The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 1938. Britain and France Draw Together

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22418, 3 June 1938, Page 12

The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 1938. Britain and France Draw Together

A month ago the French Prime Minister, M. Daladier, and his Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, arrived in London to discuss with Mr Chamberlain and Lord Halifax (so the official communique said) the recently concluded agreement between Great Britain and Italy and the situation in Spain. The discussions lasted for only seven hours; and at their conclusion it was announced that France had approved the Anglo-Italian agreement, that Great Britain hoped France would conclude a similar agreement with Italy, that Anglo-French staff talks would continue, that Great Britain and France were “in general agreement ’* over Central Europe, and that “ Britain and France are “ bound to one another by a close community “of interests.” The press of Great Britain and the Dominions accepted this unexciting version of what had occurred, though a reprovinf reference in a British Official Wireless message published in New Zealand newspapers to “ill- “ informed commentary ” and “ exaggerated “ reports ” was a hint that the press of other countries had not observed a similar restraint. The significance of the hint is revealed by American newspapers to hand by the latest mail. The “ New York Times,” for instance, announced on April 29, in a three-column headline on its front page, “Britain and France “Agree on a Defensive Alliance; Unified Com“mands in War.” According to the London correspondent of this paper, “ the principle of “ a unified command, which took three and a “ half years to be accepted in the stress of the “last World War, will be brought into instant “ operation in the next. A French general will “ command the combined armies of the two " countries, a British admiral will direct the “ allied navies, and a British air force officer “will have charge of the combined air forces “ from the moment an attack on either country “is launched.” Substantially the same assertion is made by most of the other American correspondents of standing; and it is also agreed that Great Britain and France have undertaken to begin pooling their purchases of supplies, including not only aircraft from the United States but essential war materials of all kinds. Reserve stores, it is asserted, will be set up on French soil immediately so as to minimise the transport difficulty on the outbreak of war. With the assistance of British credits, France is to buy as much material as possible in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Hungary, the purpose of this being partly to make it more difficult for Germany to obtain supplies and partly to strengthen these countries against German influence. The application of this policy to Czechoslovakia is considered to be particularly important, since there is already evidence that Germany regards economic pressure as her main weapon against Czechoslovakia. “AH these unpre- “ cedented British guarantees,• to France were “ given,” says the “ New York Times ” correspondent, “ at the price of French acquiescence “in almost every aspect of British “ foreign policy. On Italy, on Spain, and in“deed on almost every point of possible disagreement the British and French Govern- “ ments now see eye to eye. Even on Czecho- “ Slovakia the French showed signs of being “willing to limit their commitments.” Among French concessions to the British point of view in foreign policy was an undertaking (so it-was said) to reclose the French frontier with Spain; and the fact that the frontier has been closed shows that on at least one important point American versions of the results of the discussions are reliable. How much truth there is in the other assertions it would be difficult to say. It may be suspected, however, that the British official communiques gave substantially less than the whole truth and that the errors in the American accounts are errors of emphasis and perspective rather than of fact. For instance, reports of schemes for unified control of British and French fighting forces and for the pooling of materials and, equipment seem less sensational when it is recalled that the army staffs of the two countries began discussions in the spring of 1936 and the naval staffs as long ago as 1935, Indeed, it would be surprising, in view of the lessons of the Great War, if these staff discussions had not led to schemes such as M. Daladier and Mr Chamberlain are said to have sanctioned. Moreover, the publicity given in the last year or two to the Ber-lin-Rome axis seems to have obscured the fact that no two countries in Europe have closer community of interest than Great Britain and France. What must be regretted is that this community of interest has not, in the last decade or so, led to closer co-operation in the positive task of building up a European security system. All the diplomatic victories of the period since the Abyssinian crisis have goqe to Germany and Italy, not because these Powers , are together stronger than Great Britain and France, but because their governments, freed from the restraints of democratic control and the uncertainties of party politics, have worked together in almost perfect understanding. That Great Britain and France should now be working together harmoniously only because their security is directly and immediately threatened is a depressing commentary on the weakness of representative government in foreign policy.