deliberation and thoroughness. Nearly three months have elapsed since British advanced units were driven .out of Solium and Sidi Barrani; and in that period Sidi Barrani has at immense cost and labour been developed into a base for an offensive against Mersa Matruh, the main British defence position in the Western Desert, lately, the Italian people have been assured that the Albanian campaign is a side-show and that Marshal Graziani’s advance into Egypt will overthrow British power in the Mediterranean aand decide the war in favour of the Axis. In the space of a few hours, the British attack has' destroyed the work of three months. Marshal Graziani is back where he was at the beginning <of September and for the rest of the winter the threat of a major Italian offensive in the Western Desert appears to have _ been removed. Local Operation or General Offensive? What further significance can be attached to the British success is not yet clear. Sidi Barrani, 60 milfes from Bardia, the nearest Italian base in Libya, and 80 miles from Mersa Matruh, is heavy liability for the side which holds it. Waiter must be transported, communications protected against the constant danger of flank attack, and the health and morale of the garrison maintained in a climate which has defeated manjy armies. For the Italians, secure possession of i Sidi Barrani is the essential preliminary to any major offensive movement against Egypt. For the British, on the other hand,. Sidi Bairrani is merely an outlying post in an, elaborate defence system. To lose it involves no imimediate danger; to hold it is important only if an attack on the main Italian defences in Libya is contemplated. The present operations, therefore, mean one of two things: either the British command in the Near East has changed from a defensive to an offensive strategy or, knowing a resumption of the Italian offensive to be imminent, it has struck at the only base from which an offensive can be launched. The second alternative is the more probable. Reports from neutral sources have lately been predicting a renewed Italian offensive in Egypt; and it is , a safe guess that Marshal Graziani has been under pressure from Rome to do something to, distract attention from the Albanian disaster. Moreover, even allowing that British forces in the Near East have been greatly strengthened in the last two months, it is probable that they are still so much inferior to the Italians in numbers and equipment, thougfh not in fighting spirit, that for the present only tactical offensives are possible. It is significant that, in order to muster the air strength necessary for the attack, the British Command had to divert to Egypt aeroplanes which had been supporting the Greek armies. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the British Command in the Near East can rest content with a defensive strategy; it has only to hold the Suez Canal for a few more months and Italy's East African empire will collapse.