BRITAIN’S EFFORTS FOR PEACE

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22823, 23 September 1939, Page 14

BRITAIN’S EFFORTS FOR PEACE

Disclosures in White Paper STORMY INTERVIEW WITH HITLER (BRITISH OEFICIAI. WIRET.XSS.) (Received September 22, 12.35 p.m.) RUGBY, September 21. Britain’s efforts for peace and the between the British Ambassador to Berlin (Sir Nevile Henderson) and Herr, Hitler, are revealed in a White Paper of 200 pages entitled, “Documents - Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities, between Britain and Germany.” A section opens with the now famous letter which the .Prime Minister (Mr Chamberlain) addressed oh behalf of the British Government to Herr Hitler on August 22, after the news of the Soviet-German Non- • aggression Pact, and in which Mr Chamberlain again gave a clear statement of the British obligations to Poland, saying: “Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Britain’s obligations.” A telegram of August 22 from the British Ambassador, which is published for the first time, reveals that some difficulty was made about granting Sir Nevile an interview at Berchtesgaden to deliver the letter. Sir Nevile Henderson reported that Herr Hitler “was excitable and uncompromising;” His language was violent and exaggerated about both England and Poland- He began- by asserting that the Polish question would have been settled on <most generous terms but for England’s unwarranted support of Poland.

Sir Nevile Henderson’s telegram proceeded; “I drew attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our guarantee having been given on March 31 and the Polish reply on March 26. Herr Hitler retorted by saying that the Polish reply had been inspired by a British press campaign, which had invented a German- threat to Poland the week before. Germany had not moved for wafr any more than she had done during the similar fallacious press campaign about Czechoslavkia on May 20, 1938. “He then violently attacked the Poles and talked of 100,000 German refugees from Poland, excesses against Germans, the closing of German institutions, and Polish systematic persecution of German nationals generally. •

to fly to London to “put the case” to the British Government. The case, which included of friendship with Britain once the Polish question was solved, was contained in a verbal communication which, along with the first German reply and the subsequent exchanges with the two Governments, has already been published in the White Paper of September 1. The present White, Paper, however. contains a telegram from Sir Nevue Henderson describing an interview at which the German communication was handed to him. He reported that the Chancellor wag absolutely calm and normal and spoke with great earnestness and apparent sincerity. “The conversation lasted for an hour, my attitude being that the Russian Pact in .no way altered the standpoint of the British Government, and that. I must tell him quite honestly that Britain could not go back on her word to Poland, and that I knew his offer would not be considered unless it meant a negotiated settlement of the Polish question. ' “Herr Hitler refused to guarantee this, on the grounds that Polish provocation might at any moment render German intervention to protect German nationals inevitable, 1 again regretted this point, but I always got the same answer.” . Correspondence from Poland

“Herr Hitler’s next tirade was against British support of the Czechs and Poles. He asserted that the Czechs would have been independent to-day if England had not encouraged them in a policy hostile to Germany. He insinuated that the Poles would yield to-morrow if Britain ceased to encourage them to-day. He, followed this with a tirade-' against England, whose friendship he said he had sought for 20 years, only to see every Offer turned down with contempt.- The British press was also vehemently abused. “I contested every point, and kept calling his statements inaccurate, but the only effect was to launch him on some fresh tirade.” Reply to Warnings Most of the conversation was recrimination, according to , the Ambassador, At the end, “Herr Hitler observed, irt reply to my repeated warnings that action by Germany would mean war, that Germany had nothing to lose and Britain much, that he did not desire war, but that he would not shrink from it if it was necessary, and that his peoples were much more behind him than last September. “I replied that I hoped, and was convinced, that some solution was still possible without war, and asked why contact with the Poles could not be renewed.

In the meantime, in view of the increasing tension in Danzig following the appointment of Herr Albert Foerster as head of the Free City, the Polish, Foreign-Minister’(Colonel Beck) told the British Ambassador to Warsaw (Sir Howard Kennard) th£lt he considered the situation most grave. In a telegram Sir Howard Kennard added: “Colonel Beck has, as requested, instructed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin to seek an im-„ mediate interview with the State Secretary, and unless he found the attitude of Herr von Weizacker unsatisfactory, he would attempt, to examine all the points at issue with a view, to ascertaining whether anything can be done to relieve the present tension.” A later telegram on the same day from Sir Howard Kennard reads: “The Foreign Minister • informs me that the Polish Ambassador to Berlin had an interview with Field-Marshal Goering in the afternoon. The interview was most cordial' and, he told hie that Fieldmarshal Goering expressed regret that his policy of maintaining friendly relations with Poland should come to nought, and he admitted that he no longer had the influence to do much in the matter. “Significant Remark” “Field-Marshal Goering had, however, no concrete suggestion to make beyond what had struck Colonel Beck as a most significant remark, which he has requested .me to convey to you moht confidentially. Field-Marshal Goering stated that the questions of Danzig and so forth were relatively;, small matters,, but the main obstacle to any diminution in the tension between the two countries was Poland's alliance , with Britain.” Sir Howard Kennard’s telegram proceeds:—“ Colonel Beck has consulted the President, M. ,Moscicki, and Marshal Smigly-Rydz, and it has been decided that if the German Government should put forward the suggestion in any other way the answer could be categorically in the negative, as Colonel Beck feels that Germany may make every, effort to secure a free hand in Eastern .Europe by such methods, arid he feels that it should be clearly understood that Poland will not be drawn into an intrigue of this" nature.” The telegram adds that Germany was informed that Britain’s clear view, was that direct discussion on equal terms between the parties was the proper means of negotiation. ■ “Poland enjoys the protection of the Ahglo-Polish Treaty. Britain has already made plain, and is repeating in a reply to Herr Hitler today, that any settlement of GermanPolish differences must safeguard Poland’s essential interests and must be secured by an international guarantee. We have, of course, seen reports of Herr, Hitler’s reply to M. Daladier, but We should not consider an intimation by Poland or*her readiness to hold direct discussions as in any way implying acceptance of Herr Hitler’s demands which would, as is made plain above, have to be examined in the light of the principles we have stated.” A significant document is a-long telegram from Berlin reporting the interview at which Sir Nevile Henderson delivered the reply , of the British Cabinet. Sir Nevile- Henderson reiterated Britain’s readiness to reach an understanding—“it was now or never, and it ref ted with 1 Herr Hitler.” I

/“Herr Hitler’s retort was that as long as England gave Poland a blank cheque, Polish unreasonableness would render any negotiation impossible.

denied, the giving of a. blank cheque, but this only started Herr Hitler off again.”

Herr Hitler was calmer at the second talk, it was reported in a telegram the next day, but no less uncompromising. He put the whole responsibility for war on ’ Britain and maintained that Britain was determined to destroy and exterminate Germany. He was, he said, 50 years old. He preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60. Herr Hitler said, “England was .fighting for th 6 lesser races, whereas he was fighting only for Germany.” “Could Never Agree”

'When the German Chancellor spoke several times of the rejection of his offers of friendship by England, Sir Nevile Henderson referred to Mr Chamberlain’s efforts for peace and friendship with. Germany. “He said he believed in Mr Chamberlain’s goodwill at the time, but, and especially since the encirclement efforts of the last few months, he did so no longer,” Sir Nevile reported. “I pointed out the fallacy of this view, but his answer was that he was now finally convinced of the rightness of the views held by him and others, that England and Germany could never agree. “In referring to the Russian nonaggression pact,' he observed, that it was England which had forced him into the agreement with Russia. He ,did not seem enthusiastic ■ over it, but added that once he had made the agreement it would be for a long period. The text of the' agreement sighed, tp-day confirms this, and I shall be surprised if it is not supplemented later by something more ;thmi'mere non-aggression. '“1 took the line-at the end that war seemed to be' quite inevitable iif Herr Hitler persisted in direct iaction against Poland, and expressed iregyet at .the .failure of my mission !ih~ general to Berlin and my visit to him. Herr Hitler’s attitude was that if ’was England’s-fault, and nothing short'of a complete change in !her policy towards.-Germany could now ever convince him of the ; British desire for good relations.” Pact With Soviet V The first German reply to- Mr Chamberlain’s letter was given on August 23, the day of the signature of the. German-Soviet Pact, and on August 25 Herr Hitler sent for Sir Nevile Henderson and asked him