The press FRIDAY, JANUARY 5, 1940. Time: On Whose Side?

Press, Volume LXXVI, Issue 22910, 5 January 1940, Page 6

The press FRIDAY, JANUARY 5, 1940. Time: On Whose Side?

The British Government's proclamation making a further 2,000,000 men liable for military service-, following upon its decision to ration all important foodstuffs, is a formidable answer to the charge, so frequently made by- foreign propaganda bureaus, that its conduct of the war is irresolute and half-hearted. But it also destroys the comfortable illusions of the " time "is on our side" school of optimists, who appear to believe that, if the Allies maintain the efficiency of their blockade, and can hold the German armies in the west, victory will follow by a process of attrition. The failure of the German Government to launch its longthreatened lightning blow against England and France has been the subject of much comment and speculation. According to General Goering, this restraint was dictated by considerations of humanity; a more probable explanation is that the Polish campaign, short as it was, enabled Great Britain and France to mobilise such large forces along the Rhine that a German mass attack would have been enormously costly and might, by exhausting Germany's economic reserves, have led to a swift collapse. For the present, this inactivity in the west is wholly to the advantage of the Allies, since it gives them time to build up a military superiority through their superior reserves of manpower, of industrial capacity, of raw materials, and of foreign exchange. Germany's margin of supremacy in the air will have disappeared in a few months, if it has not already disappeared; and in another year her armies will be inferior in numbers and equipment to those of the Allies. Time is on our side, therefore, to the extent that every month of inactivity diminishes the possibility of Germany winning a decisive military victory. But it is a serious mistake to assume that inactivity in the west, in conjunction with the blockade, will be sufficient to win the war for the Allies. In a war . such as this there is no clear alternative be- , tween victory or defeat; the exhaustion of both sides and an agreement to suspend hostilities because there is no likelihood of their bringing any definite results is at least a possibility. Important as the blockade is, its potentialities should not be over-estimated. As long as the Balkan States, Russia, and Italy remain neutral it cannot be as complete as it was in 1914-18. Moreover, efforts to make it more efficient must .to Some extent be hindered by political considerations. There is already some evidence that, as in the early stages of the Great War, Italy's trade with Germany is not being seriously interfered with and that Germany's export trade with Japan is being allowed to continue. It is probably true, as the German Government claims, that, with the vast agricultural resources of the Balkan States and Russia to draw on, Germany cannot be starved into submission. In any case the purpose of the blockade is not so, much to inflict hardship on the German people as to create a shortage in. Germany of those raw materials, such as oil, rubber, manganese, magnesite, and iron, which are essential to the conduct of a war. Since the outbreak -of war, Germany's oil problem has been widely discussed; and th,e consensus of expert opinion seems to be that, assuming a continuance of supplies from Rumania and a fairly substantial increase in supplies from Russia, Germany can almost double her peacetime oil consumption. This seems to mean that, as long as the present subdued phase of the war continues, Germany will not be short of oil; and it may be suspected that the position is rmich the same for other essential commodities. That is, the blockade will be really .serious for„ Germany only if she is compelled to engage in intensive, large-scale military opera- ' tions. In the meantime, the German Governi ment has pinned its hopes on being able to I defeat the blockade by an economic alliance t-with Russia; and although it is clear that Russia ! cannot now make good Germany's deficiencies 'in raw materials owing to transport difficulties \ and the inefficiency of Russian industry, an intensive effort is already being made to remove [these obstacles. It is thus possible that in two [ or three years time Germany will be in a much rtietter position to withstand the blockade than \ she is now. On the other hand, the Allies will [in two or three years time have come within f sight of exhausting their resources of foreign exchange—Unless, as seems unlikely, the prohibition on borrowing in the United States is removed. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the Allies can win a decisive Victory only by building up an overwhelming military superiority and striking hard against Germany in 1941 or 1942. The British Government's decision to call up another 2,000,000 men suggests that it has accepted this conclusion.