The Press FRIDAY, AUGUST 2 , 1940. South Africa and the War

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23088, 2 August 1940, Page 8

The Press FRIDAY, AUGUST 2 , 1940. South Africa and the War

The news of the arrival of a large South African force in Kenya is heartening. In the first place, it reinforces the British defence system in Africa at a point where it needs reinforcing. Strategically, that system is a strong one. since Italian forces in East Africa are cut off from their bases of supply and, in Abyssinia at any rate, are faced with the problem of holding down a hostile and only partly conquered native people. In the air and on land, however, Italy has a substantial numerical advantage and has been able to carry the war into Kenya and the Sudan. In the Sudan, existing British forces can be considered adequate for the policy of “ active defence ” adopted by the Middle Eastern command; in Kenya, until the arrival of the South African contingent, the position was less satisfactory. In the second place, the presence of South Africans in Kenya ii a- welcome indication that the* difficulties which have confronted the South African Government since its declaration of war are on the way to solution. These difficulties were both military and political. In the few years immediately preceding the outbreak of war South Africans had been lulled into a sense of false security over the state of their defences. In 1934 Mr Pirow, then Minister for Defence, secured Parliamentary approval for an elaborate defence programme involving an expendi- . ture of £6,000,000, the training of an army of 5(5,000 men, and the co-ordination of South Africa’s defence plana with those of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Nyasaland. When, on the outbreak of war, General Smuts took over the Defence portfolio, it was disclosed that less-than £500,000 of the £6,000,000 appropriated had been spent, that fewer than 20,000 men had been trained, and that there was no modem military equipment in the country and very little ammunition. The Government's political difficulties have arisen out of the efforts of General Hertzog and Dr. Malan to unite the Afrikaner community in opposition to South Africa’s participation In the war. In the crucial Parliamentary division on the war issue, General Smuts had a majority of 22 81 votes to 59. Although this is a safe Parliamentary majority, the size of the opposition > has made it necessary for the Government to move carefully, bearing in mind always the possibility of internal strife. The issue which has aroused most feeling is that of the use - which shall be. made of the Union’s military forces. The Defence Act lays it down that they ire to be used Only in “ South Africa,” a term (deliberately left undefined. Early in the war, Dr. Malan threatened- civil disturbances if South African forces were sent north of the Limpopo river. It would appear from recent develdpments that feeling has now changed and that all but a small minority of South Africans realise that the frontiers of Kenya are the strategic frontiers of the Union. The truth is, . pefhips, that the Parliamentary following of Generil Hertzog and Dr. Malan gives an exaggerated ■ impression of their strength in the electorate.. Under the Union’s present electoral laws, the country population, where opposition to the Government is most marked, is " weighted * by more than 30, per cent, iforeover, rodent by-elections and provincial council ' elections have shown clearly that the Reunited Party (as the Heftzog-Malan coalition is now called) is in fact far from united and is losing ground elector ally.