ENGLAND AFTER MUNICH

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22597, 30 December 1938, Page 8

ENGLAND AFTER MUNICH

“ Atmosphere of Make Believe ”

SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN’3 VIEW

Craosi OCE OWS COHRJSSPONDBNT.) LONDON, December 5. An “atmosphere of mingled make believe and defeatism” on foreign policy is discerned in England by Sir Alfred Zimmern since his return from New Zealand and Australia. Writing to the “Daily Telegraph,” as one who was in the Dominions during the recent crisis, he says: “The Munich negotiation, whatever we may think of the events that led up to it and of its accompanying details, involved a choice between considerations of humanity—the averting of bloodshed here and in Czechoslovakia, and a severe diplomatic defeat, carrying with it the establishment, for the time being, of a German hegemony in Europe. “No one who was not in England at the time has a right to criticise the decision taken, and certainly in Australia there was a general desire to stifle misgivings and to put the best interpretation on what had taken place. “All the more disturbing is it, on returning, to find that, while the temporary eclipse of our influence on the Continent has been made the occasion for an orgy of savagery, members of the Government and even of the National Labour group are acclaiming the Munich Agreement at by-elections as the inauguration of an era of good feeling between ourselves and Germany, and denouncing opposition to further negotiations as the outcome of ‘prejudice.’ At the same time responsible people are heard lamenting over our decline from the position of a first-class Power.

“This atmosphere of mingled make believe and defeatism is intolerable and corrupting. British citizens at home and overseas can judge Herr Hitler by his record of violence and broken pledges without heed to the accusation of prejudice. But they have the right to know the truth —the truth about Europe, the truth about the state of our armaments, the truth about the danger to our own liberties through outside pressure. They have never wilted under the impact of truth in the past and they will not do so to-day.

“Moreover, I am convinced that, as in 1917, which the present situation in some ways resembles, the defeatists greatly under-estimate our own strength, both moral and material, the store of goodwill and of energy—what may be called in military language of ‘moral potential’ —here and overseas, is inexhaustible; and in the kind of conflict with which w.e are faced, where civilian morale counts for so much, this is of prime importance. But how can these be set in motion by a Government which, while events are moving at breakneck speed, is still thinking in terms of Christmas shopping? “For these reasons, I welcome the recent speech of Mr Eden, with its insistence on the close connexion between the effort required of us in this emergency and a bold long-term social policy. Great sacrifices will be required of us if we are to maintain our political position in the wcrld and recover our moral authority. They will fall on all sections of the community, but principally on those best able to bear them.

“The England that will emerge from the present conflict—a conflict of wills that need not necessarily develop into a conflict of weapons—will be a new and much more democratic England; and it is only an England of that type and temper that can remain in the heart of the twentieth century British Commonwealth. That is the strongest conviction with which I return from Australia and New Zealand. “But this is to look to the future. For the moment what is needed—what would indeed transform the international situation—is a Government capable of rallying the whole power °* th e nation. For, in spite of Munich, it is still for London to give the lead.”