THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22894, 15 December 1939, Page 10

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

An Approaching Crisis BASIS OF TRADE RELATIONS [By H. G. W. WOODHEAD, C.8.E.. Far Eastern Correspondent of “The Press."] November 16. The American-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911, which was denounced by the United States Government on July 26, 1939, will cease to operate on January 26, 1940. It is the fundamental trade treaty between the two Governments, and its abrogation will automatically annul all trading, navigation, and other rights that Japan has hitherto enjoyed in America, on the basis of most-favoured nation treatment. Both Governments will then be free to enforce discriminatory or penalising customs duties and other imposts, trade, shipping, and currency restrictions, embargoes, etc., against each other. And the naive assumption in some quarters in" Japan that by denouncing this treaty the United States was only paving the way for negotiating a new treaty on the basis of the recognition of Japan’s “New Order in East Asia” is entirely unwarranted, and likely, if persisted in, to result in a rude awakening during the next session of Congress. The influence of the Roosevelt Administration over the Legislature in the matter of foreign relations has recently been strikingly demonstrated by its victory in amending the Neutrality Act. A few days after the repeal of the Arms Embargo, Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who unquestionably voices the views of the Administration, openly declared his intention of introducing a resolution into Congress empowering President Roosevelt to declare an embargo against the shipment of vital war supplies and raw materials to Japan, unless Japanese-American relations had in the interval been placed upon a satisfactory basis. He doubted the possibility of this, and predicted that there would be no serious opposition to the resolution that he intended to introduce into Congress. Japanese reactions to this threat, like those to the recent outspoken address by the American Ambassador in Tokyo, have not' been reassuring. Most of the newspapers have adopted an increasingly truculent tone, and have even gone so far as to threatej to “refuse to protect American interests in China” if what are described as “examples of arrogant Americanism” continue. They again harp upon the time-worn and grotesque argument that America lacks understanding of Japan’s aims and policies in the Far East. Even the spokesman of the Foreign Office, the well-known Mr Suma, has adopted a minatory tone. So that on the surface, at any rate, there appears to be little prospect of the success of Japan’s professed attempt “to keep Japanese-American relations as tranquil as possible.” It is widely assumed that the United States is merely bluffing, and that she will be deflected from her oft-reiterated policy in China by threats to “rise up against the United States” and to seek closer relations with Soviet Russia. With the critical date so rapidly approaching it is rash to assume that America is bluffing. There is, in fact, cumulative evidence that the United States Government is preparing for a show-down in the Far East—not necessarily by force, .though this cannot be excluded, but by intensive economic and political pressure. The transfer of the American fleet to the Pacific, the reinforcement of America’s island possessions with warships, aircraft, and marines, and the huge naval expansion bill that is to be laid before the next session of Congress, are all straws pointing to the way the wind is blowing. And whatever the Japanese press may say, however truculent its tone, responsible Japanese statesmen cannot be under any delusion as to the consequences of the proposed embargo. Importance of United States In 1938 more than one-third of Japan’s imports came from, and more than one-sixth of her exports went to, the United States. Japan’s Pacific trade is incomparably more important that that in any other sphere, and the closing of the United States as the main source of supply of a number of vital commodities, and the most important market for Japanese experts, would have incalculable consequences upon the economic and financial fabric of Japan. It seems High, time for the Tokyo Government to' consider whether the anticipated but nebulous advantages of persisting in attempts to establish the so-called “New Order in East Asia” will not be more than offset by an economic war with the United States. If there is one thing that is certair it is that there is not the slightest prospect of a readjustment of Japanese-American treaty relations upon the basis of American recognition of the “New Order,” It is useless in the face of daily evidence of what it means to foreign business and financial interests in China to expect the American Government to believe that it will not permanently impair American rights and interests in this part of the world. Between now and January 26 the Japanese Government must decide whether it will persist in or relinquish a policy which the American Government and an overwhelming majority of the American people regard as illegal, hostile to legitimate American interests, and in flagrant violation of Japan’s treaty obligations. Closer economic relations with Soviet Russia, even if practicable, would in no way compensate for the paralysis of similar relations with America. A radically revised conception of the “New Order” is imperative if Japan wishes to avoid the threatened economic breach with the United States.