THE RED ARMY

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22823, 23 September 1939, Page 12

THE RED ARMY

Strength of a Giant Force rS EFFICIENCY AND OBJECTIVE ANALYSED ~~ ” -T^ [Published by Arrangement with “The Times.”] The strength of the Red Army is discussed in this article, which examines its efficiency in the light of its probable objectives in eastern Europe.

The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, under Marshal Voroshilov’s command, is a formidable fighting force. In numbers it approaches the 2,000,000 mark in peace >ime, being composed of over 100 infantry divisions and at least 30 cavalry divisions. This large force of cavalry is of particular utility in. a country which is not well equipped with railways and roads, and of which large regions on the Asiatic frontiers consist of steppes, desert, and mountain. On the completion of mobilisation some 4,000,000 men would be-under arms. There is compulsory military service for two years, which gives the country a reserve of. trained men amounting to something like 12,000,000. Russia thus has no lack of man-power for any campaign she might wish to undertake. The latest expert information shows that the army is well equipped with the most modern weapons. The rank and file are acknowledged to be excellent fighting men, extremely brave, hardy, enthusiastic, and well instructed. A tradition of German training has produced non-commissioned officers whose qualities of thoroughness are accompanied by a certain lack of initiative, and reluctance to take responsibility is a defect that becomes more pronounced the higher the rank. This is partly the effect of the “purge,” which a year or two ago reduced the efficiency, while it presumably strengthened the loyalty, of the fighting forces. It is perpetuated to some extent by the system of associating a political commissar with the commander of each unit, but this appears more unpractical to western than it does to Russian minds. • . Keen Commanders The highest ranks largely consist of new men, who make up in keenness what they lack in experience, and the “purge” is how sufficiently far past for its effect to be wearing -off. The anny has, at any rate, had continuity of command under Marshal Voroshilov, whose close association with the undisputed leader of the nation dates from their exploits in the civil wars. The Chief of Staff. Army Commander Shaposhnikov, is another old campaigner who commanded a regiment under the Tsar.

History has shown that this great force is more effective in defence than in attack. Communications in Russia are not what they are in Western Europe, and rapidity of manoeuvre in the highly complex conditions of modern war is not to be expected. . In defence of its own soil the arfiiy would undoubtedly be extremely formidable, the more so as scarcity of communications be a worse hindrance to an invader than to the defender, as the Japanese are finding; The Russian army has shown, however, that it is capable of making a sudden effort which can

seriously disconcert the most powerful enemy, and that it is also capable’of undertaking offensive operations, on a limited scale against a weak adversary.

Sources of Strength Compared with 25 years ago the military strength of the country has increased. The rank and file are no longer illiterate. Factories have sprung up all over Soviet Russia, which now manufactures weapons, munitions, and supplies of all kinds for which Tsarist Russia , was dependent on her Western allies. Here again quantity is to some ... extent handicapped by insufficiency of transport As regards one prime necessity of modern warfare Russia is per-, haps better placed than any - other *' Power except the United States; she is sure of petrol. Besides the world- - famous Baku oilfields there is the important oil region between the Volga- ■ arid the Urals known as the “second Baku,” which already produces 6000 tons of petroleum daily, and two near neighbours, Iran] and Itaq, are at hand' with further huge supplies. The fashion of building strong cqn-.' • Crete underground defence lines has not been neglected. All the important' 2 points On the western frontiers * are -J? thus protected, and yin the Far’ Bast.; the more vital spots also have those lines. ‘

Military Objectives ' ■ ; On the western frontier the tasks ', and objectives of the Russian army are >• various. Starting from the north there is the great industrial city and port of *j., Leningrad to’ be protected in case any of the eastern Baltic States were likely to become the base of a hostile attack. The same applies to Murmansk, the Arctic harbour, in the norjh-west. . •.£ Then there are the other Baltic r States and the Polish frontier tobewatched, * and. lastly, it might be a Rushan oh- ” .* jective to attack, or help defend,- the - Rumanian oil wells. Anglo-French co-operationwithßus-' : sian activities. iri Europe might have .. been effected, either by the Bosporus, . or by Murmansk, or by air. One of the, obstacles to co-operation, and now ■“ to invasion, is the difference of gauge, between the Russian and Polish railways, but this can,'if necessary* be surmounted. It is thought that' any V; attack on Russia would most likely take a northerly direction- It is re- - garded as'significant that this year’s ~ army manoeuvres were to have been held in the Leningrad area; as it is generally believed that any serious threat to the independence of Estonia or Latvia, would bring the Russianarmy over their frontiers:. that Russian 'Pressure 5 - has already been brought to Rear-bn ~ these States on the pretext thatvthey. :■ --- gave shelter to Polish submarines, and .r therefore contravened the conditions ...'t: cf neutrality. ■