The Press THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1939. Madrid Falls

Press, Volume LXXV, Issue 22673, 30 March 1939, Page 10

The Press THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1939. Madrid Falls

The fall of Madrid brings to an end the bitterest and most destructive civil war in modern history and one of the most lamentable chapters in European diplomacy. As yet, no assessment of the destruction is possible, it is an indication of the spirit in which the conflict has been waged that neither side has attempted to keep accurate casualty lists; but most foreign observers are agreed that deaths in the actual fighting and in the air bombardments of the civilian population total more than 1,000,000. For at least a year, moreover, the blockade of the Republican ports has imposed hardships upon the population of Catalonia and the Madrid area which must affect the national physique for at least a generation. In the west, in the north, and to a less extent in the south, agriculture, because it is for the most part rudimentary, has recovered relatively quickly from the effects of war. But secondary industry, particularly in Catalonia, is for the time being crippled and will revive slowly. Even before the war, Spain was a poor country, needing capital for the improvement of agriculture and communications and for industrial development. After two years and eight months of fighting, what remains is the wreckage of a nation, condemned for at least half a century to a position of inferiority in Europe.

But it is not Spain alone that has been damaged by the civil war. The whole fabric of European civilisation has been weakened. Whatever confusion of issues may have confronted the Spanish people in July, 1936, when the revolt began, whatever opinion foreigners may have had of the then Spanish Government, the issue which confronted the other governments of Europe in the first months of the war was plain. It was whether the Spanish people were to be allowed to settle their own differences or whether foreign governments were to be allowed to intervene and settle it for them. Recognition of the right of a nation to settle its own domestic problems is ar essential condition of the peaceful existence of a community of States. Knowing this, and knowing also that foreign interference might convert the Spanish war into a European war, the British and the French Governments secured the signature of every important European State to an agreement not to assist either side in Spain with munitions or troops. To do this was technically to deprive the Spanish Government of its legal rights, a step which might have been justified had the Powers responsible for the agreement also made themselves responsible for its enforcement. From the first, however, Italy and Germany dishonoured their signatures to this agreement and supplied General Franco with troops, equipment, and munitions which in the end brought him victory. The supplies which later in the war reached the Loyalist forces from Russia by devious routes were quite inadequate to redress the balance. Faced with the breakdown of the Non-Intervention Agreement, Great Britain and France abandoned justice in the name of expediency. Even the patent fact that the German and Italian campaign in Spain was undertaken for the sole purpose of weakening British and French interests in the western Mediterranean could not bring them to face the issue which had been raised; Mr Chamberlain continued to predict optimistically that when the war was over General Franco would be so much in need of the resources of the City of London that he would be as well disposed towards Great Britain as towards the axis Powers. The final ignominy has been the attempt of the British and French Governments to assist General Franco to liquidate by peaceful means Republican resistance in the Balearics and Central Spain. Their reward has been a series of studied insults, culminating in Senor Suner’s devastating gibe.

Spain will not forget the behaviour of the democracies, which tried to compel the Reds to surrender in exchange for assurances regarding Spain’s political futur^.

It is, of course, mistaken and unfair to lay the blame on Mr Chamberlain and his Government. British policy in Spain was tested in dozens of by-elections and, if it was not enthusiastically endorsed, at least there was no sign of a swing away from it. Responsibility for the Spanish tragedy lies primarily with the British nation and not with its political leaders.