The Press WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1940. Political Crisis in Australia

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23140, 2 October 1940, Page 8

The Press WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1940. Political Crisis in Australia

It makes little difference whether the Australian Government holds a majority of two or whether its Parliamentary strength is equalled by the Labour Party, the balance of power being in the hands of two or three independents. These, the alternative possibilities reported after a week of curious fluctuations; have the same practical significance: Mr Menzies and the coalition he leads are in a hopelessly insecure position. He cannot carry on without being distracted from his real business by that of counting heads and reckoning with unaccountable ones. He must, therefore, either reach success in new efforts to form a National Government or choose between resignation and the hazards of office. Fortunately, it can be no embarrassment to him to attempt to bring the Labour Party into line with his own and the Country Party. He tried in July; he entered the election campaign in the unchanged belief that a National Government was necessary, and still ready to work for it; and he is entirely free, therefore, of any suspicion that he has changed his mind under stress of political disappointment. His invitation to Mr Cameron, Mr Curtin, and Mr Beasley to examine “ all “the possibilities” with him has been prompt. It has also left no doubt of his purpose in issuing it. All the possibilities, if the leaders’ conference is to have any value, reduce themselves to one. “I call on all men of good will “of all parties,” Mr Menzies said, “to co--operate with a view to producing stability. “To my mind the only practicable course to “ save the country from disintegration, if its “war effort is not to be defeated by disorgan- “ isation, is the formation of a National Gov- “ eminent on a basis equitable to all parties.” Mr Cameron, candidly declaring that the Government “ had to recognise that it had been “ defeated,” of course accepted the invitation; so did Mr Beasley, leader of the Non-Commun-ist Labour Party; so did Mr Curtin, remarking, obscurely, "If there is to be a sinking of poli- “ tical principles, every party must sink them,” Mr Curtin perhaps meant programmes, rather than principles; and if he did mean that, Mr Menzies may take heart.

The difficulty of the situation is 1 that Mr Curtin-has already declined to enter a National Government, not because the terms proposed were not good enough to please him, but because, as he said on the eve of the election, the Labour Party .was “prepared to give Australia “ the lead it needed in its hour of direst peril.” He expected to win and to govern with a clear mandate. But he has not won; he has only helped to defeat the Government without being able to displace it. If he were to take office .now, after rejecting Mr Menzies’ proposals, he would be in as bad a position as Mr Menzies, or worse. If Mr Menzies could only uneasily depend on his alliance with Mr Cameron, Mr Curtin has reason to expect still more uneasy relations with Mr Beasley; The difficulty can, however, be overcome if all the party leaders have had their eyes opened by the event and recognise its real meaning. That is, it can hardly be questioned, that the country was much more dissatisfied with the Government’s failures to make its policy rapidly effective than .with that policy, and was seeking better government, not Labour government. The party issued were not real, though Mr Curtin strove to make th.em so. The real issues were those raised by the actual conduct of the war. The most extraordinary feature of the campaign was that the Government was supported, in the press and on the platform, by friends and by candidates who did not hesitate to denounce its administrative bungles, while they credited it with large achievements, or to insist that .the men responsible for delays and blunders must be thrust aside. “Ability to “ improve the Government’s war effort should “be the dominant factor, even if the application of this test means the displacing of sitting Government supporters and even Min“isters,” said the “Sydney Morning Herald.” A very prominent and able United Australia Party candidate said that war aims would not t>e effectively pursued without “a more virile “ Parliament, fed by new blood ” and that men who did not “ measure up to the job . , . must “stand down.” In these circumstances it becomes evident that the electoral support held by Mr Menzies ~is more significant than his losses. The country will be satisfied by a stronger, government, not bry a change of party government; by more vigour and speed in war policy, not by a change of policy. Mr Menzies may even more truly be said to have survived a crisis than to face one. His Parliamentary position is precarious; his electoral position might be tested in the near future with increased confidence, not less. If the facts shape themselves in that way before the leaders at Canberra, they will not fail to form a National Government.