ITALY’S OFFENSIVE POWER

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23128, 18 September 1940, Page 8

ITALY’S OFFENSIVE POWER

Army Reorganisation TRAINING AND TEMPERAMENT OF STAFF AND RANKS (Published by Arrangement with "The Times.’’) A review o£ Italy's war machine, now advancing info Egypt, is given in the following article, written by a correspondent of “The Times” lately in Rome.

LONDON, August 1. Although since the close of the last European War Italy has been almost continuously engaged in blooding her braves —between 1924 and 1931 in the reconquest of Libya; in 1935-36 in the conquest of Ethiopia; in 1936-1939 in bolstering, up General Franco; at Eastertide, 1939, in treacherously pouncing upon Albania —it is not easy to determine the exact value of the new enemy forces with which Great Britain is now at grips. The story is told of the famous Lord Brougham that when his horses once bolted with him in the Strand he thrust his head out of the carnage window and said to his coachman, “Run into something cheap, John. Mussolini has been guided by similar considerations of prudence. In the Libyan and Ethiopian campaigns the fleet and air force had no opposition to meet. In Albania the show of resistunce would not have satisfied the requirements of a moderately exacting Hollywood impresario. The minor skirmishes just fought against an already demoralised France were nothing but preliminary sparring. Only m the Spanish war have ti.e Italian forces had to fight under conditions of modern European warfare, and even there the test cannot be said to have been wholly conclusive. The war machine, upon which Mussolini has spent every available centesimo, and to the forging of which he has brought all the enthusiasm of his naturally bellicose temperament, is therefore still something of an unknown quantity. Italian Amy Reforms The outbreak of war last September came at an awkward moment for the Italian army. On the basis of experience gained in Abyssinia and Spain and tested during the army manoeuvres of 1938 the Italian authorities had decided to replace the existing ternary (three-regiment) division by the newly conceived binary (two-regiment) division. This decision entailed a fundamental reorganisation. It involved a reduction in the size and ponderousness of the existing divisions, and It called for the creation of new divisions incorporating the formations drawn from the former ternary divisions. Italian military opinion is apparently reckoning that the decrease in manpower and machine-guns will be more than counterbalanced by the greater mobility and power of manoeuvre of the division and by the large increase in the number of mortars and by its generally enhanced offensive power. The judgment of foreign technical observers has not, however, been wholly favour-able. It is obvious that a period of tranquillity was required to enable the general staff to reconstitute the army on its new basis. The succession of political crises which preceded the outbreak of war materially interfered with this task. Aprvt from the disorganisation caused by the change from the ternary to the binary division the army was in process of receiving new patterns of rifles, machine-guns, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, and tanks. It was also short of clothing, boots, and blankets. It was notably behindhand in antiaircraft defence of all kinds, and it was lamentably lacking in heavy artillery. Pre-trained Recruits On the other hand the Abyssinian and Spanish campaigns had not been unfruitful. The operations had been conducted and planned predominantly by the General Staff. Rivalry between the regular units and those of the Blackshirt Militia had had favourable reactions upon both bodies, and . lessons learned in the field were quickly absorbed. In particular, the fighting had done unexpectedly much to prove that the Blackshirts were an asset and not a liability. It also proved the value of the Fascist system of pre-military training. The ‘ltalian conscript now

called to the colours is no longer th« raw refractory recruit, he often was Subjected from an early age to physji cal exercises, imbued with intense, not to say excessive, pride in the merits of the Fascist regime, he appears on the barrack square already primed with a degree of military knowledge which it would probably take about six months of army service to acquire. The Italian Navy in all probability was relatively the most efficient of the throe fighting services last September. Its ships for the most part were modern or had been modernised, and it was well balanced in its composition. It could not then have risked a general fleet action against the British and French Mediterranean fleets, since the only capital ships in active service were two reconstructed battleships (two new battleships and two more reconstructed battleships have now come into active service), but it comprised 19 modern ciuiseis, three old cruisers, 70 modern, torpedo-boats, and torpedo-boat destroyers, with another 50 over 10 years old, about 100 submarines, a very large number of M.A.S. (swift anti-submarine motor-boats), and numerous auxiliary vessels. Naval Strategy By the “battle of the grain’’ and other measures for developing her economic self-sufficiency, Italy has done something to reduce the volume of her indispensable imports. To that extent she has freed the navy from the task of convoying merchant ships and thus enabled it to protect her communications with Libya, the Dodecanese, and Albania. She is not necessarily compelled to be always on the defensive. In particular, to judge from the writings of naval experts, she hopes to make skilful use of her surface vessels and submarines combined, and, in certain eventualities, to manoeuvre her surface vessels so as to draw her opponent into waters infested by what is numerically a powerful 'fleet of sub. marines. , , , , The fleet, however, is thought tohave distinct limitations. During the European war it was never engaged in any major action against the Austro-Hun-garian Navy, and though individual commanders performed gallant exploits, these exploits did not in themselves qualify leaders or subordinates to take charge of large formations. Of the personnel, about 40 per cent, are long-service men, as against 60 per cent, who are conscripts serving for 28 months. Finally, the Italian fleet has no aircraft-carriers, though the disadvantage is largely discounted by Italy’s geographical position in the centre of the sea where she will have to light. Sands Suit Temperament Of the strength of the Italian Air Force one can only speak with caution. A recent trustworthy estimate put its strength at 2200 first line machines with a 20 per cent, reserve. It is possible that this is an underestimate. Since the beginning of hostilities Italy has exploited her period of ’non-belligerency to increase production to the utmost. The personnel brims over with confidence. About 23 per cent, of it is considered by competent critics to be really good, while 50 per cent, is thought to be of average worth. Taken all in all the Italian fighting forces are not to be despised, and there is little doubt that they are better prepared, morally and materially, than at the opening of the last war. It is* however, ’common knowledge that the Italian forces have been trained for a short war of quick decision. Lack of money and certain essential raw materials has made Italy averse from engaging in a war of attrition and eco. nomic endurance. Mussolini’s entry into the struggle has obviously been timed with these considerations in view. Whether he has guessed right is another matter. Meanwhile the probability that much of Italy’s effort must now be madean Africa opens up to her men the possibility of engaging in the type of fighting in which they have had most experience and is best suited to tnS national temperament.