The Press MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1939. Polish Independence Guaranteed

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22676, 3 April 1939, Page 8

The Press MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1939. Polish Independence Guaranteed

Almost on the anniversary of its refusal to guarantee the independence of/Czechoslovakia, the Britjsh Government has decided to guarantee the independence of Poland. Its refusal to guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia was influenced by two sets of causes. In the first place, there was the deep-seated prejudice of a large section of the British people, in the Dominions as well as in the United Kingdom, against the assumption of further European commitments. British parr ticipation in a war to save Czechoslovakia would, it was assumed, be an expensive piece of altruism; common sense dictated that Great Britain’s armed strength should be reserved for the defence of “ vital British interests.” Less openly, it was contended that the more Germany ' involved herself in expansionist schemes in eastern and south-eastern Europe, the less likely she would be to run foul of Great Britain, In the second place,'the refusal to guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia was influenced by the ideas and the personality of .Mr Neville Chamberlain, who, from the time he became Prime Minister, was in effect Foreign Secretary. Mr Chamberlain brought to the direction of British foreign policy a shrewd, unimaginative, dogged, and superficially realistic mind, as much in conflict with the traditionalism of the Foreign Office as with the evangelising fervour of the League of Nations Union. As his speeches and statements show, his plan was to restore equilibrium in Europe through a four-Power concert; and he believed sincerely in his own ability to bring about the Anglo-German accord which was the essential preliminary tc a four-Power concert. Thus, the Czech crisis, which to already-disillusioned supporters of the League ideal portended another. triumph of force over justice and to the Foreign Office a dangerous disturbance of the balance of power, w.as to Mr Chamberlain his supreme opportunity to bring about a general reconciliation. For perhaps a week after Munich he and perhaps a majority of his countrymen believed that the grand design had become a reality. Subsequent events havg shown that the common sense which made the British people and the British Government unwilling to guarantee Czechoslovakia’s frontiers was not com- .on sense at all but a failure to grasp the hard realities of European politics. The surrender of the Bohemian mountains and the Czech fortifications to Germany was the destruction of one of the main props of the European system. Moreover, it is now realised that Germany’s advance eastwards, far from being an assurance that she will not become troublesome in the west, is a direct threat to the security of France and therefore of Great Britain. Events have also shown that at almost every point in the Czech- crisis Mr Chamberlain was misled or outmanoeuvred by men who had abandoned every moral scruple in their determination to reach their objective. The decision to guarantee the frontiers of Poland means that the British and French Governments are now making desperate efforts to shore up the remnants of a structure, part of which is already in ruins. As far as Great Britain is concerned, , the decision does not arise in any new-found solicitude for the rights of small nations nor yet in any admiration for the wisdom or the honesty of the present Polish Government. "What has happened is simply that British policy has once more grounded itself on the axiom that Great Britain is in danger when any Power begins to establish for itself an absolute domination over the European continent. Tt is the Foreign Office, and hot the League of Nations Union, which has come back into favqur.

The dangers of this sudden chaqge of direction in British policy are- as obvious as its ironies. If Great Britain had guaranteed the frontiers, of Czechoslovakia after the anschluss, she would, in the event of war, have been able, to count on the support of: every State in eastern Europe and the Balkans, except Hungary; to-day, she is without a single certain ally. Unfortunately, too, Great Britain has been forced into. guaranteeing a State which, by its internal misgovernment and its incorrigible shiftiness in foreign policy, has done much to weaken the status quo in eastern Europe. Polish society is split horizontally by violent class antagonisms and vertically by racial and national divisions; and the erratic ( course of Polish diplomacy is perhaps an inevitable product of these internal stresses. It is true that' the British Government has made every effort to minimise the risks. Its guarantee operates only for the duration of “certain consultations. “ which are now proceeding with other goverh“ments.” In spite of statements to the contrary, this can only mean that the British Government has good reason to believe that Poland is under, an immediate threat of force. It should also be noted that Great Britain is not' committed to defend in all circumstances the existing frontiers of Poland, which are in places irrational and unjust. She is committed to oppose by armed force any action which “ clearly threatens Polish independence ” and which the Polish Government “ considers it “ vital to resist with its national forces.” Poland is not protected, nor can she be protected by any system of pacts or guarantees, against the disintegrating effect of German propaganda among her minorities, which constitute probably two-fifths of her total population. The Polish Government can. if it wishes decide that the wiser course lies in coming to terms with Germany; it has, however, been told that, if it meets force with force, it will have British and French support. The difficulty about these implicit reservations and refinements of meaning is that in the heat of a crisis they would inevitably became meaningless. War, if it comes, will come so swiftly that none of the Governments involved will have time to weigh niceties.

It is, of course, too early to judge the wisdom or otherwise of this abrupt reversal of Britisn policy, since Mr Chamberlain’s speech has explained very little. The actual nature of the guarantee, the immediate circumstances which

gave rise to it, and the scope and purpose of the discussions now in progress are still in the main obscure. There is, however, some reason to suppose that the announcement of the guarantee has relaxed rather than intensified the tension in Europe. In the past, the success of the dictatorships has been due largely to the widespread fear of war and the consequent unwillingness of democratic governments to incur the risk of war. Yet it is probably true that the dictatorships have more reason to fear war than the democracies have. If that is a correct reading of the.situation, then the pledge to support Poland does not involve as great a risk as at first appears. In the long run, however, the success of the new course on which Great Britain has embarked will be determined by the extent to which the British people and the British Government have understood .the lessons of the last few years. The most important of those lessons is that “vital British “ interests ” are not particular but general, and consist not in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of some half-dozen countries of strategic importance to the Empire but in the maintenance of what Mr Cordell Hull has called “ orderly processes of international “ relations.” Europe, is at the moment in political chaos because the fate of Czechoslovakia has convinced every small State that Great Britain and France are incapable of offering any real opposition to Germany and that therefore their only course is to come to terms with Germany. Once Great Britain succeeds in making clear beyond the possibility of doubt her determination to resist alteration of the status quo by force, she will not lack allies, either in the old world or in the new. But the task of re-establishing confidence in her intentions and her ability to carry them out will not be easy.