The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1939. A New White Paper

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22823, 23 September 1939, Page 12

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1939. A New White Paper

The White Paper of September 1, which reproduced salient documents in the diplomatic exchanges just before the outbreak of war, has been succeeded by one in which the documentary evidence is extended to 200 pages. The wirelessed extracts can of course only imperfectly illustrate its importance. The sequence and connexion of events do not clearly appear; and references to entirely new evidence are few, though fairly full. Broadly, the new evidence seems to be valuable chiefly as it corroborates and illuminates what was already sufficiently clear. For example, it is interesting to note that, although every delay increased the tension and its risks. Sir Nevile Henderson did not easily gain access to Herr Hitler to deliver a message of crucial importance from Mr Chamberlain. It is as interesting to note, also, that when he was received he found Herr Hitler in an excited mood, which he expressed in “ violent and exaggerated ” attacks on England and Poland. It does not seem that Sir Nevile was given any opportunity for reasonable discussion; he was tied to the unprofitable task of checking and contesting Herr Hitler’s inaccurr.te charges. All this is as distressing as 'it is astonishing to read; but it is, not without its significance. It points directly to two of the underlying facts of the long negotiation. Herr Hitler did not sincerely desire or seek a negotiated settlement; and a dictator loses, as he advances, any aptitude he may have had for rational negotiation. A second point of great interest appears in the nature of the German reaction to the British guarantee to Poland. From the British point of view, the guarantee was essentially intended to insure Poland’s independence and integrity, to provide for settlement of the Danzig and corridor issues by just and proper processes, and to secure international guarantees for such a settlement. As much was said repeatedly by Mr Chamberlain and- Lord Halifax, in Parliament, and communicated to the German Government. These were the limits of an intention in no way unfriendly or hostile to Germany. The WhitePaper shows that Herr Hitler resentfully interpreted the guarantee as proof of inveterate British hostility to Germany—a “proof” demonstrably ludicrous on many grounds. Among them is the fact adduced by Herr Hitler himselff. that - Britain has “ much to lose.” British statesmanship is neither so desperate nor so dull as to risk,an Empire in the effort to “destroy and exterminate” Germany, with no motive but the hope of that bitter success. The Whi'.e Paper shows, further, that the effect of the guarantee was to change the German view of the Polish question. Poland and “ the “ questions of Danzig and so forth ” ceased to be central in the situation, which was dominated thenceforth by “ Poland’s alliance with “ Britain.” Field-Marshal Goering is not a statesman; but when he put this point to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, he undoubtedly opened a window on Nazi policy. Whether Herr Hitler and his colleagues genuinely believed in their “ encirclement ” theory or not may fce disputable. It is always difficult' to decide at what point Herr Hitler shifts from belief to self-deception and from self-deception to sheer pretence. But the certain fact ; is that Nazi strategy, in regard to Poland, was suddenly faced by the fact, and recognised the fact, .that it was ho longer possible to coerce Poland into a settlement, “ negotiated ” under threat of war or forced by military action. The British and French, guarantee signified that Germany must choose'between a justly arbitrated settlement and q European war. The previous White Paper, which has been printed as a Parliamentary paper in New Zealand, shows very plainly that Herr Hitler had never intended to take the. first course. He insisted that the British guarantee emboldened the Poles in refusing to negotiate, in military, preparations, and in out T rages against the German minorities. (It may be observed that he waited until war had broken out before calling for an international ccmmissiqn to examine the evidence for these outrages!) He crudely attempted to buy off British support of Poland by promising “to “ approach England, once more with a large, “ comprehensive offer ” of friendship and agreement, ‘ after the solution ” of the Danzig and corridor problems in his own way. When the British Government insisted that “everything “ turned on the nature of the settlement and “ the method by which it was to be reached ” questions on : which' Herr Hitler nad been “ silent ”—his reply was a subterfuge. He accepted the principle, of negotiation* on* terms that made negotiation impossible. A Polish plenipotentiary was to reach Berlin, next day, to hear Germany’s proposals and “toconduct “ and conclude ’’ ‘negotiations, there and then. The, impossible was not'performed. Herr Hitler pretended to assume that a final and honourable offer had been rejected, and launched his troops across the Polish frontier. A . great nation has seldom if ever been betrayed by its leaders into so shameful a use of force. t