WHICH WAY ITALY?

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23000, 20 April 1940, Page 10

WHICH WAY ITALY?

Mussolini’s Dilemma

NAVAL SITUATION IN MEDITERRANEAN

NEW YORK, March 20. Britain’s recent action in halting German coal for Italy, carried in Italian bottoms, although ostensibly directed against Germany, may have been designed to serve the double purpose of impressing upon Italy the potentialities of the. economic pressure the Allies can exert. Few diplomatic or strategic moves are made by the warring Powers in . Europe without consideration being given either to the effect on Italy or ho.w Italy’s- attitude can affect the decision, for Italy casts a long shadow across the Mediterranean. To-day II Duce—endeavouring to steer a middle course—seems to be in a position not unlike the early days of the World War, before Italy repudiated .its- German and Austro-Hungarian ties, , and decided the Allied cause to be the more advantageous. Divide Sea in Two Italy occupies a geographical position of supreme strategical importance in the Mediterranean which has become increasingly vital in the present conflict. The Italian Peninsula, together with the adjacent island of Sicily, almost divides the Middle Sea into two parts, leaving a passage that is less than 100 miles wide. Despite this strategical location, Italy to-day .must recognise that Britain retains absolute control over both ends of the Mediterranean; with Gibraltar on guard at the west and Port Said in the east. And the Allies, in a sense, also hold Italy’s African possessions hostage for its good behaviour. There is no question but that a hostile Italy would greatly embarrass the Allies. Ttaly has, or is about to complete, four efficient 35,000-ton battleships armed with 3 5inch guns, and also. has four older battleships that possess impressing characteristics.

The Italian navy has six- 10,000ton cruisers which carry 8-inch guns, and a number of smaller cruisers, all of which' are modern and very fast. In addition, there are many torpedo craft, submarines, and fast motor torpedo boats. .1 Italy has an extensive Air Force that comprises large numbers of efficient aeroplanes of many types, manned by capable aviators, many of whom have had combat experience in Spain. Would Scatter Forces These forces, operating on inner lines from near-by bases,> should be able ,to give excellent accounts of themselves;' and “wouldcompel the! Allies to maintain 7 at - either end of the Mediterranean forces capable of dealing with the enemy by sea and by air,, thereby causing a most undesirable dispersion of their forces. The possibility of this necessity unquestionably- is one of the ; reasons that is causing Great Britain to .push its battleship programme ahead so vigorously. ■ ■' Two years ago Britain laid down five -35.000rt0n battleships, two. of which are now nearing completion, and two others are- scheduled i for commissioning later on, this year. In addition, -work has. been started on four larger battleships. . France has several formidable battleships in hand, two of which

[By a NAVAL EXPERT.] {Published by arrangement with the ‘‘Christian Science Monitor.”] v According to recent messages from Washington, the State Department considers it more than possible that Ita’y will enter the war on the side of Germany.

are to be completed before the end of the year. Port Said and Gibraltar are approximately 1000 miles from either Italy or Sicily. Gibraltar is 800 miles from Sardinia, and Port Said is 450 miles from both Libya and Rhodes! So these British bases appear relatively safe from mass attacks by air, but even if they were not, this would : hardly prevent an effective control being exercised over passing sea-borne traffic. .The Allies would not find the Italian bases in the Dodecanese Islands difficult to reduce, and con-, trol of the Aegean Sea would then be assured them. Italy, however, should be able to control the Mediterranean in its immediate vicinity, and render, the British base at Malta untenable, thereby severing the so-called “lifeline of the British Empire.” Not an 1 irreparable loss, however, unless the war spreads to the Eastern Mediter- . ranean and the Black Sea, as the longer rbute by way of the Cape of Good Hope was frequently used during the World War when German submarines were proving too troublesome in the Mediterranean. Near East Complication ! However, should the Near East become involved in the war, the picture would be entirely different, and Italy would have to-be brought to terms before the Allies would feel justified in -undertaking extensive, military operations in an area with an insecure line of supply. : . But Italy, before taking action that is hostile to the Allies, will have to give earnest consideration to the, strangling effect on the eco- ■» nomic existence of the country, of, a blockade centred at Gibraltar, * Port Said, and in the Aegean. Italy, with few natural resources, is dependent bn its sea-borne traffic: for the taw materials its industries require. Since; Italy has practically no resources in oil or coal, fuel is an import of vital importance. Some 12,000,000 to 14,000,000 , tons of coal are imported annually, of which T,000,000 tons come from Germany . —more than 3,000,000 of it by sea. Even with promise. of partial supplies from Germany by rail, Italy must look elsewhere for coal, and very possibly Hampton Roads will , t again be a rendezvous for ; Italian colliers just as ’it was during The World War. . In addition to confronting the Allies at sea, Italy must reckon with the possibility of its industrial area in the rich valley of the Po being overrun by land. In fact, at the be- . ginning of: the war, some observers were of the opinion that the Allies would have-welcomed .the opportunity, of attempting an invasion, pf Germany through northern .Italy., - Thus diplomatic pressures are be- , - ing applied to Italy ' by both Germany and the Allies, and'it remains ’ ' to be seen which-way Premier Benito; Mussolini will be inclined.to think , ' the wind blows most favourably. . If.:ltaly can 'be induced again to.- -.j cast its lot with the Allies, or if they . - have reason ' to feel convinced- that Italy will remain non-belligerent, . even, if not neutral,. they .can , com- . mit> themselves to’ putting into use. the huge army now-assembled in the Near East.- : And it may be quite possible that the. Allies will make, use of other , “trial balloons” to force Italy to disclose its intentions. ‘